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ABSTRACT 
 A necessary precursor to irrigated agriculture in southern Alberta is the availability 
of massive quantities of water.  Many suggest that water demand will rise substantially in 
the decades to come.  These projections also come at a time of increasing environmental 
awareness in Alberta, leading some to advocate that more water should be secured for 
environmental purposes.  The Alberta government enabled inter-sectoral water transfers as 
a way to re-allocate water in order to satisfy growing demand.  This has raised skepticism 
among the irrigation community over the use of water transfers as a way to satisfy future 
demand. The research presented in this thesis approaches this issue by examining the 
factors that influence irrigators’ perceptions towards using water transfers as a way to re-
allocate water to other uses.  The findings reveal that if the government is relying on water 
transfers as the primary way to re-allocate water in the future, it must address irrigators’ 
skepticism, and create conditions that promote transfers as a preferable option. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 With the closure of the South Saskatchewan River Basin for new license 
applications in 2006, water users have braced for the reality that new demand must be met 
by existing supply.  The Alberta government has responded to this by allowing license 
holders to ‘trade’ or transfer some or all of their licensed allocations.  Since most of the 
SSRB’s water allocation is tied up with irrigation uses, it is expected that this will be a 
major source of water that will be re-allocated for environmental purposes and to satisfy the 
demand for new consumptive uses.  Studies in the region have indicated a negative 
responses by many in the irrigation community towards the use of water markets to re-
allocate water (Bjornlund et al, 2007; Nicol et al, 2008).  Since the future prosperity and 
well-being of Albertans depends on finding ways of sharing the existing finite water 
resources, and irrigators have some of the most senior licenses with the largest allocations, 
it is important to understand irrigators’ perceptions towards the current transfer system.  
This research intends to address irrigators’ perceptions towards water transfers by: i) 
identifying the intentions of irrigators to trade or transfer water and the factors that 
influence those intentions; and ii) identifying irrigators’ acceptance of policies to share 
water with other users including the environment. 
1.1 Problem Context 
The decision to farm the semi-arid expanses of southern Alberta was based on 
optimistic hopes over the region’s water.  In 1857 John Palliser led the British North 
American Exploring Expedition to conduct a survey of what was then Rupert’s Land in 
order to find a possible route for the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR).  In 1863 upon 
reporting his findings to the British parliament he identified a triangular shaped area 
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between the US border and 52° N; and 100° to 114° W that he deemed unfit for agriculture.  
Since then that area has been named “Palliser’s Triangle” (Marchildon et al, 2009).  He 
recommended settlement further north along the mixed grasslands and parklands (Figure 
1.1).   
In the 1870s, a period of above average precipitation, John Macoun accompanied 
Sir Sandord Fleming’s survey expeditions of the prairies as a field naturalist.  He would 
later lecture on the agricultural possibilities in Palliser’s triangle.  The Dominion 
government, along with the CPR, used Macoun’s findings as rationale for their ambitions to 
settle the region with farmers by building the main CPR line through Palliser’s Triangle. 
Palliser’s Triangle presently encompasses the largest expanse of agricultural land in Canada 
(Marchildon et al, 2009: 32).   
 After the construction of the CPR line there was a push by the government and 
private investors to expand agriculture in the region (Marchildon et al, 2009).  In order to 
facilitate this, the Dominion government passed several pieces of legislation including the 
Northwest Irrigation Act in 1894.  This act altered traditional riparian water law, which 
exclusively attached the right to use water with land ownership, and granted control of 
water to the federal crown.  The Crown granted large diversions of water to what would 
become irrigation uses.  In 1900 large scale irrigation was underway with the completion of 
a 184 kilometer canal from the St. Mary River to land near Lethbridge to deliver water for 
agricultural purposes.  In 1903 the CPR constructed a weir on the Bow River near Calgary 
and a canal system to bring water to 80,000 hectares of farmland (IWMSC, 2002).  In 1909 
construction began on a diversion structure near Bassano and a canal system to irrigate 
roughly 160,000 acres near Brooks in the heart of Palliser’s Triangle (IWMSC, 2002).  
Since then Canada’s most extensive irrigation system was built in the South Saskatchewan 
River Basin (SSRB) providing water for roughly 600,000 hectares of land (IWMSC, 2002).  
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Licenses for irrigation now account for 77% of all water allocations in the SSRB (AMEC, 
2009).   
 
Figure 1.1 – Palliser’s Triangle and Prairie Eco-Regions 
(Marchildon et al, 2009: 2) 
 
 Many in the SSRB are now concerned that surface water in the basin is being over 
allocated, and are concerned that the present supply may not be enough to satisfy demand 
during times of drought (Christensen and Droitsch, 2008). This fear comes from projected 
growth in water demand that is expected from a rapidly growing population and increased 
demand from industrial and municipal users.  A 2005 report by Alberta Environment 
projected that the population of the SSRB is expected to grow more than 2 million by 2021, 
and that demand from non-irrigation uses could increase 67% by 2021.  By 2046, demand 
from non-irrigation uses may rise by 52-136% (Alberta Environment, 2005).  These 
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projections come at a time of increasing environmental concerns regarding water quality 
and eco-system degradation due to low flows (Christensen and Droitsch, 2008).  
Considering these projections, in 2006 Alberta Environment stopped accepting applications 
for new water licenses in the Bow, Oldman, and South Saskatchewan River sub-basins 
(Figure 1.2).  This means that existing licensed allocations must meet a rapidly growing 
demand for water in the SSRB.   
In response to these concerns, the Alberta government released its Water for Life 
Strategy (WFL) in 2003.  The WFL calls for a 30% increase water use productivity and 
efficiency over the 2005 levels by 2015.  It is assumed that this water can be “freed” up 
from existing use and can then be transferred to satisfy new demand for environmental 
purposes via water conservation objectives (WCOs), and to other consumptive uses via 
water transfers.  The current legislation gives license holders a large degree of agency in 
deciding whether or not to transfer all or a part of their licensed allocations. Since water for 
irrigation accounts for roughly 77% of the SSRB’s water allocation, it is expected that this 
water will be a major source of water to meet future demand through market re-allocation.   
The Water Act of 1999 allows license holders to “share” water via assignment 
agreements (Section 33), and to transfer licensed water allocations (Section 81) in order to 
satisfy demand with existing supply.  License holders have the ability to trade water, or to 
sell some or part of their licensed volumes for financial compensation.  Typically only 
transfers of users within the same sector have taken place, usually farmer to farmer (Levine 
et al., 2007: 221).  Participation in the transfer of permanent and long term licensed 
allocations has been low in southern Alberta, in part because irrigators have expressed 
skepticism towards transferring, or trading, water as a means for permanent re-allocation 
(Nicol & Klein, 2006; Bjornlund et al, 2007).  A common sentiment expressed is that 
permanent transfers are too final, and may threaten the long term supply of current license 
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holders (Bjornlund et al, 2007).  A 2006 study analysing responses from irrigation district 
managers and board members indicated a strong sense of skepticism in the irrigation 
community over the use of water transfers (Bjornlund et al, 2007).  According to the study, 
only 8% agreed with the use of water transfers (Bjornlund et al., 2007).  This raises 
concerns of the effectiveness of water transfers as a means to re-allocate water to meet new 
demand.   
 
Figure 1.2 – South Saskatchewan River Basin of Alberta 
(Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development, 2014) 
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Several other studies suggest that the decision to transfer water is based on 
overriding social, cultural and economic factors (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Bauer, 
1997; Solanes and Gonzales-Villarreal, 1999; Johansson et al, 2002; Levine et al, 2007; 
Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Bjornlund, 2010).  This compliments research suggesting a diversity 
of motives and objectives that generally affect farmers’ decision making (Gasson, 1973; 
Gasson, 1974; Austin et al, 1996; Vanclay et al, 1998; Willock et al, 1999a; Willock et al, 
1999b; Beedell and Rehman, 1999; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Falconer, 2000; Austin et 
al, 2001; Burton, 2004; Maybery et al, 2005; Vandermersch, 2006).  However, no 
comprehensive study has rigorously analysed the effects of social, attitude and value 
influences towards irrigators’ policy preferences or views towards water transfers in the 
SSRB.  This study intends to fill this gap in the research by investigating the role of values 
and attitudes towards social influences, perceived risk and outside control, and perceived 
outcomes of water transfers; in forming irrigators’ water trading intentions and policy 
preferences.  
1.2 Research Question and Objectives 
The central question that this thesis addresses is: ‘what are the factors associated with 
irrigators’ perceptions towards using water transfers as a way of re-allocating water to 
other users’.  In order to answer this research question, the following research objectives 
are specified: 
i) Identify influences through a review of the attitude-behaviour and extractive 
commodity literature. 
ii) Investigate the factors that influence irrigators’ intentions to engage in water 
transfers in the SSRB. 
iii) Investigate irrigators’ policy preferences towards re-distributing water and the 
government’s role in transfers. 
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iv) Explain the concerns raised by irrigators in the SSRB. 
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
 Chapter two will provide the policy context within which the research is conducted.  
This is done by reviewing the literature pertaining to the institutional framework for water 
trading and water management in the SSRB (Chapter Two – Policy Context).  The first 
objective will be achieved by reviewing the literature pertaining to farmers’ decision 
making (Chapter Three – Literature Review).  Chapter three outlines the conceptual 
foundation for a model that was used to achieve objectives two and three.  Chapter four 
discusses the methodology that was used to gather the information to achieve objectives 
two and three.  In particular, chapter four outlines both quantitative and qualitative methods 
that were used in combination with one another in order to answer the research question.  
The results are divided into two chapters for this reason: chapter five that analyses the 
results from a telephone survey; and chapter six that discusses results from personal 
interviews with key informants.  Chapter seven is composed of discussion and conclusions 
that achieve objective four.  This chapter discusses implications of the research, as well as 
proposed avenues for future research.  The appendix provides copies of research 
instruments and additional information about the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POLICY CONTEXT 
2.0 Introduction 
A discussion of Alberta’s “interrelated legal, administrative and political forces 
responsible for allocating water”, or water institutions (Johansson et al, 2002: 187) is 
necessary to provide an understanding of the issues surrounding water re-allocation 
strategies in the SSRB.  This chapter will discuss Alberta’s water institutions within the 
context of the water policy and resource management literature.  Water transfers, and their 
role in Alberta’s water allocation system, are discussed along with the role of irrigators.   
2.1 Role of Water Transfers 
Irrigated agriculture now occupies 18% of total arable land globally, produces more 
than 33% of global agricultural production, and is the largest water user accounting for 
roughly 70% of water withdrawals (Johansson et al, 2002; FAO, 2010).   Other areas of the 
world share the SSRB’s problems, including the Colorado River watershed in the USA and 
Mexico (MacDonnell, 2005), watersheds of central and northeastern Mexico (Rosegrant 
and Binswanger, 1994), the Murray-Darling basin in Australia (Bjornlund, 2003a), and La 
Ligua River basin in Chile (Bauer, 1997; Budds, 2009).  These regions use tradable water 
entitlements as a way to allocate water.  Other regions, such as Pakistan and northwestern 
India, have a history of informal water markets between irrigators (Rosegrant and 
Binswanger, 1994; Easter et al, 1999).  
Globally, the area under irrigation peaked in 1978 and has declined since then 
(Postel, 1999; FAO, 2010).  During the late 1970s to early 1980s the cost of irrigation 
development has increased, coupled with rising government debt loads, growing inter-
sectoral competition, and loss of land due to urban sprawl and salinization (Johannson, 
2000).  Public opposition towards certain irrigation projects and growing environmental 
 9 
 
concerns began to change water institutions at the policy level (Bjornlund, 2004; Meinzen-
Dick, 2007).   
As Meinzen-Dick (2007) points out, from the 1970s onwards there was a trend 
among administrations to de-centralize irrigation systems as the limitations of their state-
run systems was becoming apparent.  This culminated with the use of water trading as a 
way to solve inefficiencies of water use in water stressed areas.  Rosegrant and 
Binswanger’s (1994) influential article laid out the case for tradable water rights to create 
incentives for water use efficiency.  Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) concluded that using 
tradable water rights can be very effective under certain circumstances, but their 
effectiveness depends on a host of factors including climate, levels of water scarcity, 
agricultural intensification, infrastructure, and government’s ability to regulate impacts on 
third parties. This sentiment has been echoed by the World Bank and other development 
agencies (Dinar et al, 1997; Thobani, 1997; Easter et al, 1999).   
In theory, the market moves the resource to its highest economic uses and avoids 
the problems associated with water being an open access resource (Ostrom and Gardner, 
1993; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Dinar et al, 1997; Thobani, 1997).  Nicol and 
Klein (2006b) identify in their literature review that irrigation water markets tends to move 
water from low to high valued uses; and water tends to be transferred from sellers who use 
relatively inefficient irrigation equipment to buyers who use relatively more efficient 
systems (Nicol and Klein, 2006b: 96).  Market mechanisms are seen as useful for 
increasing overall water use efficiency (Howe et al, 1986; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 
1994; Thobani, 1997).   
Water markets are, however, difficult to implement as they require clearly defined 
property rights and a delivery and conveyance system that allows for water trading (Dinar 
et al., 1997; Thobani, 1997; Bjornlund, 2003b).  Administrative obstacles may also exist 
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once a market is implemented such as complex paperwork, high transaction costs, a lack of 
information, and lack of transparency (Dinar et al., 1997; Bjornlund, 2003b).   Many have 
concerns over social equity as well as the damaging ecological effects associated with 
water markets (Tisdell et al, 2001; Bakker, 2007; Christensen and Droitsch, 2008).    
Much of the literature has warned against a ‘one size fits all’ approach to water 
policy.  As Thobani (1997) points out: “…tradable water rights are not a panacea, and an 
effective system is not easy to introduce” (p. 177).  The literature suggests tradable water 
entitlements may be a useful tool for allocating water during times of water scarcity in 
some regions, but may fall short of their goals in other regions (Bauer, 1997; Solanes and 
Gonzalez-Villarreal, 1999; Bjornlund, 2003b; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Bjornlund, 2010).  The 
successes and failures of market-based water allocation typically lie with the effectiveness 
of the water institutions governing them (Howe et al, 1986; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 
1994; Thobani, 1997; Bjornlund, 2010).  The literature suggests that in order for water 
institutions to successfully manage market based allocation, they must optimally coordinate 
geographical and environmental knowledge, political and legal structure, economic 
concerns, and socio-cultural concerns (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Dinar et al, 1997; 
Thobani, 1997; Bauer, 1998; Solanes and Gonzalez-Villarreal, 1999; Boelens and  
Zwarteveen, 2005; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Bjornlund, 2010). 
In order to effectively allocate water, water institutions must also have the ability to 
work within the confines of the local environment from which they serve (Howe et al, 
1986; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Thobani, 1997).  Meinzen-Dick (2007) discusses 
the negative effects of top-down bureaucratic policies that can be out of touch with local 
needs.  This view is also expressed by others who stress the need for user based 
participation, and a grassroots approach to alleviating the effects of water scarcity 
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(Thobani, 1997; Solanes and Gonzalez-Villarreal, 1999; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Bjornlund, 
2010). 
2.2 Water Allocation Systems 
Water institutions are generally guided by overarching legislation that identifies the 
structure of water allocation systems which include distribution methods and water 
management techniques, such as pricing mechanisms.  Property rights heavily influence 
water allocation systems.  In most cases the legal system that establishes the guidelines 
from which water allocation is ran is based on the following legal traditions: i) public 
allocation; ii) riparian rights; and ii) prior appropriative rights (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 
1994; Tarlock, 2001). 
Public allocation involves the administration or government allocating and 
distributing the water (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Dinar et al, 1997).  In western 
North America most major irrigation systems were initiated by government agencies, and 
the state has played an active role with water distribution systems (Reisner, 1993; Dinar et 
al, 1997; Tarlock, 2001; Meinzen-Dick, 2007).  Water is viewed as a public good by many, 
and most governments have legislation protecting non-economic uses over economic uses 
(Bakker, 2007).  Water distribution systems are often managed by user based or ‘collective 
action’ groups (Dinar et al, 1997). 
  ‘Collective action’ groups, such as irrigation districts, are heavily involved with the 
conveyance and delivery of water (Dinar et al., 1997).  User based allocation has the ability 
to be extremely flexible with adapting to local water needs (Howe et al, 1986; Rosegrant 
and Binswanger, 1994; Dinar et al, 1997).  There are, however, concerns about the 
difficulty in promoting inter-sectoral transfers of water, as one collective action group may 
conflict with another (Dinar et al, 1997).  For example, an irrigation district’s interests may 
conflict with that of a growing municipality creating a difficult atmosphere from which 
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voluntary transfers of water may be met with a large degree of resistance.  Such an example 
has been very common throughout the literature (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Dinar 
et al, 1997; Bjornlund et al, 2007).     
North American water laws determining water rights, or the right to divert and use 
water, are often based on riparian rights or prior appropriative rights (Rosegrant and 
Binswanger, 1994).  Riparian rights originate from English common law and links 
ownership of water to adjacent or overlying lands (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; 
Tarlock, 2001).  Owners of these lands cannot sell these rights or transfer them separate 
from the land (Tarlock, 2001).  Risk is shared between all water users during times of water 
shortage, as usually allotments are fixed in proportion to frontage on the water source 
(Tarlock, 2001).   
Policy makers in 19th century Canada and USA found the riparian doctrine was ill 
suited for managing access to water in the arid west (Tarlock, 2001).   Prior appropriative 
water rights became entrenched in several states’ legislation since the Wyoming vs. 
Colorado Supreme Court case in 1872 (Tarlock, 2001).  This case identified prior access to 
water as the defining feature of the right to use, as opposed to land ownership adjacent to 
water ways (Tarlock, 2001).   This means that older license holders, or uses, receive 
priority of use which is in stark contrast to the riparian system from which water is accessed 
equally among users adjacent to a water body (Tarlock, 2001).   This initially gave more 
water security to “tail-enders” of waterways, as their supply was not threatened by “head-
enders” or up-stream users (Tarlock, 2001).  This system is referred to as first-in-time, first-
in-right (FITFIR). 
2.2.2. First-in-Time, First-in-Right 
 Canadian policy makers adopted elements of the prior appropriation doctrine with 
the Northwest Irrigation Act of 1894 (Adamowicz et al, 2010).  Although elements of 
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American prior appropriative water laws were used in this legislation, there are notable 
differences (Adamowicz et al., 2010).  In Alberta, the Crown, or provincial government, 
has control over the transfer process making inter-sectoral transfers an administrative 
decision.  The Crown in this sense publically allocates the water, hence the term ‘prior 
allocation’.  This is very different to the prior appropriation system in the US where a user 
originally started to extract the water and then appropriated it via the courts; much the same 
way a miner stakes a claim.  The FITFIR principle was originally based on the social values 
of fairness and justice, and to better maximize the economic efficiency of water (Tarlock, 
2001).  It attached water rights to use, which encouraged farmers to irrigate land as access 
to water was not threatened by others adjacent to the water source.  This opened up rights to 
water for non-riparian landowners, which established the necessary conditions for large 
scale irrigation developments in the west (Tarlock, 2001).   
 FITFIR-based water rights were developed during a time when irrigated agriculture, 
stock watering and mineral extraction were seen as the most beneficial and economically 
valuable uses of water (Tarlock, 2001).  They were also developed during a time when 
there was very little storage capacity in the west protecting users from drought conditions 
(Tarlock, 2001).  A contentious issue in many western regions is that urban and industrial 
developments are now providing more economic output, yet priority of use lies with older 
and less valuable irrigation uses (Tarlock, 2001).   
Zilberman and Shoengold (2005) contend that seniority-based water allocation 
systems impede water transfers because senior users have little incentive to conserve water 
and participate in the market.  Furthermore, they contend that the corresponding lack of 
market activity may result in low prices which compound the problem as senior users have 
little financial incentive to sell any extra water they accrue from adopting water conserving 
technologies, such as from upgrading irrigation equipment (Zilberman and Shoengold, 
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2005).  There is an argument that FITFIR does not rationalize the distribution of water as it 
does not base allocation on evolving socio-economic values or environmental 
vulnerabilities (Brandes et al, 2008).    Others note that the system is irresponsible 
environmentally since “irrigated agriculture currently has priority regardless of how little 
water remains for in-stream flow needs when stream-flow is low” (Huffnaker et al, 2000: 
267).     
A recent suggestion in the SSRB is to replace the FITFIR doctrine with that or a 
proportional sharing doctrine (Droitsch and Robinson, 2009; Zilberman and Schoengold, 
2005).  Under a proportional sharing system water is allocated in proportion to the size of 
each license instead of according to the licenses’ seniority.  Under this system the historical 
practice of appropriative water licenses would continue, but these licenses would be 
effected substantially when water is scarce (He et al, 2012).  According to a 2012 study that 
simulated economic gains in Alberta with a proportional sharing system, it out-performed 
the seniority based system in the following three scenarios: i) irrigation districts’ 
permissible diversions being reduced in proportion to each district’s licensed allocations; ii) 
the diversions being reduced in proportion with each district’s past five-year average 
diversions; and iii) the diversions being reduced proportionately with each district’s 
diversion in a single prior year (He et al, 2012).  Nevertheless, the FITFIR system is still an 
entrenched water institution in the SSRB. 
2.3 Alberta’s Water Institutions 
Alberta’s water allocation systems are governed by the Water Act of 1999, Alberta 
Land Stewardship Act of 2009, and Irrigation Districts Act of 2000.  The Water Act clearly 
identifies the rights and responsibilities of license holders and the provincial government 
(Crown).  The Water Act vests ownership of water with the Crown (Section 3), and 
distributes water in the form of licensed allocations following a prior allocation system 
 15 
 
using the FITFIR principle (Sections 30 and 32).  During times of water scarcity senior 
license holders get access to water ahead of junior license holders.  In the SSRB there is an 
ongoing debate whether the FITFIR principle is the appropriate allocation tool to meet the 
challenges of growing inter-sectoral demands (Huffnaker et al, 2000; He et al, 2012).  As 
mentioned, some have suggested a share-based allocation system where water in excess of 
certain flows is allocated to users proportionally; that is the risk associated with uncertainty 
of supply is shared proportionally among users (Bjornlund, 2010; He et al., 2012).   
The Crown gives license holders the ability to share water with another license 
holder via assignments (Section 33), however, the buyer can only do that up to the volume 
of their own license.  Therefore, this system cannot be used to expand production, only to 
maintain it.  It also does not allow new non-license holders to start using water.  In effect an 
assignment only transfers the priority of the seller’s license to the license of the buyer.  The 
Water Act also facilitates the transfer some or all of a licensed allocation to other users, 
both existing and new users (Section 81).  In order to transfer a license the two participants 
must apply for Crown approval (Section 81).  These transfers of water may be subject to a 
10% holdback in volume traded at the discretion of the Crown to satisfy water conservation 
objectives (WCOs) (Section 83).     
Before the Crown takes action under the Water Act, it must consider the goals of 
regional plans as outlined in the Alberta Land Stewardship Act of 2009 (Water Act Section 
4.1).  The Alberta Land Stewardship Act (ALSA) provides a regional land use framework 
in Alberta, from which long term development decisions are based (Section 2).  Regional 
plans outline land-use planning goals, and serve as a way to align geographic, socio-
cultural, economic and legal considerations in a region (Section 8).  Regional plans may 
contain specific regulations concerning land-use restrictions that may affect water use 
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(Section 13).  As of 2013 the South Saskatchewan Regional Plan (SSRP) is in the process 
of approval.   
The Irrigation Districts Act of 2000 governs how irrigation districts operate and 
specifies their goals and responsibilities (Section 6).  Most irrigation district hold senior 
licenses, and their licensed allocations are much larger than other users in the SSRB.  
Irrigation districts must act in accordance with ALSA regional plans, and must abide by 
their status as license holders under the Water Act.  The Irrigation Districts Act enables 
transfers of irrigated acres between irrigators within each district, given district approval 
(Sections 25 and 26).  As licence holders, irrigation districts also have the ability to trade 
their licensed allocations as stipulated under the Water Act.  In order for a water transfer to 
occur, however, districts must hold plebiscites to which over half of the irrigators must vote 
in favour of the transfer (Section 11).  Irrigation districts also have the ability to enter into 
water supply agreements with other users, including non-irrigators if the license allows this.  
This is typically done by amending licenses with the approval of Alberta Environment in 
order to supply users.  This has traditionally been the desired sharing mechanism for 
irrigation districts because they still retain the licensed volume, whereas with a water 
transfer they lose the licensed allocation (Bankes and Kwasniak, 2005).       
Regulations concerning WCO’s, in-stream flow objectives, and watershed planning 
are outlined in Water Management Plans.  WCO’s, according to the Water Act (Section 83) 
are held by the Crown, and cannot be held by individual license holder, preventing 
environmental organizations and stewardship groups from holding water licenses for 
environmental purposes.  The SSRB’s Water Management Plan was approved in 2006, and 
closed the Bow, Oldman, and South Saskatchewan River sub-basins for new license 
applications (Alberta Environment, 2006).  The SSRB’s water management plan reinforces 
the role of the Crown in approving water transfers, and outlines matters that must be 
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considered before the approval of a transfer (Alberta Environment, 2006: 14).  The over-
arching goals of the Alberta government, affecting water management plans, are outlined in 
the Water for Life Strategy (WFL) of 2003.   
2.3.1. Water for Life Strategy  
The WFL has the following goals: i) provide safe, secure drinking water supply; ii) 
secure healthy aquatic ecosystems and iii) ensure reliable, quality water supplies for a 
sustainable economy (Alberta Environment, 2003).  WFL calls for the overall efficiency 
and productivity of water use in Alberta to improve by 30 per cent from 2005 levels by 
2015 (Alberta Environment, 2003).  A long-term goal of the strategy is to “review the water 
allocation transfer system to ensure a viable market that moves water to support sustainable 
economic development” (Alberta Environment, 2003: 12).  This expresses the WFL’s 
objective to use water transfers, or trading, as an incentive to reallocate water gained by 
increasing overall efficiency.   
As mentioned, some in the irrigation sector have expressed skepticism towards the 
goals of WFL.  A 2006 survey irrigation district board members in the SSRB found that 
only half of the respondents believe the economic efficiency goal of 30% can be achieved 
and only 26% of respondents believe water use efficiency can be improved to meet the 
target (Bjornlund et al, 2007: 138).  Many felt that the 30% goal is too ambitious, and that 
prices for commodity crops do not provide incentive for purchasing more efficient 
irrigation equipment (Bjornlund et al, 2007).  Another study concluded irrigators who have 
their own private licenses are unlikely to invest in improving irrigation technologies and 
management practices (Nicol et al, 2010).  A range of factors were identified, including 
geographic and financial constraints (Nicol et al, 2010).   
Some also question the assumption that improvement in water use efficiency will 
lead to reduced water use (English et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 2003).  Often the primary 
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purpose of adopting water saving technology is to increase yields, not to save water.  
Therefore, the adoption of more efficient technologies often increases, rather than 
decreases, water use (English et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 2003; Bjornlund et al, 2009).  A 2009 
study in the Taber and Raymond Irrigation Districts in the SSRB found that the main 
reason for implementing changes to irrigation were to improve crop yields and reduce 
energy costs (Bjornlund et al, 2009).  The study re-affirmed an earlier 2006 study 
indicating that adoption of water saving technologies among SSRB irrigators has been high, 
and a further 30% improvement is questionable (Bjornlund et al, 2007).   
Several irrigation districts have attempted to have portions of their licenses 
amended to enable them to supply water to non-irrigation users (Bjornlund et al, 2009).  
This would enable them to satisfy water demand under a number of arrangements other 
than the permanent transfer of the water right (Bjornlund et al, 2009).  Some environmental 
groups argue that these types of amendments allow irrigation districts to operate as water 
brokers by obtaining authority to provide water to any person for virtually any purpose at 
whatever price is determined (Christensen and Droitsch, 2008).  They also argue that this 
system circumvents the need for public oversight associated with transfers laid down in the 
Water Act.  This concern was first raised in 2003 when the St. Mary Irrigation District 
(SMRID) got an amendment of one of its licenses allowing them to divert 270,000 ML for 
other, non-irrigation uses (Banks and Kwasniak, 2005).  This trend continued when the 
Eastern Irrigation District (EID), and other districts, sought to amend two licenses, 
accounting for 940,000 ML in 2007 (Bjornlund et al, 2009).  These amendments were 
vigorously opposed both administratively and in the courts by environmental groups.  In 
January, 2013 the Queen’s Bench of Alberta has ruled that there is no public standing at the 
Alberta Environment Appeal Board for those not directly affected by proposed 
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amendments (Fluker, 2013).  Nevertheless, concerns amongst environmental lobby groups 
remain over these licensed amendments. 
The opposition to these amendments represents concerns over water use.  
Historically, the EID has only used an average of 74% of its allocation (Christensen and 
Droitsch, 2008: 22).  Amending a license could result in the use of more of that allocation 
augmenting the environmental impact of the current level of extraction.  Although the 
director has the ability to only allow traded volumes that have been ‘historically used’ as 
opposed to total allocation; this leaves a policy gap where irrigators may be more inclined 
to sell water they are not using.  This may actually increase water use which is contrary to 
the goals of WFL. 
A potential solution to this problem was highlighted in the approved water 
management plan for the SSRB that proposed to “allow a part of a licence to be cancelled. 
The Water Act only permits cancellation of a full allocation. This is an obstacle to the 
desired objective of being able to match actual water needs with allocations.” (Alberta 
Environment, 2006: 17).  The need to rectify licensed volumes available for trade was also 
expressed by an advisory group in 2009 with the recommendation:  “The minister [must] 
clarify the amount of water the licencee is entitled to transfer. The Water Act does not deal 
clearly with this and it must ultimately be resolved for the transfer system to achieve its full 
potential.” (Alberta Environment, 2009: 4). 
2.4 Water Trading Issues 
 The skepticism expressed towards WFL goals, and particularly towards the use of 
water trading, is in tune with the part of the literature highlighting institutional barriers to 
transfers.  For example, Easter et al (1999: 102) pointed out that frequent problems 
associated with poorly regulated water markets include negative third party effects due to 
water trading, and reduction in return flows along with changes in water quality.  
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Additional problems with trading surface water may include increased costs of irrigation 
systems, unfair market power for large-scale buyers and sellers, and drop in land values 
(Easter et al, 1999: 102).   
 In order to mitigate the negative effects of poorly regulated markets, the following 
has been suggested: i) establish clearly defined and enforceable property rights and water 
entitlements; ii) ensure proper monitoring and evaluation of water use; iii) encourage 
reduced transactions costs associated with trade; iv) ensure transparency and readily 
accessible information for participants; and v) ensure proper protection for environmental 
and social needs (Thobani, 1997; Solanes and Gonzalez-Villarreal, 1999; Easter et al, 1999; 
Horbulyk, 2005; Chong and Sunding, 2006; Levine et al, 2007; Bjornlund, 2010). 
 A study conducted in 2004 examining permanent buyers and sellers of water in the 
SSRB concluded that that buyers and sellers had a hard time finding one another, and that 
price information was scarce leading to a high variability in price (Nicol et al, 2008).  The 
researchers cited that, although comparatively administrative transaction costs are lower 
than the average, they were an impediment to trading that caused complaints by market 
participants (Nicol et al, 2008).    
 Another potential issue for water trading in the SSRB is environmental protection.  
Currently WCOs are defined under the current water management plan are 45% of natural 
flow, or the current in-stream objectives plus 10% whichever is greater.  As mentioned the 
Director may hold back 10% of a traded volume and allocate it towards a WCO.  This 
raises two concerns.  First, WCOs still abide by the priority licensing system.  WCOs 
acquire license priority just like any other transfer.  So, for example, during the 2007 
transfer between WID and the M.D. of Rocky View, the 10% holdback acquired a 1903 
license, since that was the licensed volume being transferred.  This does not pose much of 
an issue for WCOs acquiring senior priority.  Many, however, believe that WCOs should be 
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held outside of the priority system to reflect their importance.  In 2009 a minister’s advisory 
group highlighted the inadequacy of this with their first recommendation regarding 
protected water stating that the current WCO system “…does not reflect the level of 
protection that would have been defined if the basin had not been so heavily allocated at the 
time that the Management Plan was completed.” (Alberta Environment, 2009: 1).   
 Enabling the possibility of a 10% holdback also brings into question the incentive to 
trade water.  The minister’s advisory group recommended future studies of the possibility 
of a financial fee, or charge, as opposed to, or complimenting, a 10% holdback (Alberta 
Environment, 2009: 14).  This comes with the realization that long term inter-sectoral 
transfers may be financially large, but the 10% holdback would provide very little to meet 
WCO’s.  The irrigation sector has expressed a negative disposition towards WCO’s for this 
reason (Bjornlund et al, 2007).   
 Property rights are also a concern as water for irrigation is attached to land as 
elements of riparian law still exist in Alberta.  Under section 58 of the Water Act licenses 
are “appurtenant to the land or the undertaking specified in the licence and are inseparable 
therefrom.”  This largely applies to irrigated land where water ‘rights’ are attached to the 
property and are transferred with the sale of property.  The Water Act and Irrigation District 
Act does allow for licensed, or district allotted, water to be transferred from one piece of 
land to another, however the attachment of water to land has increased irrigated land 
values.  This means that water prices must meet or exceed their difference in land values in 
order to encourage trading, particularly for long-term permanent trading.  International 
experiences have shown that this is rare and is an impediment for trading water (Easter et 
al, 1999; Bjornlund, 2001).   
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2.5 Importance of Irrigation 
Irrigation districts are “dominant economic and political players within the 
provincial water rights regime” (Bankes and Kwasniak, 2005: 6).  There are thirteen 
irrigation districts in the SSRB that hold approximately 84% of irrigation allocations with 
the remaining 16% held by private irrigators (IWMSC, 2002).  Most of the early water 
trading activity in the SSRB has been in the form of trading between irrigators with most 
trade occurring within irrigation districts (Nicol et al, 2008).  Irrigation district water 
conveyance and distribution systems also serve communities and industries.  As of 2002 
Irrigation districts in the SSRB supplied water to approximately forty two thousand people 
in forty seven communities and to twelve industrial users (IWMSC, 2002).    
Irrigation systems in the SSRB are important to agricultural producers as they have 
increased crop production and allowed for the production of specialty crops that would not 
grow under dryland conditions (Samarawickrema and Kulshreshtha, 2008).  Most irrigation 
water in the SSRB is used for oilseed, cereal and forage production (IWMSC, 2002).  
Forage crops are mostly used to feed livestock, which of itself is a $4.4 billion industry in 
Alberta (IWMSC, 2002). Irrigated crop production in the SSRB has attracted major food 
processing industries that contribute billions of dollars in spinoffs to the provincial 
economy.  One study estimated that increases in primary production from irrigation and the 
spin-offs in agri-food processing contribute over 18 % to the agri-food portion of gross 
domestic product for Alberta (IWMSC, 2002).   A 2002 report highlighted that “ the ratio 
between the value of agri-processing shipments and farm receipts from primary production 
is 2.65 in the irrigated south, compared with 1.05 for other parts of Alberta” (IWMSC, 
2002: 141).  These financial incentives, combined with the relative security of water supply 
and comparatively low cost of using it, strongly encourage irrigation use in southern 
Alberta. 
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 Eighty-nine water bodies created as irrigation infrastructure provide recreational 
activities to southern Albertans (IWMSC, 2002).  The recreational activities provided by 
these water bodies’ impacts local economies as “it is estimated that tourists spend about $2 
million a year on water-based recreation in southern Alberta.  The monetary impact of 
recreational activities on the regional economy has been estimated to be in the order of $29 
million a year” (IWMSC, 2002: 143).In addition to recreational activities, irrigation water 
supports over 35,000 hectares of wetlands habitat that preserves natural ecosystems 
(IWMSC, 2002).    
The skepticism irrigators have towards water transfers is perhaps most apparent 
with the 2007 transfer of water from the Western Irrigation District (WID) to the 
municipality of Rocky View.  This involved the permanent transfer of 2500ML of water in 
exchange of a $15 million payment to the WID to convert a leaky canal into an efficient 
pipeline.  The pipeline saved more than 2500ML therefore gaining the district more access 
to water after the sale (Christensen and Droitsch, 2008; Bjornlund et al, 2009).  Irrigators 
were concerned about the permanent loss of water, and there was widespread opposition to 
the sale.  The plebiscite was passed, albeit by a very a narrow margin.  This sale illustrates 
what the literature has already suggested: permanent inter-sectoral trades of water from 
irrigation to non-irrigation uses encounter opposition in the early phases of the market. 
 
 24 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Irrigation Districts of Alberta 
(PSSRB, 2009: 107) 
 
2.6 Summary 
 This chapter has highlighted the research problem by reviewing the role of water 
trading, and the barriers to water trading, given Alberta’s current water institutions.  
Irrigation uses have been noted as particularly important in Alberta’s water institutions, and 
their unwillingness towards using water transfers as a means to re-allocate water has been 
highlighted.  The table below illustrates the barriers to trade that may contribute to this 
unwillingness: 
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Table 2.1 – Institutional Barriers to Water Transfers in Alberta 
Barriers to 
Trade 
Alberta Context Supporting Literature 
Property Rights 
i) Consumptive uses vs. 
Total allocations. 
ii) Priority System (FITFIR). 
iii) Attachment to Irrigated 
Land (Water Act Section 
58) affecting land value. 
Rosegrant and Binswanger, 
1994; Thobani, 1997; Easter et 
al, 1999; Bjornlund et al, 2009 
Lack of 
Information 
 
i) Connecting buyers and      
sellers. 
ii) Lack of knowledge of 
benefits or costs of trade. 
Thobani, 1997; Nicol et al, 2008 
Environmental 
Purposes i) WCO holdbacks 
Rosegrant and Binswange,r 
1994; Thobani, 1997; Meinzen-
Dick, 2007;Bjornlund et al, 
2007 
Transaction 
Costs 
ii) Lengthy approval 
processes 
Horbulyk, 2005; Nicol et al, 
2008 
 
Factors that influence water trading identified in the literature include: i) price 
(Brooks and Harris, 2008); ii) risk averse attitudes (Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004); iii) 
farm income including off farm sources (Wheeler et al, 2008); iv) farm size (Bjornlund, 
2006) and v) farm investments (Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005).  Motivations to buy water 
are typically different to selling water (Gomez-Limon and Risego, 2004; Bjornlund, 2006; 
Loch et al, 2012).  Motivations to buy water identified in the literature are associated with 
risk averse attitudes and weather uncertainties; whereas motivations to sell include having 
surplus water, and changing crop needs (Gomez-Limon and Risego, 2004; Bjornlund, 2006; 
Loch et al, 2012).   
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There is a wealth of literature suggesting that attitudes, values and social 
interactions also influence farmers’ management decisions (Gasson, 1973; Gasson, 1974; 
Potter and Gasson, 1988; Fairweather and Keatng, 1994; Austin et al, 1996; Willock et al, 
1999a; Willock et al, 1999b; Beedell and Rehman, 1999; Austin et al, 2001; Burton, 2004; 
Maybery et al, 2005; Vandersmensch, 1996; Kuehne et al, 2008).  These influences may be 
particularly useful in explaining decisions to vote in an irrigation district plebiscite where 
individual irrigators within the district do not receive financial compensation for re-
allocating water.  Attitudes towards water use may also explain unwillingness towards re-
allocating water for environmental purposes via WCOs.  The next chapter reviews these 
influences by drawing from health psychology and extractive-commodity literature that 
tends to treat farmers as consumers or customers.  This creates the conceptual framework 
that forms the foundation for the methods used in the research. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the second research objective: to identify influences of 
farmers’ decision making through a review of the social psychology, economics and 
geography literature.  In particular, attitude-behaviour connection and extractive 
commodity theory literature formed the foundation of the conceptual framework derived 
from this literature review.  The first section is an overview of psychological motives for 
farming found in the literature.  This is followed by a discussion of the importance of 
values and attitudes identified in the literature towards farmers’ decision making.  Next, 
there is a review of the literature regarding farmer heterogeneity and the common practice 
of categorizing farmers in order to understand the diversity of their intentions and 
influences.   
3.1 Psychological Motives in the Literature 
Landholder attitudes towards environmental policies have led to varying levels of 
political opposition and cooperation (Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Tisdell et al, 2001; 
Morris and McBeth, 2003; Maybery et al, 2005).  Financial interests in land play a 
fundamental role in farmers’ attitudes towards risk, water use, debt, and land (Gomez-
Limon and Riesgo, 2004; Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; Kuehne et al, 2008; Wheeler et al, 
2008).  This gives some credence to the extractive-commodity theory that assumes an 
intimate connection between individuals’ occupations and place of residence with their 
environmental attitudes (Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Lowe 
and Pinhey, 1982; Samdahl and Robertson, 1989; Morris and McBeth, 2003). 
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3.1.1 Extractive Commodity Theory 
 Extractive commodity theory was developed by Tremblay and Dunlap (1978) in an 
attempt to explain concerns that rural residents in the United States had significantly 
different environmental concerns from the urban population.  This theory was embraced by 
those who researched social determinants of environmental concern (Samdahl and 
Robertson, 1989) and the effects of demographical characteristics on environmental 
concern (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Lowe and Pinhey, 1982).  This theory has more 
recently been used to appeal to ‘green consumerism’ in marketing strategies (Straughan and 
Roberts, 1999; Laroche et al, 2001; Diamantopoulos et al, 2003).   
 Most uses of extractive-commodity theory have identified groups of people based 
on socio-demographic information (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Lowe and Pinhey, 1982; 
Samdahl and Robertson, 1989; Morris and McBeth, 2003; Huddard-Kennedy et al, 2009). 
Pro-environmental groups, for instance, are more likely to be urban, with higher levels of 
education and income (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Lowe and Pinhey, 1982; Samdahl and 
Robertson, 1989; Morris and McBeth, 2003; Huddard-Kennedy et al, 2009).  This is 
partially because of varying information sources between urban and rural populations; and 
the different level of dependence on the land for economic purposes (Morris and McBeth, 
2003).  In one Montana study, the farmers who were less dependent on farming for 
household income were more likely to be supportive of environmental initiatives (Morris 
and McBeth, 2003).  The study also found that farmers tended to trust information from 
agricultural organizations as opposed to environmental groups, which is markedly different 
from their urban counterparts (Morris and McBeth, 2003).  Dependence on the land for 
income is likely also to influence goals and views towards the environment (Van Liere and 
Dunlap, 1980; Lowe and Pinhey, 1982; Samdahl and Robertson, 1989; Morris and McBeth, 
2003; Huddard-Kennedy et al, 2009).   
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When analysing environmental concern, Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) hypothesize 
that age, sex, residence, social class, political leaning and education are all influential 
factors.  The social connections that farmers have are often dictated by where they live, and 
what affiliations they have (Morris and McBeth, 2003).  Morris and McBeth (2003) 
stressed the importance of agricultural and social group affiliations in relaying information 
to farmers.    
Table 3.1 – Socio-Demographic Influences on Decisions 
Socio-Demographic Variable Supporting Literature 
Off-farm and on-farm income 
Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Samdahl and 
Robertson, 1989; Beus and Dunlap, 1990. 
Age 
“Age Hypothesis”- Van Liere and Dunlap, 
1980. 
Gender 
“Sex Hypothesis” – Van Liere and Dunlap, 
1980. 
Education 
Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Lowe and 
Pinhey, 1982; Samdahl and Robertson, 
1989; Morris and McBeth, 2003; Huddard-
Kennedy et al, 2009. 
Location – Place of Socialization 
“Residence Hypothesis” – Tremblay and 
Dunlap, 1978; Van Liere and Dunlap, 
1980; Beus and Dunlap, 1990; Huddart-
Kennedy et al, 2009. 
Social Group Affiliations Morris and McBeth, 2003. 
 
Morris and McBeth’s (2003) research uncovers a component of attitudes and 
values: the type of information people are receiving.  This may shape views of the 
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environment between rural and urban populations.  Berenguer et al (2005) discovered that 
rural populations tend to care about environmental issues more than urban populations, but 
that those concerns are primarily due to the economic dependence on the land.  Stein et al 
(1999) conclude that rural and urban populations share similar values with their urban 
counterparts, but have different views of the environment.  Rural populations tend to view 
environmental problems more specifically, such as with rivers, or farmland.  Urban 
populations tend to view environmental problems on a more macro scale (Stein et al, 1999).  
Table 3.2 – Farm characteristics influencing Irrigators’ Decisions 
Farm Characteristics Supporting Literature 
Dependence on Irrigation 
Tisdell et al, 2001; Bjornlund, 2003a; 
Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; Kuehne 
et al, 2008 
Crops Grown 
Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Austin et 
al, 1996; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; 
Bjornlund, 2006; Loch et al, 2012. 
Farm Investments 
Tisdell et al, 2001; Burton, 2004; 
Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; Bjornlund et 
al, 2007 
Location 
Dent et al, 1995; Willock et al, 1999a; 
Meinzen-Dick, 2007 
Water trading behaviour in southern Alberta may be explained by the level of the 
traders’ dependence on the land for income.  This is certainly in tune with the literature 
suggesting that farm income and farm investments are strong influences on water trading 
behavior (Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; Kuehne et al, 
2008; Wheeler et al, 2008).  It can be hypothesized, based on the extractive-commodity 
theory literature, that farmers in southern Alberta will likely fall into specific groups in part 
based on their socio-demographic differences; and that these groups will have different pro-
environmental attitudes based on their economic dependence on the land (Tremblay and 
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Dunlap, 1978; Beus and Dunlap, 1990).  There is literature suggesting that dependence on 
irrigation, level of farm investment, crop needs and locational characteristics (such as soil, 
water availability and heat units) all play significant roles in irrigators’ decisions (Table 
3.1.2). 
3.1.2 Transactional Theory 
It is thought that the socio-demographics that influence pro-environmental attitudes, 
also influence farmers’ decision making, and that there is a tangible connection between the 
two (Willock et al, 1999a).  In this body of literature it is often assumed that socio-
demographics and external constraints influence farmers’ values and attitudes towards farm 
decision making (Gasson, 1973; Austin et al, 1996; Willock et al, 1999a; Maybery et al, 
2005; Kuehne et al, 2008).  That is, they are antecedent to behaviours.  This is known as the 
transactional theory (Willock et al, 1999a).  
Transactional theory has its roots in methodological approaches to studying the 
psychological factors influencing volitional management behaviour (Kraus, 1995; Willock 
et al, 1999a).  Historically, this stemmed from the demand for more quantitative 
behavioural studies which motivated researchers to adopt standardized models of behaviour 
to investigate psychological factors (Kraus, 1995).  These models conceptually draw from 
past literature on the relationship between attitudes and behaviour.  One such theory is 
transactional theory, which was originally devised by psychologists Lazarus and Folkman 
(1987).  Transactional theory breaks down action and reaction relationships within 
behaviour.  Antecedent variables, such as personal characteristics lead to mediating 
variables, such as attitudes, which then lead to behaviours.   A multi-disciplinary 
agricultural research group from the UK conceptualized this theory into a model, as 
displayed in Figure 3.1 (Willock et al, 1999a: 6). 
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The use of transactional assumption is usually used to rationalize the study of 
psychological factors towards farming (Gasson, 1973; Potter and Gasson, 1988; Austin et 
al, 1996; Willock et al, 1999a; Willock et al, 1999b; Tisdell et al, 2001; Maybery et al, 
2005).  Research into the non-financial influences on irrigators decision making have been 
popular in countries such as Australia (Tisdell et al, 2001;Bjornlund, 2004;  Kuehne and 
Bjornlund, 2008; Wheeler et al, 2008; Kuehne and Bjornlund, 2010); and the UK (Willock 
et al, 1999a; Willock et al, 1999b; Beedell and Rehman, 1999; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; 
Rehman et al, 2007). This body of literature embraces farming as a vocational behaviour 
that is influenced by psychological factors, such as values and attitudes, and not only as a 
profit maximising activity (Gasson, 1973; Gasson, 1974; Fairweather and Keating, 1994; 
Willock et al, 1999a).  Ashby (1926) popularises this view:  “if we want to know how or 
why a farmer acts in a certain way or how to induce him to act in a certain way, we have to 
enquire why men act, and especially why men act as they do when they live in the sort of 
social environment and general circumstances in which farmers live” (Ashby in Gasson, 
1973: 521).   
Figure 3.1 – Transactional Theory 
(Willock et al, 1999a: 6). 
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Due to differing values and attitudes towards land, water, and farming practices; 
some suggest it is difficult to “[ensure] an equitable and fair distribution of water, [meet] 
environmental flow requirements, and [account] for local economic and social impacts” 
(Tisdell et al, 2001: 21).  Farmers usually display a diversity in their long termed goals and 
objectives, which may or may not be aligned with environmental strategies (Fairweather 
and Keating, 1994; Austin et al, 1996; Tisdell et al, 2001; Maybery et al, 2005; Darnhofer 
et al, 2005; Kuehne and Bjornlund, 2008).  A general conclusion is that these long termed 
goals and objectives are, at least partly, influenced by the values and attitudes that farmers 
hold towards farming (Gasson, 1973; Gasson and Potter, 1988; Beus and Dunlap, 1990; 
Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Willock et al, 1999b; Maybery et al, 2005; Kuehne et al, 
2008).   
Farmers seem to hold different values toward the family, farming as an occupation, 
and attitudes towards debt, the environment, and land use. That is, different value and 
attitude orientations have been identified in the literature, highlighting different farming 
motives and goals (Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Willock et al, 1999b; Bjornlund, 2004; 
Maybery et al, 2005; Kuehne and Bjornlund, 2008).  These value orientations have been 
used to either identify groups of farmers based on some underlying trait; or to identify 
underlying factors related to farmers’ decision making (Beus and Dunlap, 1990; 
Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Austin et al, 1996; Jackson-Smith and Buttell, 2003; 
Darnhofer et al, 2005; Maybery et al, 2005; Kuehne and Bjornlund, 2008).   
3.2 Values  
Grube, Mayton and Ball-Rokeach (1994) define values as “cognitive representations 
of individuals’ needs and desires on the one hand, and of societal demand on the other… 
they are translations of individual needs into a socially acceptable form that can be 
presented and defended publicly” (p.155).  They are desired end-states that establish 
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criterion for observing the world (Rokeach, 1973).  According to Friedman (1987) 
“identifying values most cherished by an individual should enable a reasonable prediction 
of that individual’s action…the root of the problem lies in the difficulty in identifying 
values independently of the actions they are supposed to inform” (p.56).   
In agriculture a common value comparison is between conventional and alternative 
forms of farming (Beus and Dunlap, 1990).  Conventional agriculture is “capital-intensive, 
large-scale, highly mechanized agriculture with monocultures of crops and extensive use of 
artificial fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, with intensive animal husbandry (Knorr and 
Watkins, 1984: x in Beus and Dunlap, 1990: 594).  Alternative agriculture, on the other 
hand, is “organic agriculture, [environmentally] sustainable agriculture, regenerative 
agriculture, eco-agriculture, permaculture, bio-dynamics, agro-ecology, natural farming, 
low-input agriculture, and others (Beus and Dunlap, 1990: 594).  Beus and Dunlap (1990) 
conclude that over-riding values towards farming have diverged from a historically 
utilitarian (conventional) orientation towards a more eco-friendly (alternative) orientation.  
This, in turn, effects where farmers lie on a scale of conventional versus alternative (Beus 
and Dunlap, 1991).   
 Beus and Dunlap’s (1990) influential research inspired other studies investigating 
the role of values towards the adoption of alternative forms of agriculture, particularly 
organic agriculture (Beus and Dunlap, 1994; Salamon et al, 1997; Corner et al, 1999; 
Abaidoo and Dickinson, 2002; Jackson-Smith and Buttel, 2003; Darnhofer et al, 2005; 
Maybery et al, 2005; Wheeler, 2008).  Most have found that value orientations displayed 
by farmers are heterogeneous with different groups of farmers more or less willing to adopt 
alternative agricultural practices (Salamon et al, 1997; Corner et al, 1999; Maybery et al, 
2005).   
 
 35 
 
Table 3.3 – Farmer value classifications from the literature 
Farmer Value Orientations Supporting Literature 
Instrumental, Social, Expressive and 
Instrinsic 
Gasson (1973) 
Conventional and Alternative Beus and Dunlap (1990) 
Dedicated producer, Flexible strategist and 
Environmentalist 
Fairweather and Keating (1994) 
Yeoman and Entrepreneur Austin, Deary, Gibson, McGregor and 
Dent (1996) 
Family Farmism, Environmentalism and 
Farm Lifestyle 
Jackson-Smith and Buttel (2003) 
Economic, lifestyle and Conservation. Maybery, Crase and Gullifer (2005) 
Committed conventional, Pragmatic 
conventional, Environment-conscious but 
not organic, Pragmatic organic and 
Committed organic 
Darnhofer, Schneeberger and Bernhard 
(2005). 
Providers, Lifestylers and Investors Kuehne, Bjornlund and Cheers (2008) 
 
 There has been some interest in the Australian literature analysing the values of 
farmers in order to assess the success of environmental policy instruments (Maybery et al, 
2005; Kuehne et al, 2008; Kuehne and Bjornlund, 2010).  In Australia, over-allocation in 
the Murray-Darling Basin has led to water reforms aimed at cutting irrigation water 
entitlements so that environmental flow allocations can be increased (Kuehne et al, 2008).  
This, as discussed in the Policy Context, is similar to the goal of WCOs in Alberta.  The 
difference is that state governments in Australia actively buy back entitlements for 
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environmental purposes, whereas that action has not yet been taken in Alberta.  The 
Australians have found that policies solely relying on commercial incentives, such as 
market-based instruments to achieve landholder cooperation, only gains participation from 
those who are motivated by profit maximisation (Bjornlund, 2004; Maybery et al, 2005; 
Kuehne et al, 2008).  They find that values offer some insight into the non-commercial 
motives of farmers.  
3.3 Attitudes 
 Attitudes towards policies or management decisions are discussed far more often in 
the literature than farmer’s over-riding values (Lowe and Pinhey, 1982; Beus and Dunlap, 
1990; Petzrelka et al, 1996; Willock et al, 1999a; Willock et al, 1999b; Tisdell and Ward, 
2003).  This is because attitudes are more object or action specific (Rokeach, 1973).  
Attitudes are defined as “a positive or negative response(s) towards an attitude-object 
[person, idea, concept or physical object]” (Willock et al, 1999b: 287).  Many beliefs 
underlie attitudes (Willock et al, 1999b).   These are beliefs about the world shaped by 
social stimulus and behavioural conditioning (LaPiere, 1934; Rokeach, 1973).  Attitudes 
are shaped by the level of known information and emotions (Rockeach, 1973).   
Beginning in the 1920’s there have been attempts to quantify attitudes through the 
use of scales (Thurstone, 1928; Likert, 1932).  Advances in polling and sampling 
techniques around this time enabled representative surveys of wide-held attitudes (Kraus, 
1934).   This was quickly used to the benefit of marketers and advertisers; as well as the 
media and intelligentsia (Kraus, 1934).  Early studies focused on reliability and assumed 
close relationships between attitudes and behavior (Wicker, 1969; Kraus, 1995).   
  Virtually the only use of attitudes as predictor variables for behaviours during this 
period was LaPiere’s (1934) study of social attitudes.  LaPiere (1934) studied the validity 
of social discriminatory attitudes in the United States.  He toured the United States with a 
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couple of Chinese origin and monitored them as they asked for the services of 251 hotels 
and restaurants.  His findings showed that although 97% of respondents indicated they 
would not serve people of Chinese origin, the couple was only refused service 2 %of the 
time (LaPiere, 1934).    
More skepticism over an attitude-behaviour connection came with Wicker’s (1969) 
review of 47 empirical studies exploring the connection.  Wicker noted that there was “little 
evidence to support the postulated existence of stable, underlying attitudes within the 
individual which influence both his verbal expressions and his actions” (Wicker, 1969: 75).  
Kraus (1995) points out that after this review, researchers began to view inconsistencies in 
attitudes and behaviours as resulting from either methodological errors, or lack of 
moderator variables. 
3.3.1 Theory of Reasoned Action 
Azjen and Fishbein proposed that methodological errors were largely responsible 
for past attitudinal inconsistencies with behaviour.  Instead of focusing on reliability, as 
most previous research had done, Ajzen and Fishbein dedicated most of their 
methodological research towards accurately measuring the validity of attitudes (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1970; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Kraus, 1995).  This 
shifted the focus of their surveys and measurements of attitudes. Their empirical research in 
the 1970’s showed the more precise the measure of intention was, correlations became 
more significant between intentions and behaviours (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1970; Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977).   
This research used a conceptual model that Fisbhein created that expanded on Dulany’s 
theory of propositional control (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1970).   
Fishbein’s theory of reasoned action (TRA) claimed that behavioural intentions are 
antecedent to behaviour, and that attitudes and social influences are immediate antecedents 
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to behavioural intentions (Ajzena nd Fishbein, 1970).   Social influences, or subjective 
norms, are subjective beliefs about the social influences of others (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1970).  Attitudes and subjective norms are anchored by expectations of the outcome of the 
behaviour, social influences of a combination of normative beliefs and the motivation to 
comply with those beliefs (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1970).   
The TRA immediately received attention in the academic community, particularly 
in the disciplines of health sciences (Pender & Pender, 1986; Charng et al., 1988; Schlegel 
et al., 1992); marketing and commerce (Shimp and Kavas, 1984; Hansen et al, 2004; 
Fitzmaurice, 2005); and social psychology (Madden et al, 1992; Rehman et al, 2007).  The 
TRA was utilised to explain farming activities as well (Lynne et al, 1995; Willock et al, 
1999b; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Tisdell et al, 2001; Corbett, 2002; Rehman et al, 2003; 
Tisdell and Ward, 2003;  Rehman et al, 2007).   
The initial excitement over the TRA as a potential model to predict a range of 
behaviours gave way to conclusions of the overall strength of the theory.  An influential 
meta-analysis by Sheppard, Hartwick and Warshaw’s (1988) reviewed 87 previous studies 
using TRA research and proposed recommendations to modify the model. These studies 
came from a wide range of disciplines, some employing variations to the original TRA 
model.  They concluded that while the TRA offered an important “starting point” for 
predictive studies, modifications to further standardize measurements of variables would be 
useful (Sheppard et al, 1988: 340). 
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Figure 3.2 – Theory of Reasoned Action 
(Madden et al, 1992: 4) 
 
The primary critique of the TRA was that the theory was based on the assumption 
of volitional control (Sheppard et al, 1988). Volitional control refers to freedom of action of 
the individual without any external constraints.  In farming volitional control may be 
limited because of  outside forces such as commodity markets, input costs, crop/livestock 
needs, farm investments, and off-farm income sources  (Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; 
Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; Bjornlund, 2006; Brooks and Harris, 2008; Wheeler, 2008; 
Wheeler et al, 2008).  Ajzen (1985) acknowledged the problem of volitional control by 
adding perceived behavioural control (PBC) variables to the theory.  This new theory was 
called the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). 
3.3.2 – Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Ajzen (1985) concluded that a more thorough analysis of control variables was 
needed in order to improve the explanatory power of the TRA.  An example of how 
external, or behavioural, controls affect volitional behaviour was given: “A father’s plan to 
take his children fishing on the forthcoming weekend, for example is best viewed as an 
intention… successful performance of the intended behavior is contingent on the person’s 
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control over the various factors that may prevent it [preparing required equipment, securing 
a fishing licence, etc.] from happening” (Ajzen, 1985: 29).   
  The TPB was quickly used in marketing and advertising (Taylor and Todd, 1995; 
Kalafatis et al, 1999; Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006), health sciences (Norman et al, 1999; 
Conner et al, 2002; Armitage, 2005) and social sciences (Sparks and Shepherd, 1992; 
Chang, 1998; Terry et al, 1999; Carr and Sequeira, 2007).  In agricultural studies the theory 
has been applied mostly by research into technology adoption and conservation actions 
(Beedell and Rehman, 1999; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Corbett, 2002; Burton, 2004).   
 
 
Figure 3.3 – Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(Madden et al, 1992: 4). 
 
Most conservation and water management studies that employ TPB models have 
studied its usefulness with predicting riparian zone conservation activities and adoption of 
water savings technology (Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Corbett, 2002; Lam, 2006; Fielding 
et al, 2008).  Very little research has been conducted applying a TPB based model for the 
 41 
 
purpose of understanding water trading behaviour.  This is because government strategies 
and policies often have a wide range of potential outcomes. The explanatory power of TPB 
is maximized when actions tested are very specific (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1970; Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Sheppard et al, 1998; Armitage and Conner, 2001).   
Despite the relative success of the TPB in predicting certain behaviours, criticisms 
of TPB have been expressed (Armitage and Conner, 2001 Hardeman et al, 2002; Francis et 
al, 2004).  Most of these criticisms express the following: i) the behavioural measurements 
used are derived from the participant’s own estimates of his/her behaviour and are therefore 
open to acquiescence biases; ii) the behavioural measures are a snapshot in time of the 
participant’s subjective interpretations; iii) questions must be worded very precisely in 
order to ensure internal consistencies that are crucial for the successful operation of the 
model; and iv) in order to measure an intention-action relationship a long follow-up period 
is needed which cannot always be guaranteed  (Armitage and Conner, 2001; Hardeman et 
al., 2002; Francis et al, 2004). Furthermore, the weights of each variable have been found 
in some studies to be of minimal importance.  For example, the measurement of an attitude 
may not be influenced very much by the evaluation of that attitude, particularly in studies 
of policy acceptance and cooperation (Armitage and Conner, 2001).  At the practical level 
this may lead to unnecessary long surveys and more of a risk for acquiescence bias 
(Armitage and Conner, 2001).   
3.3.3 – Attitudes towards Water Re-Allocation 
 TRA and TPB have enjoyed some success in predicting behaviour because of their 
focus on the validity of attitudes and beliefs (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1970; Ajzen, 1985; 
Sheppard et al, 1988; Madden et al, 1992).  Identifying predictor variables for permanent, 
out of district water re-allocation may be difficult considering the wide range of outcomes 
that can result from the sale.  Nevertheless the literature suggests that specific attitudes 
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towards social impacts, economic risk and immediate impacts of re-allocation all play 
important roles in the decision to participate in re-allocation strategies (Gomez-Limon and 
Riesgo, 2004; Burton, 2004; Bjornlund, 2004; Darnhofer et al, 2005; Maybery et al, 2005; 
Kuehne et al, 2008; Wheeler et al, 2008).  TRA and TPB type variables can measure 
attitudes towards water re-allocation, and offer a good starting point with regards to 
framing research questions.  For the purpose of this research, TRA and TPB styled 
questions may provide a snapshot in time of irrigators’ attitudes and motives.   
Table 3.4 – Attitudinal Influences towards Water Transfers 
Attitudes Supporting Literature 
Towards social acceptability and social 
influence 
Potter and Gasson, 1988; Samdahl and 
Robertson, 1989; Beedell and Rehman, 
2000; Tisdell et al, 2001; Jackon-Smith 
and Buttel, 2003; Burton, 2004; Kuehne et 
al, 2008. 
Towards risk and economic factors 
Dent et al, 1995; Petzrelka, 1996; Gomez-
Limon and Riesgo, 2004; Darnhofer et al, 
2005; Bjornlund, 2006; Brooks and Harris, 
2008 
Towards long termed impacts of re-
allocation 
Bjornlund, 2002; Tisdell and Ward, 2003; 
Burton, 2004; Bjornlund and Rossini, 
2005. 
 The TRA and TPB literature has displayed the value in identifying accurate 
measures of attitudes towards a specific outcome.  They have displayed the value of views 
towards social acceptance and influence and how attitudes towards social acceptability can 
influence behaviour.  The literature investigating water trading motives has shown that 
farmers tend to consider the direct impacts of re-allocation, such as where the water is 
being re-allocated and how that will affect their local communities (Bjornlund, 2002; 
Tisdell and Ward, 2003).  Along with this, license holders analyse the risks associated with 
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the sale, and attitudes on the importance of various controls such as commodity markets 
and energy costs (Dent et al, 1995; Petzrelka, 1996; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004).   
3.4 Categorising Farmers 
 Farmers’ values and attitudes towards the potential outcomes of water transfers, a 
topic far too broad to directly test with TRA and TPB variables alone; are expected to differ 
between cases based on the literature suggesting farmer heterogeneity (Tremblay and 
Dunlap, 1978; Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Petzrelka et al, 1996; Salamon et al, 1997; 
Corner et al, 1999; Schoon and Grotenhuis, 2000; Darnhofer et al, 2005; Maybery et al, 
2005). Drawing from extractive commodity theory (Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978), 
transactional theory (Willock et al, 1999a), and the attitude-behaviour literature (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1970; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Rehman et al, 2007), a conceptual framework 
can be used to identify irrigators’ motives and influences in the SSRB (Figure 3.4). 
The conceptual framework (figure 3.4) draws heavily from Willock et al (1999a) 
transactional theory.  Willock et al (1999a) was not actually in favour of classifying 
farmers via typology.  Willock et al (1999a; 1999b) found that although categorising 
farmers into groups may be useful, it was difficult to do and that farmers should be treated 
as individuals.  They championed using structural equation modelling as a way to identify 
farmers’ influences.  This conclusion largely came from Austin et al (1996) response to 
Salamon ‘s (1995) work classifying farmers to “yeoman” and “entrepreneur”.  Austin et al 
(1996) concluded that farmers’ typologies tend to ignore more complex influences, and that 
groups of farmers are virtually assured through the correct survey instrurments.  
Neverntheless, they found that measuring the difference between “yeomans” (lifestyle and 
family oriented farmers) and “entrepreneurs” (business minded farmers primarily 
concerned with profit motives) was useful when identified as factors (Austin et al, 1996).   
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Antecedent Variables   Mediating Variables   Outcome 
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Figure 3.4 – Conceptual Framework for Irrigators’ Decision Making 
 The mediating variables, or attitudes and values, have most often been subject to 
common factor or component anlaysis in order to identify underlying themes in the data 
(Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Austin et al, 1996; Petzrelka, 1996; Austin et al, 2001; 
Maybery et al, 2005).  This is because, in these surveys, underlying themes were expected 
to be founded based on instrumetnal value or attitude constructs.  Under these 
circumstances, separate factors can be used to explain variation in the data sets.   
 Others have turned to grouping cases, as opposed to variables, in order to address 
groups of attitudes and values (Schoon and Grotenhuis, 2000; Bjornlund, 2002; Gomez-
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Limon and Riesgo, 2004; Vandermersch, 2006; Kuehne et al, 2008).  This usually involves 
cluster analysis,a profiling technique that is most often found in marketing studies 
(Straughan and Roberts, 1999; Laroche et al, 2001; Diamantopoulos et al, 2003).  As 
Austin et al (1998a: 207) points out “The existence of distinct types of farmer would have 
implications for agricultural policy, since a range of strategies, each targeting a different 
group of farmer, could be developed.” Groups of cases discovered by profiling can provide 
beneficial information for exploring different irrigator types, based on either demographic 
information or their values and attitudes (Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978; Van Liere and 
Dunlap, 1980; Beus and Dunlap, 1990; Schoon and Grotenhuis, 2000; Bjornlund, 2002; 
Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; Vandermensch, 2006; Kuehne et al, 2008). 
3.5 Conclusions and Identifying the ‘Knowledge Gap’ 
 Although there have been studies in the SSRB analysing irrigators’ farming 
intentions and water trading history (Horbulyk, 2005; Nicol et al, 2006b; Bjornlund et al, 
2007; Nicol et al, 2008; Bjornlund et al, 2009; Nicol et al, 2010), there has not yet been 
research into either the non-profit maximising motives behind irrigators decisions that have 
been seen as important for long-term goals and objectives (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; 
Beus and Dunlap, 1990; Austin et al, 1996; Austin et al, 1998a; Willock et al, 1999a; 
Willock et al, 1999b; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; Maybery et al, 2005; Kuehne et al, 
2008).  Nor have irrigators been profiled according to their demographics and farm 
characteristics in such a context (Schoon and Grotenhuis, 2000; Bjornlund, 2002; Gomez-
Limon and Riesgo, 2004; Vandermersch, 2006; Kuehne et al, 2008).  Furthermore, the 
values and attitudes that have been observed from irrigators in the SSRB have not been 
specifically geared towards water transfers.  TRA and TPB research has pointed out that 
specifically framed attidue questions towards anticipated outcomes usually yields the most 
interpretable and valid results (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977).   
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 The first research objective is to identify factors that influence irrigators’ 
perceptions towards using water transfers through a review of the attitude-behaviour and 
extractive commodity literature.  This literature has determined that analysing irrigators’ 
value and attitudes towards water transfers, and farm characteristics and demographics, is 
important for identifying irrigators’ motives and goals (Figure 3.4).  As such, this research 
attempts to address this ‘knowledge gap’ by identifying irrigators’: i) farm characteristics 
and demographics; and ii) their values and attitudes towards water tranfers, farming, social 
acceptance and the socio-economic impacts of transfering water.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methods and approaches used to investigate: i) how the 
factors identified in the Literature Review influence irrigators’ intentions to engage in water 
transfers are in the SSRB; ii) what irrigators’ policy preferences are for re-allocating water 
for; and iii) how they see government’s role in transfers.   Ethics clearance was granted for 
both the personal interviews and telephone survey by the University of Lethbridge Ethics 
Committee. 
4.1 Research Hypotheses 
 In order to analyse Southern Alberta’s irrigators’ motives and preferences, the 
following needs to be identified: i) irrigators’ farm characteristics and demographics; and  
ii) irrigators’ values and attitudes towards water tranfers, farming, social acceptance and the 
socio-economic impacts of transfering water.  In order to identify these variables, the 
following hypotheses will be tested:  
Table 4.1 – Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis 1 How to Test 
Irrigators’ values and attitudes are associated 
with different trading or transfer intentions, 
and policy preferences. 
(Beus and Dunlap, 1990; Gasson and 
Errington, 1993; Fairweather and Keating, 
1994; Austin et al, 1996; Salamon et al, 1997; 
Beedell and Rehman, 1999; Willock et 
al,1999a; Willock et al, 1999b; Stern, 2000; 
Austin et al, 2001; Tisdell et al, 2001; Jackson-
Smith and Buttel, 2003; Gomez-Limon and 
Riesgo, 2004; Darnhofer et al, 2005; Maybery 
et al, 2005;  Kuehne and Bjornlund, 2007; 
Factor Analysis was conducted to identify 
underlying trends in the data (Fairweather and 
Keating, 1994; Austin et al, 1996; Petzrelka, 
1996; Austin et al, 2001; Maybery et al, 2005). 
 
Categorize factor score components, and  use 
cross tabulation to determine any signficant 
correlations between values and attitudes; and 
intentions and policy preferences. 
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Rehman et al, 2007;  Brooks and Harris, 2008; 
Kuehne et al, 2008). 
 
 
Table 4.2 – Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis 2 How to Test 
Irrigators can be grouped based on their farm 
characteristics and demographics. 
 
(Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978; Van Liere and 
Dunlap, 1980; Lowe and Pinhey, 1982; 
Petrzelka et al, 1996; Salamon et al, 1997; 
Corner et al, 1999; Bjornlund and Rossini, 
2005; Maybery et al, 2005; Keuhne and 
Bjornlund, 2008; Kuehne et al, 2008; Wheeler 
et al, 2008; Loch et al, 2012). 
Hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis was 
performed using: 
- Farm Characteristics  
 Irrigated land vs. dry land farmed. 
 Crops grown. 
 Farm investments, such as irrigation 
equipment. 
 
- Demographics 
 Income from farming. 
 Education. 
 Age. 
 
 
Table 4.3 – Hypothesis Three 
Hypothesis 3 How to Test 
Different groups of irrigators will stress 
importance on different values towards 
farming and water trading; and attitudes 
towards social acceptance, risk and impacts of 
re-allocation.  
 
(Gasson, 1973; Gasson, 1974; Potter and 
Gasson, 1988; Fairweather and Keating, 1994; 
Willock et al, 1999b; Gomez-Limon and 
Riesgo, 2004; Maybery et al, 2005; Bjornlund, 
2006; Bjornlund et al, 2007; Bjornlund et al, 
2009; Kuehne et al, 2008; Nicol et al, 2008; 
Wheeler et al, 2008; Loch et al, 2012).   
Cross tabulate irrigator groups created through 
cluster analysis with values and attitudes. 
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Table 4.4 – Hypothesis Four 
Hypothesis 4 How to Test 
Different groups of irrigators will have 
different long-term goals and objectives for 
their farms. 
 
(Gasson, 1973; Gasson, 1974; Potter and 
Gasson, 1988; Fairweather and Keating, 1994; 
Willock et al, 1999b; Gomez-Limon and 
Riesgo, 2004; Maybery et al, 2005; Bjornlund, 
2006; Bjornlund et al, 2007; Bjornlund et al, 
2009; Kuehne et al, 2008; Nicol et al, 2008; 
Wheeler et al, 2008; Loch et al, 2012).   
Cross tabulate different irrigator groups with: 
 Intentions to buy or lease more dry land 
and/or irrigated acres. 
 
 Intentions to trade water. 
 
 Intentions to upgrade irrigation equipment. 
 
 
Table 4.5 – Hypothesis Five 
Hypothesis 5 How to Test 
Different groups of irrigators will have 
different re-allocation policy preferences 
regarding water re-allocation. 
(Beus and Dunlap, 1990; English et al, 2002; 
Whittlesey, 2003; Jackson-Smith and Buttell, 
2003; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; 
Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005;  Zilberman and 
Schoengold, 2005; Bjornlund, 2006; Bjornlund 
et al, 2007; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Kuehne et al, 
2008; Nicol et al, 2008; Bjornlund et al, 2009; 
Schwarz et al, 2009). 
 
Cross tabulate different cluster solutions with: 
 Re-allocation preferences and policy 
options. 
 
 
 
4.2 Study Area 
 The area under investigation is the area defined by the draft South Saskatchewan 
Regional Plan (SSRP) (Figure 4.2.2).  This area includes thirteen irrigation districts and 
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approximately 1367 private irrigation license holders (Nicol et al 2010, Hohm, 2012).  
According to Holm (2012) there were roughly 7,000 irrigation users in southern Alberta in 
2012, although that number is very difficult to quantify because of land transfers.  Since 
irrigated acres are more of an accurate representation of irrigation in southern Alberta, it is 
important to identify the amount of irrigated land in the basin.   According to Alberta 
Agriculture and Rural Development, as of 2013 there was approximately 525,000 hectares 
of irrigated land within the irrigation districts, while irrigation on land held by private 
licensed holders was approximately 100,000 hectares (AARD, 2013).   
  The annual discharge may vary substantially from year to year with the Southern 
tributaries of the Oldman River sub-basin displaying the highest variability (AMEC, 2009).  
Total water allocations in the SSRB are approximately 5,454,039 dam3 accounting for 
roughly 58% of the average annual discharge (AMEC, 2009).  The majority of irrigation 
water is used for forage and cereals (Woods and Winter, 2012).   
 
Figure 4.1 – Irrigated Crops in Irrigation Districts, 2010 
(Woods and Winter, 2012). 
38%
13%14%
4%
31%
Irrigated Crops 2010
Within 13 Irrigation Districts
Forages Oilseeds Specialty Other Cereals
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Figure 4.2 – Study Area 
(Government of Alberta, 2013: 157). 
 
4.3 Research Tools 
Both personal interviews and a survey instrument were used to test the hypotheses.  
Combining qualitative and quantitative research techniques serves to avoid over-
generalizations.  Investigating local factors that may have not been explored in the existing 
literature may be crucial in understanding the research problem, as well as adding detail to 
quantitative data (Corbin and Strauss, 2007).  Combining qualitative and quantitative 
research methods is a common research strategy using focus groups, follow-up interviews 
or personalized interviews (Gasson, 1973; Beus and Dunlap, 1991; Fariweather and 
Keating, 1994; Salamon et al, 1997; Corner et al, 1999; Darnhofer et al, 2005; Maybery et 
al., 2005; Loch et al, 2012).  Qualitative interviews before the development of the survey 
instruments provides a greater conceptual understanding of the issues at the irrigator level 
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which is essential when creating an effective survey instrument (Corbin and Strauss, 2007).  
Irrigators were interviewed to help create attitude and value statements for the survey 
instrument used for this research (Section 4.4).     
Nine key informants were interviewed during June and July of 2011.  The key 
informants were irrigation farmers from the Western Irrigation District (WID), Lethbridge 
Northern Irrigation District (LNID), the Eastern Irrigation District (EID) and the Saint 
Mary River Irrigation District (SMRID). They were chosen through personal and 
professional leads.  All key informants had to agree, either in writing or verbally before the 
interview, to the consent form approved of by the University of Lethbridge Committee on 
Human Subjects Research (Appendix B).  The consent form ensures the anonymity of the 
key informants, and for this reason, names are not given.  The ensuing interviews were 
loosely based on a series of questions (Appendix A).  Of the nine key informant interviews, 
citations from five key were used creating value and attitude statements (Section 4.4).  The 
four who were not used did not provide attitude and value specific knowledge.  Instead they 
informed the researcher by providing a better understanding of farming as a vocation and 
lifestyle.   
The interview guide used for the key informant interviews was designed to explore: 
i) importance of irrigation to the farmer; ii) attitudes and values towards water allocation 
and WFL strategies; and iii) personal demographics and farm characteristics (Appendix A).  
These questions frequently lead to other topics, and they were not strictly followed during 
the interviews.  The focus of the preliminary round of interviews was to gain a local 
understanding of the issue, not to conduct a rigorous qualitative analysis of the sample 
population.  The core focus of the methodology is to test a representative sample of the 
irrigator population, via survey, so that findings from the literature can be tested 
adequately.    
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In order to achieve the second and third research objectives identified in Chapter 
One, both a survey questionnaire and a second round of qualitative interviews were used.   
The survey was designed to identify irrigators’ influences towards water transfers by 
identifying several characteristics such as attitudes, values, intentions to expand, and other 
farm characteristics (Appendix C).  The survey instrument was primarily used to test the 
five research hypotheses, and the differences of irrigators’ intentions towards water trading 
and long-termed water transfers.  The results of the survey are outlined in Chapter Five.  
After the survey results were analysed, a second round of qualitative interviews was 
conducted with irrigation district board members, government officials, and other members 
of the irrigation community.  This round of interviews substantiated the survey results by 
addressing officials and professionals in the field.  The results from the second round of 
interviews are discussed in Chapter Six.   
The survey was chosen as a primary data collection technique for its ability to 
address large segments of the population.  A telephone survey method was chosen after 
considering literature that suggests telephone surveys provide greater accuracy, decreased 
risk of response bias, increased flexibility and, typically, increased response rates; over 
mail out surveys (Dillman, 1978; Dillman, 1991; Sellers, 2000).  Telephone interviews also 
have the benefit of being conducted by trained interviewers, as opposed to mail out surveys 
being dependent on the participant carefully following the directions of the survey (Sellers, 
2000).  While mail-out surveys typically have a cost-savings benefit and may capture the 
most enthusiastic responses; the performance of telephone surveys often outweighs the 
performance of mail-out surveys (Dillman, 1978; Dillman, 1991).  The telephone survey 
option was tested on two irrigators and one employee of a calling company.  The telephone 
survey was tested for length and clarity.  Incentives were offered to encourage participation 
in the form of inclusion in a draw for two cash prizes of $500 each.  The draw was 
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conducted by a calling company hired to conduct the survey by randomly selecting two of 
the respondents. 
Telephone numbers were chosen based on postal codes within the SSRB within 
which irrigation was practiced.  This was done in order to reach the proper geographic 
coverage within the study area.  This information was derived from available postal code 
maps and written information from Canada Post and Statistics Canada.  Once these postal 
codes were identified, a list of residents living in these postal codes, with name address and 
phone number, was purchased from a list provider.  Members of the list with town 
addresses and business names clearly not related to farming were removed from the list.  
More phone numbers were obtained from a list of water license holders provided by 
Alberta Environment.  Many of these license holders had licenses for irrigation use.   
The calling company was then told to recruit respondents from this list using a 
random sampling technique.  A first screening question was used asking the respondents if 
there were over 18, and were either part of an irrigation district or had their own license for 
irrigation uses.  If they did not the interview was terminated and the number deleted from 
the list.  A second screening question asked if the participant was the long-term decision 
maker for their farm.  This was asked because long-termed decision makers who own the 
land must approve of a water transfer or transfer or irrigated acres, under the Water Act and 
Irrigation Districts Act.  The remaining screening questions addressed farmers’ locations, 
water sources, and what the priority dates on their licenses were if they were private license 
holders.  These were asked to get location-specific information, and to understand how 
representative the survey was.  A discussion of the response rate is in Section 4.7. 
4.4 Survey Structure 
 The telephone survey was administered to both private and district irrigators.  As 
discussed in the Policy Context, there are major differences between district irrigators and 
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private license holders who are allocated water for irrigation purposes.  Private irrigators 
are in charge of the construction and maintenance of their own delivery and conveyance 
systems, and have the right to directly transfer some or all of his/her license via transfers.  
District irrigators cannot sell water rights to different license holders via a transfer 
agreement.  As private irrigators were asked slightly different questions than district 
irrigators (Appendix C), the survey was therefore divided into two separate data sets 
reflecting private irrigator and district irrigator responses.  A series of screening questions 
in part two of the survey was responsible for separating the data set (Appendix C). 
 The survey instrument was used to collect data in order to test all five hypotheses.   
As such, the survey instrument needed to gather irrigators’ farm characteristics and 
demographics; and  irrigators’ values and attitudes towards water tranfers, farming, social 
acceptance and the socioeconomic impacts of transfering water; as well as their policy 
preferences.  The following sub-sections provide the components of the survey that 
gathered this information. 
4.4.1 – Value Statements 
 Parts three and four of the survey gathered information about respondents’ values 
towards farming and water trading.  The goal of these value statements is to identify 
farmers’ values concerning both farming as a vocational behavior; and towards water 
transfers as a mechanism to re-allocate water.  The value statements were created based on 
the concepts in the literature, and from the key informant interviews.  Following the 
literature suggesting farmers hold economic, lifestyle and conservation motives to varying 
degrees the following value statements were created.  Values statements were asked on a 
scale of 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree.  All value and attitude statements were 
based on a 7 points likert scale, directly following recommendations in the TRA and TPB 
literature (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1970; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). 
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Table 4.6 – Economic Value Statements 
Value Statement Academic Relevance Key Informant 
Support 
A1-a: A maximum annual 
financial return from your farm is 
your most important goal. 
  
“Dollars and cents is what farming is 
all about” 
- Maybery et al, 2005 
 
“Financial gain is the only reason for 
my involvement in farming” 
- Keuhne et al, 2008 
 
A1-d: Increasing the asset value 
or net worth of your farming 
operation is very important to 
you. 
  
“Important/Unimportant: Increasing 
the asset value or net worth of the 
farm” 
- Austin et al, 1996 
 
A1-g: You view your farming 
operation as first and foremost a 
business investment. 
  
“I view my farm as first and foremost a 
business enterprise” 
- Maybery et al, 2005  
 
A1-l: When faced with decisions 
that affect the way you manage 
your farm financial concerns tend 
to outweigh lifestyle 
considerations. 
“My land is just something I use to 
generate an income” 
- Kuehne et al, 2008 
 
 
A1-m: When faced with decisions 
that affect the way you manage 
your farm financial concerns tend 
to outweigh environmental 
concerns.   
 
 
“My land is just something I use to 
generate an income” 
- Kuehne et al, 2008 
 
 
B2-d: Irrigation water should not 
be transferred to non-agricultural 
users 
Skepticism towards water transfers as 
identified in: 
- Nicol et al, 2008 
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B2-f: Temporary leases of water 
are ok, but permanent sales of 
water are not. 
Reluctance of re-allocation as 
expressed in WID 2007 transfer to 
M.D. of Rockyview. 
- Described in Policy Context 
Chapter 
 
Market activity and reluctance for re-
allocation as described in: 
- Bjornlund et al, 2007; Nicol et al, 
2008 
 
 
B2-k: Permanent water transfers 
between farmers are ok but 
trading water out of agriculture 
is not. 
Market activity and reluctance for re-
allocation as described in: 
- Bjornlund et al, 2007; Nicol et al, 
2008 
 
 
Table 4.7 – Lifestyle Value Statements 
Value Statement Academic Relevance Key Informant 
Support 
A1-c: The lifestyle that comes 
with living in a rural area is very 
important to you. 
  
“The lifestyle that comes with being 
on the farm is very important to me” 
- Maybery et al, 2005 
 
A1-e: For you, a rural 
environment is a better place to 
live than an urban environment. 
  
“Farming communities are a great 
place to live” 
- Maybery et al, 2005 
 
A1-h: Rural communities are a 
great place to live and raise a 
family. 
  
“A rural environment is a great place 
to raise children” 
- Maybery et al, 2005 
 
A1-j: You make farm decisions 
based on how they will affect 
future generations farming on 
your land. 
  
“Motives: ‘Following in the family 
tradition’” 
- Austin et al, 1996 
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“’Custodian’” motives: replicate the 
farm, with children all owning farm” –  
Kuehne and Bjornlund, 2008 
A1-k: Having land to pass down 
to future generations is more 
important than selling it for 
profit. 
“Motives: ‘Following in the family 
tradition’” 
- Austin et al, 1996 
“’Custodian’” motives: replicate the 
farm, with children all owning farm” –  
Kuehne and Bjornlund, 2008 
 
 
Table 4.8 – Conservation Value Statements 
Value Statement Academic Relevance Key Informant 
Support 
A1-b: Managing environmental 
problems on your land is a high 
priority. 
  
“Managing environmental problems 
on my farm is a very high priority” 
- Maybery et al, 2005 
 
“Humans must live in harmony with 
nature in order to survive”  
- Sullivan et al, 1996 
 
 
A1-f: Your right to do what you 
want with your water allocation 
has to be balanced against wider 
environmental concerns. 
  
“We should restrain consumption of 
natural resources now to protect 
future generations” 
- Petzrelka et al, 1996 
 
Based on Stern’s (2000) “biospheric 
values”  
 
A1-i: Having enough water in 
rivers and streams to support 
healthy ecosystems is important to 
you. 
  
Based on Stern’s (2000) “biospheric 
values”  
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A1-n: When faced with decisions 
that affect the way you manage 
your farm,environmental concerns 
tend to outweigh lifestyle 
considerations. 
“Land stewardship by farmers is more 
important than anything else about 
farming” 
- Maybery et al, 2005 
 
B2-J: Re-allocating water from 
irrigation to water conservation 
objectives is beneficial to society. 
 
“I think it’s pretty much 
justified but the only thing 
is if I transferred acres to 
my son I wouldn’t want to 
see no 10% there, but I 
think you can live with 
10%” 
- Key Informant 2, 2011    
B2-a: Rivers and streams of 
southern Alberta are 
environmentally degraded due to 
low flows. 
 
“…The spinoffs created by 
irrigation are huge!...All I 
know about this irrigation 
stuff is if we had more dams 
and off stream storage over 
the last four years we would 
have enough irrigation 
water for the next 20 years” 
- Key Informant 3, 2011 
4.4.2 – Attitude Statements 
Attitude statements were meant to measure attitudes towards socio-economic 
impacts of water transfers.  In order to do this the potential outcomes of water transfers 
were created in attitude statements, along with the social acceptance of the use of water 
transfers, and attitudes towards risk factors that may affect the decision to re-allocate water.  
These attitude statements are identified in parts four, five, six and seven of the survey 
(Appendix C).  Attitude statements were partially based on the TRA and TPB literature 
analysing attitudes as dispositions towards certain outcomes (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1970; 
Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977).   As a result, a scenario was given to 
both private and district irrigators: 
A non-agricultural user has approached your irrigation 
district with a proposition to permanently purchase 
water.  The irrigation district is going to hold a 
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plebiscite to approve the sale of water to the non-
agricultural user.  The irrigation district plans to spend 
the money made from the sale to upgrading its 
infrastructure to result in increased water use 
efficiency. 
- For District Irrigators; and 
A non-agricultural user has approached you to buy 
some of your water rights.   
- For Private Irrigators 
These scenarios were given in order to measure attitudes directed towards the socio-
economic outcomes of water re-allocation via transfers.  These statements were created 
considering TRA and TPB literature recommending that attitudes constructs are placed 
around as specific a topic as possible (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1970; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; 
Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen, 2011).  The first set of attitude statements (C1) measures 
the attitudes towards various outcomes of water transfers.  This addresses the literature 
suggesting that attitudes towards socio-economic impacts of re-allocation affect trading 
behaviour (Bjornlund, 2002; Tisdell and Ward, 2003; Burton, 2004; Bjornlund and Rossini, 
2005).  These attitudes were asked on a scale from 1 extremely negative to 7 extremely 
positive (Appendix C). 
 
 
 
 
 61 
 
Table 4.9 – Attitudes towards outcomes of transfers 
Outcome of Transfer Academic Relevance Key Informant Support 
C1-a: Move water away from 
agriculture. 
Fears from irrigators over permanent 
water re-allocation strategies. 
- Bjornlund et al, 2007; Nicol et al, 
2008; Bjornlund et al, 2009. 
When asked about having 
less water for agriculture:  
“It would have to be a win-
win [for irrigation districts 
and municipalities or 
industries].  We can’t reduce 
supply in the districts” 
- Key Informant 5, 2011 
C1-b: Satisfy the water demands 
of a municipality 
 
“It’s the city people that 
think ‘forget the farmers we 
need the water’.  They say 
that but if that happens then 
good look finding food to 
eat.  We need to protect the 
irrigated land out here” 
- Key Informant 2, 2011 
C1-c: Satisfy the water demands 
of an industry 
 
“Well, if referring to oil 
drilling, no I don’t think it 
should be. I mean if it is 
used for environment I have 
no issues, but for drilling I 
think they already use 
enough water” 
-  Key Informant 3, 2012 
C1-d: Increase water use 
efficiency 
Typical outcome of enabling tradable 
water rights. 
- Based off Nicol and Klein, 2006b 
literature review 
 
 
C1-e: A 10% holdback of the 
traded volume to meet water 
conservation objectives. 
Skepticism over WCOs. 
- Bjornlund et al, 2007 
“I think it’s pretty much 
justified but the only thing is 
if I transferred acres to my 
son I wouldn’t want to see 
no 10% there, but I think 
you can live with 10% ” 
- Key Informant 1, 2011   
C1-f: Less water for irrigation.  
“It’s the city people that 
think ‘forget the farmers we 
need the water’.  They say 
that but if that happens then 
good look finding food to 
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eat.  We need to protect the 
irrigated land out here” 
- Key Informant 2, 2011 
C1-g: Irrigation infrastructure 
improvements (For District). 
Identifying how much this outcome 
matters to irrigators.  This is asked 
given irrigators in the WID expressing 
opposition towards the 2007 transfer 
to the M.D. of Rockyview. 
- Bjornlund et al, 2009. 
“Well, I know that there are 
pros and cons to it. The pros 
are that they are moving the 
water now through a main 
closed line so they are not 
losing as much. Water that 
we are losing is going to 
Balzac, so kind of a win-win 
situation. If there someone 
just pulling water out of the 
well canal system I think I 
would have an issue with 
that” 
-  Key Informant 1, 2011 
C1-h: Money made from sale (For 
Private). 
Potential financial outcome and 
incentive for private irrigators to trade 
water. 
- Nicol et al, 2010 
 
B2-c: There is an increasing 
demand for water from 
municipalities and industries in 
southern Alberta. 
Measuring the importance of C1-b 
and C1-c.  Taken from weighted 
outcome variables expressed in TRA 
and TPB literature. 
- Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975; Ajzen 
and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen, 1985 
 
 
B2-b: You are aware of your 
abilities to buy or sell water with 
other farmers. 
Lack of knowledge of benefits or 
costs of trade as market barrier due to 
lack of information: 
- Thobani, 1997; Nicol et al, 2008 
When asked about his 
knowledge of water 
transfers, or water trading: 
“You know what, I really 
don’t know. I couldn’t even 
give you a guess on that. 
Never been approached or 
approached anyone myself. 
From what I can tell 
everyone is using their 
pivots this year” 
- Key Informant 4, 2011 
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B2-g: More water should be set 
aside for irrigation. 
 
“It’s the city people that 
think ‘forget the farmers we 
need the water’.  They say 
that but if that happens then 
good look finding food to 
eat.  We need to protect the 
irrigated land out here”  
- Key Informant 2, 2011 
B2-e: Irrigation water should 
only be permanently sold to non-
agricultural users if the money 
made from the sale goes towards 
increasing agricultural water use 
efficiency (for example, fixing 
canals or installing pipelines 
resulting in a net savings of 
water). 
 
“Well, I know that there are 
pros and cons to it. The pros 
are that they are moving the 
water now through a main 
closed line so they are not 
losing as much. Water that 
we are losing is going to 
Balzac, so kind of a win-win 
situation. If there someone 
just pulling water out of the 
well canal system I think I 
would have an issue with 
that”  
- Key Informant 1, 2011 
B2-i: Re-allocating water from 
irrigation to municipalities and 
non-agricultural users is 
beneficial to society. 
Analysing attitudes towards 
transferring water to municipalities 
and non-agricultural users.  
Skepticism towards this mentioned in: 
- Bjornlund et al, 2007 
 
The second set of attitude statements (C2) measure perceived social acceptability 
towards water transfers.  This addresses the literature suggesting that there are strong social 
influences associated with farming and water transfers (Potter and Gasson, 1988; Samdahl 
and Robertson, 1989; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Tisdell et al, 2001; Jackon-Smith and 
Buttel, 2003; Burton, 2004; Kuehne et al, 2008).  These attitude statements were asked on a 
scale of 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree. 
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Table 4.10 – Attitudes towards Social Acceptance  
Social Acceptance 
Statement 
Academic Relevance Key Informant Support 
C2-a: Members of your family 
would think it’s a good idea. 
Attitudes and values towards social 
acceptability: Family influences as 
mentioned in: 
- Gasson, 1973; Potter and Gasson, 
1988; Fairweather and Keating, 
1994;Tisdell et al, 2001; Kuehne 
et al, 2008 
 
Statement created to mirror social 
affects as displayed by TRA and TPB 
literature on social affects: 
- Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975; Ajzen 
and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen, 1985; 
Beedell and Rehman, 1999; 
Beedell and Rehman, 2000; 
Corbett, 2002 
 
 
C2-b: Members of your 
community would think it’s a 
good idea. 
Attitudes and values towards social 
acceptability: Community influences 
as mentioned in: 
- Potter and Gasson, 1988; Tisdell 
et al, 2001; Morris and McBeth, 
2003; Kuehne et al, 2008. 
 
Statement created to mirror social 
affects as displayed by TRA and TPB 
literature on social affects: 
- Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975; Ajzen 
and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen, 1985; 
Beedell and Rehman, 1999; 
Beedell and Rehman, 2000; 
Corbett, 2002 
 
 
C2-c: The government would 
think it’s a good idea. 
 
When asked about how the 
government would feel 
about a possible 10% 
holdback for a WCO: 
“I’m sure they would think 
it’s a good idea.  But not too 
many folks outside of that 
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group would think it’s a 
good idea” 
- Key Informant 5 
C2-d: Your neighbours and 
friends would think it’s a good 
idea. 
Social influences as mentioned in: 
Fairweather and Keating, 1994; 
Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Tisdell et 
al, 2001; Maybery et al, 2005; 
Kuehne et al, 2008. 
 
C2-e: Members of agricultural 
communities and organizations 
would think it’s a good idea. 
‘Effects of social group affiliations’ 
- Morris and McBeth, 2003; 
Kuehne et al, 2008. 
 
C2-f: Recreational users of rivers 
and streams would think it’s a 
good idea. 
 
All informants expressed 
that they use reservoirs for 
recreation.  As described by 
one: 
“…they have a lot of 
investments out there on the 
lake (reference to Lake 
McGregor) and it’s 
important to keep that going.  
But it is water for irrigation 
and that’s its purpose” 
- Key Informant 2 
 
C2-g: Professionals, scientists 
and members of environmental 
groups would think it’s a good 
idea. 
Taken from environmental concerns 
expressed by some in the 
environmental scientific community 
and environmental lobby groups. 
- Christensen and Droitsch, 2008 
 
Analysing the effects of that attitude 
on behaviour as highlighted in the 
social influences of TRA and TPB 
literature. 
- Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975; Ajzen 
and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen, 1985 
 
 
C2-h: Other irrigators around 
where you live would think it’s a 
good idea. 
Social influences as mentioned in: 
- Fairweather and Keating, 1994; 
Beedell and Rehman, 2000; 
Tisdell et al, 2001; Maybery et al, 
2005; Kuehne et al, 2008 
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C2-i: Your irrigation district 
would think it’s a good idea (For 
District). 
Measuring the effect of location, and 
professional and agricultural 
affiliations: 
- Dent et al, 1995; Willock et al, 
1999a; Tisdell et al, 2001; 
Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Kuehne and 
Bjornlund, 2008. 
 
 
B2-h: Municipalities and other 
non-agricultural users should be 
more efficient with their water. 
 
“I don’t see a lot of 
unnecessary use of water 
from the farmers.  The 
[urban] grass growers tick 
me off. I think the city needs 
to regulate that better.  Then 
we wouldn’t have guys 
stripping the topsoil and 
watering so much.  That in 
itself would be a big boost. It 
is very water intensive. 
Some years when it’s dry 
people use a lot of water” 
- Key Informant 5, 2011 
C3-g: Growing water demands 
from industries 
Measuring how strong the influence 
of growing demand for industries is 
on irrigators’ decision to transfer. 
Taken from analysing TRA and TPB 
literature on social affects: 
- Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975; Ajzen 
and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen, 1985. 
 
“Well, if referring to oil 
drilling, no I don’t think it 
should be. I mean if it is 
used for environment I have 
no issues, but for drilling I 
think they already use 
enough water” 
- Key Informant 3, 2011 
C3-i: Growing water demands 
from communities 
Measuring how strong the influence 
of growing demand from communities 
is on irrigators’ decision to transfer.  
Taken from analysing TRA and TPB 
literature on social affects: 
- Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975; Ajzen 
and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen, 1985. 
 
 
C3-j: Environmental water 
demands 
 
“Let’s not worry about all 
the environmentalism right 
away.  Look at the Oldman 
dam, everyone complained 
about it before it happened.  
Now look at it. The 
environment is fine and we 
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have water! … It’s about 
ensuring supply” 
- Key Informant 3, 2011 
The third and final set of attitude statements (C3) are based on points made in the 
literature suggesting that attitudes towards risk and economic factors influence farming 
decisions and water transfer decisions (Dent et al, 1995; Petzrelka, 1996; Gomez-Limon 
and Riesgo, 2004; Darnhofer et al, 2005; Bjornlund, 2006; Brooks and Harris, 2008; 
Wheeler et al, 2008).  These risk factors were measured by asking the survey participants if 
the factors were 1 not all important to 7 very much important. 
Table 4.11 – Attitudes towards risk factors 
Risk Statements Academic Relevance Key Informant Support 
C3-a: Uncertainty about the costs 
and benefits associated with the 
trade 
Lack of knowledge of benefits or costs 
of trade as market barrier due to lack 
of information: 
- Thobani, 1997; Nicol et al, 2008 
 
C3-b: Plans to expand your 
farming operation 
Farm size and investments affecting 
water trading behaviour: 
- Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; 
Bjornlund, 2006. 
 
C3-c: Annual precipitation 
patterns. 
 
“It really came in 2004, and 
since then it has been too 
wet all the time, so 
irrigation hasn’t really 
helped that much.  It has 
helped in that you can 
fertilize an 80 bushel crop 
instead of worrying about 
the rain to grow such a large 
crop” 
- Key Informant 2, 2011 
C3-d: Rising or declining 
commodity prices. 
Commodity prices affecting on-farm 
income and crop production. 
- Bjornlund et al, 2007; Wheeler et 
al, 2008;  
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C3-e: Rising or declining 
operations costs. 
Farm size and investments affecting 
water trading behaviour: 
- Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; 
Bjornlund, 2006. 
 
C3-f: Uncertainty about the 
future of your farm. 
 
“I think it’s pretty much 
justified but the only thing is 
if I transferred acres to my 
son I wouldn’t want to see 
no 10% there but I think you 
can live with 10%” 
- Key Informant 1, 2011    
B2-l: You would feel more 
comfortable transferring your 
unused allocations rather than 
water you are actually using. 
Addressing about property rights and 
consumptive use vs. total allocations 
as described by: 
- Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; 
Thobani, 1997; Easter et al, 1999; 
Bjornlund et al, 2009 
 
Recommendation Five “The minister 
must clarify the amount of water the 
licensee is entitled to transfer.  The 
Water Act does not deal clearly with 
this and it must ultimately be resolved 
for the transfer system to achieve its 
full potential” 
- Minister’s Advisory Group, 2009 
 
The attitude and value statements were used to test hypothesis one: ‘irrigators will 
hold a diversity of values towards farming and water trading; and diverse attitudes towards 
social acceptance, risk, and socio-economic impacts of re-allocation.’ The remaining 
hypotheses were tested through gathering information on goals, intentions and objectives; 
policy preferences; demographics; and farm characteristics.  The survey questions 
gathering this information are in parts eight and nine of the survey (Appendix C). 
4.4.3 – Goals, Intentions and Objectives 
 Goals and objectives towards trading water, farm expansion and upgrading 
irrigation equipment were asked (D1, D2, E17, E18, E19).  This information was useful for 
testing hypothesis four, that irrigators will have different long term goals and objectives for 
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their farms.  It is expected that buyers will have different characteristics than sellers (Nicol 
et al, 2008; Loch et al, 2012); irrigators will have different trading histories, and those who 
have traded in the past will likely trade in the future (Gomez-Limon and Risego, 2004; 
Bjornlund, 2006; Loch et al, 2012); and there will be limited room for efficiency gains 
through irrigation equipment upgrades (Nicol et al, 2010). 
Table 4.12 – Trading or Transfer intentions and past behaviour 
Intentions Past Behaviour 
D1-a: Purchase a lease of water. 
 
D2-a: Leased out water? 
 
D1-b: Permanently buy water. 
 
D2-b: Permanently sold water? 
 
D1-c: Sell a lease of water. 
 
D2-c: Purchased a lease of water? 
 
D1-d: Permanently sell some of your water 
allocation. 
 
D2-d: Permanently bought water? 
 
D1-e: Vote ‘yes’ in a plebiscite to 
permanently sell some district water to 
outside of the district 
- District only. 
D2-e: Has your irrigation district held a 
plebiscite in the last five years regarding a 
sale of water, and if so, what did you vote 
in that plebiscite? 
- District only 
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Table 4.13 – Intentions to upgrade irrigation equipment 
Intentions to upgrade over next five years Past upgrades over last five years 
E17-a: Convert from flood/gravity to wheel 
move. 
Converted from flood/gravity to wheel 
move. 
E17-b: Convert from wheel move to pivot 
irrigation. 
Converted from wheel move to pivot. 
E17-c: Convert from flood/gravity to pivot 
irrigation. 
Converted from fllod/gravity to pivot. 
E17-d: Convert from high pressure pivot 
system to low pressure pivot system. 
Convert from high pressure pivot system to 
low pressure pivot system. 
E17-e: Purchase a computer panel for 
your pivot system. 
Purchased a computer panel for pivot 
system. 
In order to assess the effects of succession on farm decision making, respondents 
were also asked if they had a successor lined up for the farm (E5).  This is a specific 
variable that will not make up the clusters or the factors, but will rather be compared to 
each cluster created from the demographic data.  This question about succession borrows 
from the literature suggesting that successor-ship plays a major role in long term farm 
decision making, of which water rights are a part of (Gasson, 1973; Potter and Gasson, 
1988; Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; Kuehne et al, 2008).   
 4.4.4 – Demographics 
Demographic data were used to test hypothesis two: ‘groups of irrigators will be 
identified based on their farm characteristics and demographics’.  This borrows from 
extractive-commodity research suggesting that socio-demographics have an influence on 
attitudes towards the environment (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Lowe and Pinhey, 1982; 
Samdahl and Robertson, 1989; Morris and McBeth, 2003; Huddard-Kennedy et al, 2009).   
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Table 4.14 – Demographic Data 
Demographic Data Academic Relevance 
E2- Age 
“Age Hypothesis” – Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980 
 
Used in other research concerning farmers values and 
attitudes (Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Tisdell et al, 
2001; Darnhofer et al, 2005; Maybery et al, 2005; 
Kuehne et al, 2008). 
E6- Education 
Extractive-commodity literature regarding attitudes and 
preferences (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Lowe and 
Pinhey, 1982; Samdahl and Robertson, 1989; Morris and 
McBeth, 2003; Huddard-Kennedy et al, 2009). 
E7, E8- Net Household Income 
- Percentage coming from 
farming and land use 
Extractive commodity literature highlighting importance 
of off-farm and on-farm income as influencing 
environmental views and preferences (Van Liere and 
Dunlap, 1980; Samdahl and Robertson, 1989; Beus and 
Dunlap, 1990). 
 
Dependence on irrigation as a farm characteristic 
influencing irrigators’ trade decisions (Tisdell et al, 
2001; Bjornlund, 2003a; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 
2004; Kuehne et al, 2008). 
Other demographic questions were asked that were not used to directly test 
hypothesis two.  This is done in order to embrace model parsimony and include variables 
that are most specific to irrigation uses.  Punj and Steward (1983) contend that cluster 
analysis should be used with variables that have a strong conceptual background and that 
will not skew results.  A more detailed discussion of the use of cluster analysis is provided 
in section 4.7.   Demographic data such as E1 gender (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980), E3 
marital status, E4 number of children, E20, E21, E22 social group affiliation (Morris and 
McBeth, 2003; Kuehne et al, 2008), and E10 generations living on the farm (Tremblay and 
Dunlap, 1978; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Beus and Dunlap, 1990; Huddart-Kennedy et 
al, 2009) will be collected to observe differences between the clusters. 
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4.4.5 – Farm Characteristics 
 Farm characteristics were used in conjunction with demographics in order to test 
hypothesis two.  It was hypothesized that different groups of irrigators will have different 
dependencies on irrigation (Tisdell et al, 2001; Bjornlund, 2003a; Gomez-Limon and 
Riesgo, 2004; Kuehne et al, 2008) and will have different irrigation equipment (Tisdell et 
al, 2001; Burton, 2004; Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; Bjornlund et al, 2007).  As Nicol and 
Klein (2006b) point out, traded water tends to move water from lower valued crops to 
higher valued crops.  It is hypothesized that dependence on crops that need large amounts 
of irrigation water will coincide with a higher level of dependence on irrigation and 
therefore the use of more efficient types of irrigation equipment (Bjornlund, 2002; 
Bjornlund et al, 2007; Kuehne et al, 2008; Nicol and Klein, 2006b; Nicol et al, 2008). 
A farm characteristic that will not be included in the cluster analysis is E14 
inquiring if the farm supports a livestock operation.  This is of interest in order to see how 
much water was attached to cattle production, and to see if the findings mimic Nicol’s 
(2010) study indicating most private irrigators used irrigation water to support a larger 
livestock operation.  Responses between cattle producers and other types of farmers may 
therefore be of interest. 
Table 4.15 – Farm Data 
Farm Data Academic Relevance 
B3: Amount of water allocation used. 
“Percentage of water right used” as a variable in 
Bjornlund (2002). 
 
Dependence on irrigation as influencing motives and 
farm decisions (Bjornlund, 2002; Tisdell et al, 2001; 
Bjornlund, 2003a; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; 
Kuehne et al, 2008). 
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E11, E12- Irrigated land vs. Dry land 
Dependence on irrigation as influencing motives and 
farm decisions (Bjornlund, 2002; Tisdell et al, 2001; 
Bjornlund, 2003a; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; 
Kuehne et al, 2008). 
E13- Crops Grown  
Crop needs as important influences on trading 
activity (Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Austin et 
al, 1996; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; 
Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; Bjornlund, 2006; 
Nicol and Klein, 2006b). 
E16- Irrigation Systems 
Farm investments as important influences on trading 
activity (Tisdell et al, 2001; Burton, 2004; 
Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; Bjornlund et al, 2007). 
 
4.4.6 – Policy Preferences 
 The final set of questions focused on policy preference statements that were used to 
test hypothesis five.  The policy preference statements were drawn from the Policy Context, 
highlighting current issues being debated in Alberta towards water policy.  Most of these 
issues concern recommendations made by the Minister Advisory Group in 2009 regarding 
protected water and WCOs.  The other statements inquired about other institutional barriers 
to trade in Alberta as highlighted in the Policy Context, such as the FITFIR system, and the 
role of government intervention in the water market (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; 
Thobani, 1997; Easter et al, 1999; Horbulyk, 2005; Nicol et al, 2008; Bjornlund et al, 
2009).   
Table 4.16 – Policy Preference Statements 
Policy Preference 
Statement 
Academic Relevance 
B1-a: The government, rather than market 
forces, should get to decide who uses Alberta’s 
water. 
Chong and Sundig (2006) making reference to 
conflicting public interests being an impediment to 
trading. 
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Social equity concerns over market allocation (Tisdell 
et al, 2001; Bakker, 2007; Christensen and Droitsch, 
2008). 
B1-b: If an irrigation district or private license 
holder is not using all of their water allocation, 
the government should be able to take that 
water for environmental purposes, without any 
compensation. 
Approved water management plan’s proposal to “allow 
a part of a licence to be cancelled. The present Water 
Act only permits cancellation of a full allocation. This 
is an obstacle to the desired objective of being able to 
match actual water needs with allocations.” (Alberta 
Environment, 2006: 17).   
B1-c: Minimum flows of water should be set for 
all rivers and streams, and only the water above 
those minimum flows should be used for 
economic purposes such as irrigation. 
Analysing skepticism towards WCOs and in-stream 
flow objectives (Bankes and Kwasniak, 2005; 
Bjornlund et al, 2007). 
 
Global experience suggesting it is difficult to balance 
economic, social and ecological goals and objectives 
(Thobani, 1997; Bauer, 1997; Solanes and Gonzalez-
Villarreal, 1999; Tisdell et al, 2001; Bjornlund, 2003b; 
Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Bjornlund, 2010). 
B1-d: Private groups and individuals should be 
able to hold water licenses for environmental 
purposes. 
Policy literature highlighting the effects of user-based 
participation in managing water (Thobani, 1997; 
Solanes and Gonzalez-Villarreal, 1999; Meinzen-Dick, 
2007; Bjornlund, 2010). 
 
Minister’s Advisory Group (2009) concerning 
recommendation 2 over protected water: 
“assess[ing] the potential role of water trusts as a 
vehicle for acquiring licenses through the transfer 
process for WCO purposes on an arms’ length basis.” 
 
B1-e: Water that is saved through improved 
water use efficiency should be used to increase 
economic activity. 
Intentions from the literature suggest increases in water 
use efficiency may lead to increases in water use 
(English et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 2003; Bjornlund et al, 
2009). 
 
Irrigators’ intentions to increase crop yields and reduce 
energy costs, as opposed to re-allocating water to rivers 
(Bjornlund et al, 2007; Bjornlund et al, 2009). 
Minister’s Advisory Group  
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B1-f: The government should buy water from 
current license holders, like irrigation districts, 
so that more water can be left in the rivers. 
In reference what is happening in Australia (Kuehne et 
al, 2008). 
 
Minister’s Advisory Group (2009) advising the 
government use a number of actions to ensure WCO 
targets including “acquiring water allocations 
(preferably senior) in the name of the Province through 
the transfer process to meet specific WCO purposes.” 
B1-g: The seniority of a water license must be 
honored under all circumstances. 
Attitudes towards FITFIR system as being very strong 
amongst irrigation users (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 
1994; Tarlock, 2001; Zilberman and Shoengold, 2005; 
Adamowicz et al, 2010). 
 
Attitudes towards FITFIR as compared to proportional 
shares based allocation (Huffnaker et al, 2000; 
Horbulyk, 2005; Bjornlund, 2010; He et al, 2012). 
B1-h: Public funds should be used to improve 
irrigation systems only if the water that is saved 
is left in rivers. 
In reference to the current pay ratio of 75:25 between 
the Province and irrigation districts.  Some 
environmental lobbyists see this as justification to take 
efficiency gains and put them in the rivers (Christensen 
and Droitsch, 2008). 
 
Concerning irrigators’ intentions to use efficiency gains 
to irrigate more crops instead of re-allocating water 
(including to environmental purposes). 
- English et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 2003; Bjornlund et 
al, 2009 
B1-i: If water is to be traded among irrigation 
districts and/or municipalities, the government 
should set the price. 
Social equity concerns over market allocation (Tisdell 
et al, 2001; Bakker, 2007; Christensen and Droitsch, 
2008). 
 
Attitudes towards public allocation vs. market 
allocation (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Dinar et 
al, 1997; Tarlock, 2001; Bjornlund et al, 2007; 
Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Kuehne et al, 2008). 
 
 Based on the literature review it was anticipated that most irrigators will have 
negative views of WCOs, and a negative view of water transfers (Bjornlund et al, 2007; 
Nicol et al, 2008).  It is also hypothesized that the majority of irrigators will want to use 
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water saved from efficiency gains, rather than to sell it or re-allocate it for environmental 
purposes (English et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 2003; Bjornlund et al, 2009).   
4.5 Data Analysis 
 Once the survey data was collected two statistical methods were applied: factor 
analysis was applied to the value and attitude constructs, while cluster analysis was applied 
to the farm characteristic and demographic data.  In order to test hypotheses three, four and 
five, cross tabulation using Chi-Square was used with the appropriate cluster solution and 
the variables under investigation.  This section discusses factor analysis, cluster analysis, 
and cross tabulation methods and their applicability towards the research.   
4.5.1 – Factor Analysis 
 The focus of exploratory factor analysis is to “…identify the fewest possible 
constructs needed to reproduce the original data” (Gorusch, 1997: 533).  In other words, 
factor analysis provides the ability to identify trends in the data, or to reduce a complex 
data set into general factors that can be used to explain underlying trends. Factor analysis 
avoids the problems associated with using broad attitude and value constructs to classify 
types, especially with several types of attitudes and values being present (Austin et al, 
1996).  With factor analysis, the individuals involved are not of intrinsic interest except for 
the variance they contribute to the defining factors (Reinmann, 2008; Padgett, 2011).  
Concerning the attitude and value statements, factor analysis identifies underlying factors 
that explain the variance in the data.  This method has been used extensively to analyse 
value and attitude data (Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Austin et al, 1996; Petzrelka, 1996; 
Austin et al, 2001; Maybery et al, 2005).  It is mentioned by Willock et al (1999a; 1999b) 
and Austin et al (1998a; 1998b) as a eddential step in analysing major constructs in 
psychological data. 
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 As mentioned previously, it is expected thatirirgators will express a diversity of 
attitudes and values.  This makes it difficult to conceputally separate individuals based on 
attitude and values.  This is highlighted by Austin et al (1998a) and Willock (1999a) as a 
reason why it is difficult to classify irrigators.  This is why they suggested to identify 
factors, as opposed to types, and to treat irrigators individually instead of collectively.   
 The suitability of the data for factor analysis was determined by the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) statistic.  The KMO compares correlation and partial correlation coefficients 
(Kaiser, 1974).  Kaiser (1974) developed a scale measuring the general acceptability of a 
KMO statistic from below 0.50 as being unacceptable to 0.90 as being marvellous. 
Barlett’s test of sphericity was also examined.  This tests the null hypothesis that the 
variables in the population correlation matrix are uncorrelated (Foster et al, 2005).  When it 
is significant, the test indicates that the data is suitable for factor analysis. In addition, a 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix analysing the variables was also examined.  This was to make 
sure that the statistical significance was not confused with practical significance (de Winter 
et al, 2009).  Analysing a correlation matrix is useful for identifying variables that have 
poor correlations with others (Reinmann et al, 2008; de Winter et al, 2009).  DeVaus 
(2002) suggests the strength of correlations for social sciences be used on a scale from 0-
0.09 being trivial to over 0.70 as being very strong. 
Internal consistence was measured using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, and by 
analysing the inter-item correlations (Reinmann et al, 2008).  The Cronbach’s alpha scores 
have been described by Reinmann et al (2008) from less than 0.5 being unacceptable to 0.9 
as being excellent. 
With smaller sample sizes, or small numbers of items, analysing the mean of inter-
item correlations is a good test of reliability (de Winter et al, 2009).  An inter-item 
correlation mean of over 0.2 usually indicates satisfactory reliability in the sample (de 
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Winter et al, 2009).  The factor extraction method used was principal components. Padgett 
(2011) notes that Varimax orthogonal axis rotation method is common because it focuses 
on making as many values in each column of the factor loading coefficient table as close as 
possible to zero, thereby providing a simple explanation of the latent factors.  Varimax 
orthogonal axis rotation was therefore used to simplify the task of interpreting the factor 
components (Padgett, 2011).   
 The number of factors was chosen by a number of criteria including: i) Kaiser’s 
eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule; ii) Cattell’s scree test; iii) analysis of rotated sum of 
squares loadings and what the percentage of variance explained is by each factor (Costello 
and Osborne, 2005; Courtney, 2013).  It is also good practice to stop including factors when 
they stop making conceptual sense (Courtney, 2013).  Very simple structure criterion could 
not be applied to the data because it was not available on the version of SPSS used by the 
researcher.  The factor extraction process was, therefore, partially subjective as both the 
eigenvalues and the scree plot were analysed in order to decide on the number of factors.  
This decision was based on the importance of using a variety of factor extraction 
techniques, as Kaiser’s commonly used eigenvalues-greater-than-one rule may lead to over-
factoring or under-factoring of the data (Courtney, 2013). Items used in the Varimax 
orthogonal rotated solutions needed a minimum factor loading of 0.5 in order to be 
assigned to corresponding factors.  This is well above the recommended minimum factor 
loading of 0.32 as discussed by Costello and Osborne (2005).   
4.5.2 – Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis was used with farm data and demographic data in order to test 
hypotheses two, three, four and five.  Exploratory cluster analysis was used as a tool to 
analyse and explain irrigators’ intentions, attitudes, values and policy preferences.  As 
mentioned in the Literature Review and in the hypotheses section, clustering demographics 
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is common in the extractive-commodity and marketing literature (Straughan and Roberts, 
1999; Schoon and Grotenhuis, 2000; Laroche et al, 2001; Bjornlund, 2002; 
Diamantopoulos et al, 2003; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2004; Vandermersch, 2006; 
Kuehne et al, 2008).   
Agglomerative hierarchical clustering is often the most preferred method because it 
is easy to interpret, and clusters can be chosen based on intuitive sense and by a number of 
cluster validation techniques (Punj and Stewart, 1983; Adams, 2003).  Using this method, 
the number of clusters to include is decided by:  i) viewing a dendrogram; ii) internally 
valide the clusters by cross tabulating the variables creating the clusters with the different 
cluster groups; and by iii) validating the data externally by cross tabulating variables that 
did not make the clusters with various cluster solutions (Punj and Stewart, 1983).  This 
forms the basis for comparing the most well defined clusters when testing  hypotheses 
three, four and five. 
The Ward’s Minimum Variance Cluster Analysis with Squared Euclidean Distance 
was chosen as it is one of the most commonly used algoritihms (Reimann et al, 2008; 
Padgett, 2011).  Ward’s method usually forms groups in a manner that limits loss of 
information (Adams, 2003; Reimann et al, 2008).  It is, however, sensetive to the effects of 
outliers (Reinmann et al, 2008).   
Some have criticized the use of cluster analysis for lacking statistical vigor (Adams, 2003; 
Dolnicar, 2003).  It is most often used as a data mining technique, and with hiearchical 
cluster analysis, various clusters will always be found regardless of how well they actaully 
relate to one another.  This research takes the conceptual approach of clustering irrigators 
according to demographics and farm charctiersitcs, which are well cited in the literature as 
being defining factors for irrigators’ water transfer decisions (Tables 4.4.9 and 4.4.10).  As 
such, the use of exploratory cluster analysis is acceptable in this case, with the proper 
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internal and external validation (Punj and Stewart, 1983).  As Punj and Stewart (1983: 146) 
explain “ideally, only a small number of variables should be required to classify 
individuals.  This classification should then have implications beyond the narrow set of 
classification variables.” This validation will be done with the use of cross tabulation. 
4.5.3 – Cross Tabulation 
 Cross tabulation is a popular method to investigate comparisons between two 
categorical variables (De Vaus, 2002).  The Chi-Square statistical test was used to test the 
strength of association in the cross tabulations.  As an inferential technique, the Chi-Square 
test offers an estimate of the likelihood that an association observed in the sample data 
exists in the population from which the sample was drawn.  This test indicates the strength 
of the relationship between the variables.  Chi-Square tests have a requirement that no more 
than 20% of cells have expected counts of less than five (Miller et al, 2002).  Cross 
tabulation was used to test hypotheses two, three, four and five; in particular to validate the 
clusters internally and externally (Punj and Stewart, 1983).  Cramer’s V test was also used 
as an additional measure of association.  For a Cramer’s V test 0 indicates the absence of 
association, where 1 indicates perfect association (De Vaus, 2002).   
4.6 Response Rate 
In total there were 9,648 numbers that were called and approximately 1230 
respondents that qualified for the survey (were farmers who had irrigated land).  Out of the 
1230 respondents that qualified, 319 completed the survey giving a response rate of 25.9%.  
Out of the 319 that completed the survey, 89 were private irrigators and 230 were district 
irrigators. The 8,419 that did not qualify, did not do so as they: i) did not farm irrigated 
land; ii) were under the age of 18; and/or iii) did not have a water license.  The status of 
those who did not qualify may be ambiguous because many refused to answer whether or 
not they were irrigators.   
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Not everyone completed the entire survey.  For the private irrigators, there are a low 
of 85 responses for some variables used for factor analysis.  Given there are over 1,000 
private licenses for irrigation use (Nicol et al, 2010; AARD, 2013), the private survey data 
has a margin of error greater than 5%, and a confidence level of less than 95% (Raosoft, 
2014).  However, approximately 14,791ha of irrigated land was held by private irrigators 
who account for approximately 15.5% of all land held by private irrigators in the province 
(AARD, 2013).  From a land-use perspective, this data has a margin of error less than 5% 
and a confidence level of more than 95% (Raosoft, 2014). 
There were 230 responses from district irrigators; however, as for the private 
irrigators not everyone completed the entire survey.  There were a low of 222 responses for 
some of the variables used in factor analysis.  In total, the district irrigators controlled 
73,450ha of irrigated land (Table 4.7.1).  From a land use perspective, the district irrigator 
sample has a margin of error less than 5% and a confidence level of more than 95% 
(Raosoft, 2014).  Private and district irrigators were grouped together for the factor analysis 
and cluster analysis.  The amount of land represented by complete cases in the cluster 
analysis was 77,025 hectares by 263 cases.  This is because many refused to answer 
questions surrounding crop types, and land represented by crop types in 2011. 
As a result of the sample size, and composition of the survey data, caution should be 
taken when assuming it is completely representative.  While a significant proportion of 
irrigated land is represented, both in the private and district data, it may not represent the 
total amount of cases to a 95% confidence level.  It is difficult to establish the exact number 
of farmers that use water for irrigation purposes because it is attached to land, and land is 
bought, leased and sold all the time (Hohm, 2012).  This is why it is important to represent 
a significant sample of the irrigated land.  This also likely means that large private 
landowners are more represented than smaller ones as the 89 private irrigators in the data 
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represents over 15.5% of all privately irrigated land.  The difference between total number 
of cases, and irrigated land area is important when interpreting the results. 
Table 4.17 – Irrigated hectares represented from Irrigation Districts 
Irrigation District Total Irrigated 
Hectares 
Sample Irrigated 
Hectares 
% of Irrigation 
District 
Western Irrigation 
District 
27,375 1,631 5.96% 
Eastern Irrigation 
District 
111,267 14,515 13.05% 
Bow River 
Irrigation District 
80,209 14,403 17.96% 
Lethbridge 
Northern Irrigation 
District 
49,526 9,764 19.71% 
St. Mary River 
Irrigation District 
138,712 22,662 16.34% 
Mountain View 
Irrigation District 
426 182 42.72% 
Leavitt Irrigation 
District 
1,862 951 51.07% 
Aetna Irrigation 
District 
781 340 43.53% 
Magrath Irrigation 
District 
4,528 1168 25.80% 
United Irrigation 
District 
6,992 522 7.47% 
Raymond 
Irrigation District 
13,065 3,123 23.90% 
Taber Irrigation 
District 
31,110 4,189 13.47% 
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Ross Creek 
Irrigation District 
427 0 0.00% 
Total 466,280 73,450 15.75% 
*Irrigated hectares from AARD, 2013: 8. 
 As is identified in table 4.17, some districts are proportionally over-represented in 
the sample, while others are under-represented.  In particular, the smaller irrigation districts 
such as Aetna, Leavitt, and Mountain View have a high degree of representation in the 
sample.  Some of the larger irrigation districts, particularly the Western and Eastern 
irrigation districts, have proportionally lower representation in the sample.  A reason for 
this is the size differences between each district.  Nevertheless, it is important to point out 
that each district is not equally represented in the sample. 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has described the methods that were employed to achieve the research 
objectives.  The bulk of this chapter described the survey instrument that was used.  This 
method was the primary data extraction technique.  As discussed, a second round of 
qualitative interviews was conducted with five key informants representing Alberta 
Environment, Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development, the Alberta Irrigation Projects 
Association, the Eastern Irrigation District and the St. Mary River Irrigation District.  The 
next chapter focuses on the survey instrument, and how the data matches the literature by 
testing the research hypotheses.  Chapter six investigates the responses of the key 
informants to describe the survey results.   
 
 
 
 
 84 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
SURVEY RESULTS 
5.0 Introduction 
 The goal of this chapter is to report on the information collected from the telephone 
survey.  This was done by testing the research hypotheses outlined in the Methodology 
chapter.  These findings contribute to achieving the second and third research objectives, 
which are to: i) Investigate the factors that influence irrigators’ intentions to engage in 
water transfers in the SSRB;  and ii) Investigate irrigators’ policy preferences towards re-
distributing water and the government’s role in transfers.  Groups of farmers are also 
identified based on their farm characteristics and demographics. 
5.1 Omitted Variables 
As discussed in the Methodology chapter, outliers are a serious issue concerning 
factor analysis and cluster analysis (Anderberg, 1973; Padgett, 2011).   The data were 
therefore analysed to determine levels of skew-ness.  If variables had over 85% of the 
responses leaning one way, or another, they were considered outliers and were excluded 
from the factor analysis.  The cut-off point of 85% was decided upon after reviewing 
literature pertaining to outlier detection techniques (Hodge and Austin 2004; Costello and 
Osborne, 2005; Padgett, 2011).  Categories were compressed from a seven point likert scale 
to a three point scale, in order to identify levels of skew-ness.  Categories 1 to 3 in the likert 
scale were combined to represent one category; category 3 was left alone; and categories 4 
to 7 were combined to represent the third category.  Factor analysis was, however, 
conducted using the seven point scale as it displays more variance than the compressed 
three point scale. 
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Table 5.1 – Omitted Variables 
Omitted Variable District Responses (%) Private Responses (%) 
A1-b: Managing environmental 
problems on your land is a high 
priority. 
DA – 3.9 
N – 4.8 
A – 91.3 
DA – 4.5 
N – 9 
A – 86.5 
A1-c: The lifestyle that comes with 
living in a rural area is very 
important to you. 
DA – 2.6 
N – 3.9 
A – 93..5 
DA – 2.2 
N – 2.2 
A – 95.5 
A1-d: Increasing the asset value or 
net worth of your farming operation 
is very important to you. 
DA – 3.1 
N – 6.1 
A – 90.8 
DA – 4.5 
N – 10.1 
A – 85.4 
A1-e: For you, a rural environment 
is a better place to live than an 
urban environment. 
DA – 2.2 
N – 4.8 
A – 93 
DA – 1.1 
N – 1.1 
A – 97.8 
A1-h: Rural communities are a 
great place to live and raise a 
family. 
DA – 2.6 
N- 3.9 
A – 93.5 
DA – 2.2 
N – 3.4 
A – 94.4 
A1-i: Having enough water in 
rivers and streams to support 
healthy ecosystems is important o 
you. 
DA – 2.2 
N – 1.3 
A – 96.5 
DA – 1.1 
N – 9 
A – 89.9 
A1-j: You make farm decisions 
based on how they will affect future 
generations farming on your land. 
DA – 3.1 
N – 4.4 
A – 92.5 
DA – 3.4 
N – 5.6 
A – 91 
A1-k: Having land to pass down to 
future generations is more 
important than selling it for profit 
DA – 5.7 
N – 9.3 
A - 85 
DA – 5 
N – 10 
A – 85 
B2-c: There is an increasing 
demand for water from 
municipalities and industries in 
southern Alberta. 
DA – 3.9 
N – 8.7 
DA – 3.4 
N – 10.1 
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A – 87.4 A – 86.5 
B2-h: Municipalities and other 
non-agricultural users should be 
more efficient with their water. 
DA – 1.3 
N- 10.9 
A – 87.8 
DA – 4.5 
N – 5.7 
A – 89.8 
DA- Disagree, N – Neutral, A – Agree, NG – Negative, P- Positive.  
Before running factor analysis, the data were tested for reliability using a correlation 
matrix identifying inter-item correlations. Variables that did not have any correlation with 
another item of at least 0.3 were eliminated from the factor analysis as they contribute little 
towards explaining the variance in the data set (Costello and Osborne, 2005; Padgett, 
2011).  Items with weak inter-correlations are not usually good indicators of factors as they 
are considered “noise” in the data that alters the results of factor analysis (Costello and 
Osborne, 2005).  During two rounds of reliability tests, a total of 14 statements were 
removed because their inter-correlations were lower than 0.2.  One statement was removed 
because it did not correlate with at least 0.3 with any other item in the correlation matrix 
(Table 5.1.2). 
Table 5.2 – Items Removed due to Low Correlation  
Item Removed Inter-Item Correlation 
A1-a: A maximum annual financial return from 
your farm is your most important goal. 
0.141 
A1-g: You view your farming operation as first and 
foremost a business investment. 
0.189 
A1-l: When faced with decisions that affect the way 
you manage your farm environmental concerns tend 
to outweigh lifestyle considerations. 
0.174 
A1-m: When faced with decisions that affect the 
way you manage your farm financial concerns tend 
to outweigh environmental concerns.   
0.175 
B2-b: You are aware of your abilities to buy or sell 
water with other farmers. 
0.159 
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B2-d: Irrigation water should not be transferred to 
non-agricultural users 
-0.078 
B2-e: Irrigation water should only be permanently 
sold to non-agricultural users if the money made 
from the sale goes towards increasing agricultural 
water use efficiency (for example, fixing canals or 
installing pipelines resulting in a net savings of 
water). 
0.2 
(Did not correlate with at least 0.3 with any item). 
B2-f: Temporary leases of water are ok, but 
permanent sales of water are not. 
0.104 
B2-g: More water should be set aside for irrigation. 0.184 
B2-k: Permanent water transfers between farmers 
are ok but trading water out of agriculture is not. 
0.053 
C1-a: Move water away from agriculture. 0.189 
C1-f: Less water for irrigation. 0.152 
C2-c: The government would think it’s a good idea. 0.030 
C2-f: Recreational users of rivers and streams 
would think it’s a good idea. 
0.092 
C2-g: Professionals, scientists and members of 
environmental groups would think it’s a good idea. 
0.117 
Furthermore, statements a1_n- “When faced with decisions that affect the way you 
manage your farm environmental concerns tend to outweigh lifestyle considerations” and 
b2_l- “You would feel more comfortable transferring your unused allocation rather than 
water you are actually using” had low communalities of 0.253 and 0.230 respectively.  
Costello and Osborne (2005) recommend items with communalities less than 3.5 be 
removed from the data in order to achieve robust results.  Most of the removed statements 
were value statements. These statements, showing near unanimously weak inter-item 
correlations may hint that the data is better structured for two factor analyses as opposed to 
one.  To test this possibility, reliability tests were ran on the value data only.  After 
numerous rounds of reliability tests, the highest Cronbach’s alpha that was achieved was 
0.643 for seven statements, which is considered low by most standards (Costello and 
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Osborne, 2005; Reinmann et al, 2008; Padgett, 2011; Courtney, 2013).   The failure of 
these variables to fit in the model effectively removed the majority of the value statements 
from the factor analysis.  This low fit is most likely due to the high amount of value 
statements with extreme response bias being taken out of the reliability test (Costello and 
Osborne, 2005).    
 Factor analysis was conducted with the remaining 23 statements.  After one round 
of factor analysis it was discovered that that c3-a – “uncertainty about the costs and 
benefits associated with the trade” and c3-j  - “Environmental water demands” were cross-
loaders having high correlations with two factors.  Costello and Osborne (2005) note that 
cross-loaders can skew the results significantly, and that if possible should be removed 
from the analysis.   
 The remaining 21 statements were tested for reliability and produced a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.860.  The KMO statistic for the remaining statements reached 0.828, and the 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant indicating that the data was suitable for factor 
analysis.  All item communalities were over 0.4 as recommended by Costello and Osborne 
(2005).  The 21 statements were therefore deemed acceptable and factor analysis was 
conducted. 
5.2 Factor Analysis  
 The factor analysis performed on the 21 statements indicated 5 factors with an 
eigenvalue of higher than 1.0 accounting for 62.44% of the data (Table 5.2.1).  It was, 
however, decided after analysing the factor loadings and Scree plot that 4 factors would be 
extracted (Figure 5.2.1). This follows the advice of Costello and Osborne (2005) and 
Padgett (2011) suggesting that the most appropriate rule about when to stop accepting 
additional factors is when they stop making sense conceptually.  The four factor solution 
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made much more conceptual sense than the five factor solution.  The four factors account 
for 57.43% of the variation taken by the factors in the data (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 – Total Variance Explained 
Componen
t 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Tota
l 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulativ
e % 
Tota
l 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulativ
e % 
Tota
l 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulativ
e % 
1 5.77 27.49 27.49 5.77 27.49 27.49 4.06 19.32 19.32 
2 2.65 12.61 40.10 2.65 12.61 40.10 3.55 16.90 36.22 
3 2.20 10.49 50.59 2.20 10.49 50.59 2.30 10.98 47.19 
4 1.44 6.84 57.43 1.44 6.84 57.43 2.15 10.24 57.43 
5 1.05 5.01 62.44             
6 0.90 4.31 66.75             
7 0.76 3.60 70.35             
8 0.74 3.51 73.85             
9 0.71 3.37 77.23             
10 0.63 3.02 80.25             
11 0.58 2.75 83.00             
12 0.53 2.52 85.52             
13 0.51 2.41 87.93             
14 0.47 2.24 90.17             
15 0.42 2.02 92.19             
16 0.39 1.87 94.06             
17 0.37 1.78 95.84             
18 0.28 1.35 97.19             
19 0.25 1.18 98.37             
20 0.20 0.97 99.34             
21 0.14 0.66 100.00             
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Figure 5.1 – Scree Plot 
 All variables had a factor loading above 0.5 with one of the four factors (Table 5.4).  
The first factor accounts for 19.32% of the variance in the rotated data (Table 5.3).  This 
factor corresponds with risk attitudes, citing that decisions to transfer water are based on 
uncertainty over input costs, the future of the farm, and the future demand for water from 
communities or industries.  This factor is named risk-averse attitude to highlight this.  The 
second factor accounts for 16.9% of the variance in the rotated data, and very closely 
corresponds with the importance of the social acceptance of water transfers.  This factor is 
named social acceptance attitude to reflect this.  The third factor, accounting for 10.98% of 
the variance in the rotated data, indicates pro-sharing attitude.  The components of this 
factor mainly reflect favourable attitudes towards satisfying the water demands of a 
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municipality and/or industry.  These factor components also include favourable views 
towards increasing water use efficiency, indicating a desire to “expand” the resources by 
increasing use efficiency and thereby provide increased supply for their own or others use.   
Table 5.4– Rotated Components Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
a1_f –Your right to do what you want with your water allocation has to be balanced 
against wider environmental concerns: Level of agreement from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree. 
.012 .037 .040 .653 
b2_a – Rivers and streams of Southern Alberta are environmentally degraded due to 
low flows: Level of agreement from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
.177 .068 -.137 .574 
b2_i -- Re-allocating water from irrigation to municipalities and non-agricultural 
users is beneficial to society: Level of agreement from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree. 
-.015 .145 .564 .426 
b2_j -- Re-allocating water from irrigation to water conservation objectives is 
beneficial to society: Level of agreement from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
.091 .052 .281 .688 
c1_b -- Satisfy the water demands of a municipality: Level of agreement from 
extremely negative to extremely positive. 
.146 .045 .870 .049 
c1_c -- Satisfy the water demands of an industry: Level of agreement from extremely 
negative to extremely positive. 
.206 .176 .775 .022 
c1_d -- Increase water use efficiency Level of agreement from extremely negative to 
extremely positive. 
.065 .126 .581 .101 
c1_e -- A 10% holdback of the traded volume to meet water conservation objectives: 
Level of agreement from extremely negative to extremely positive. 
.119 -.050 .230 .648 
c2_a -- Members of your family would think it's a good idea: Level of agreement 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
.167 .780 .172 .038 
c2_b -- Members of your community would think it's a good idea: Level of 
agreement from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
.057 .784 -.001 .107 
c2_d -- Your neighbours and friends would think it's a good idea: Level of 
agreement from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
.155 .863 .106 .006 
c2_e -- Members of agricultural communities and organizations would think it's a 
good idea: Level of agreement from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
.124 .809 .127 .040 
c2_h -- Other irrigators around where you live would think it's a good idea: Level of 
agreement from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
.136 .853 .128 -.012 
c3_b -- Plans to expand your farming operation: How much this factor influences 
decision to approve of a transfer of water from not at all to very much. 
.566 .066 .093 -.235 
c3_c -- Annual precipitation patterns: How much this factor influences decision to 
approve of a transfer of water from not at all to very much. 
.656 .077 .168 .096 
c3_d -- Rising or declining commodity prices: How much this factor influences 
decision to approve of a transfer of water from not at all to very much. 
.781 .220 .055 .077 
c3_e -- Rising or declining operations costs: How much this factor influences 
decision to approve of a transfer of water from not at all to very much. 
.825 .198 .037 .071 
c3_f -- Having a successor lined up for your farm: How much this factor influences 
decision to approve of a transfer of water from not at all to very much. 
.711 .043 .012 .039 
c3_g -- Growing water demand from industry: How much this factor influences 
decision to approve of a transfer of water from not at all to very much. 
.635 .049 .129 .276 
c3_h -- Uncertainty about the future of your farm: How much this factor influences 
decision to approve of a transfer of water from not at all to very much. 
.744 .070 .058 .109 
c3_i -- Growing water demand from communities: How much this factor influences 
decision to approve of a transfer of water from not at all to very much. 
.584 .117 .079 .354 
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The final factor is composed of pro-environmental values indicating a belief that Alberta’s 
rivers and streams are degraded, WCO holdbacks are good, and that land use must 
accommodate demands environmental purposes.   
 The attitude and value factor scores were assigned to each respondent in order to 
test research hypothesis 3: ‘different groups of irrigators will stress importance on different 
values towards farming and water trading; and attitudes towards social acceptance, risk and 
impacts of re-allocation.’  The factor scores were transformed into categorical variables so 
that they could be cross-tabulated with the cluster groups (Section 5.4).  After analysing 
their distribution, it was decided that factor scores should be categorized based on one-half 
standard deviation from the mean.  As such, each factor score was categorized in the 
following four ranges: 1=lowest to -0.4999; 2=-0.5 to 0; 3=0-0.4999; and 4= 0.5 to highest 
factor score.  These scores were categorized to eliminate problems with minimum cell 
counts that may render chi-square tests invalid (Miller et al, 2002; Padgett, 2011).   
5.3 Value and Attitude Associations with Trading or Transfer Intentions and Policy 
Preferences 
 In order to test the first research hypothesis, cross tabulation and chi-square tests 
were used to test for significant association between the value and attitude factors, and 
intentions and policy preferences.  This does not assume causality between the two.  To 
assume causality between such constructs may highlight problems associated with 
endogeneity bias (Duncan et al, 2004).  The Literature Review chapter highlights problems 
described in the attitude-behaviour connection literature with assuming causality between 
values, attitudes and behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977).  The parameters set in the 
survey provide a case that trading intentions may just as easily affect values and attitudes, 
as values and attitudes affect trading intentions.  Instead of assuming causality between 
these constructs, the purpose of this research is exploratory, taking a ‘snap shot in time’ of 
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irrigators’ values, attitudes, intentions and policy preferences.  Significant relationships 
between these constructs observed by chi-square tests simply identify associations between 
values and attitudes and certain trading or transfer intentions, and policy preferences.  
Responses towards trading intentions re-iterate skepticism found in the literature towards 
using market mechanisms to re-allocate water from agricultural purposes to non-
agricultural purposes (Bjornlund et al, 2007; Nicol et al, 2008) (Table 5.3.1).   
Table 5.5- Trading or Transfer Intentions Responses 
Intentions  Frequency Percentage 
d1_a -- Purchase a Lease of Water 
Unlikely 148 48.8% 
Neutral 44 14.5% 
Likely 111 36.6% 
d1_b--Permanently Buy Water 
Unlikely 139 45.9% 
Neutral 41 13.5% 
Likely 123 40.6% 
d1_c--Sell a Lease of Water 
Unlikely 242 79.9% 
Neutral 25 8.3% 
Likely 36 11.9% 
d1_d--Permanently Sell Water 
Unlikely 254 83.8% 
Neutral 27 8.9% 
Likely 22 7.3% 
d1_e—Vote 'Yes' in a Plebiscite 
Unlikely 179 81.0% 
Neutral 32 14.5% 
Likely 10 4.5% 
 
 Only value and attitude statements that were shown to have significantly different 
associations with trading intentions are reported in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8.  The level of 
risk-averse attitude, social acceptance attitude and pro-environmental values were 
significantly associated with some intentions to trade or transfer water.  Both risk-averse 
attitude and social acceptance attitude have significant associations with intentions to 
purchase a lease of water.  High risk-averse attitude tends to display neutral or likely 
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intentions to purchase a lease of water over the next five years, whereas a low risk-averse 
attitude tends to associate with a low level of intentions to purchase a lease of water (Table 
5.6).   
Table 5.6 – Risk-Averse Attitude and Trading or Transfer Intentions 
Trading Intention   Risk Averse Attitude 
  1 2 3 4 
d1_a -- Purchase a lease of water. */* 
 
Unlikely 30.9% 19.9% 20.6% 28.7% 
Neutral 14.3% 16.7% 19.0% 50.0% 
Likely 28.4% 12.7% 27.5% 31.4% 
d1_b -- Permanently buy water.  
Unlikely 29.9% 21.3% 19.7% 29.1% 
Neutral 22.5% 20.0% 17.5% 40.0% 
Likely 26.5% 10.6% 27.4% 35.4% 
d1_c -- Selling a lease of water. 
Unlikely 28.6% 17.4% 21.9% 32.1% 
Neutral 16.0% 8.0% 32.0% 44.0% 
Likely 28.1% 18.8% 21.9% 31.3% 
d1_d -- Permanently sell some of your water allocation. 
Unlikely 28.0% 16.5% 24.2% 31.4% 
Neutral 14.8% 14.8% 14.8% 55.6% 
Likely 38.9% 22.2% 16.7% 22.2% 
d1_e -- Vote 'yes' in a plebiscite to permanently sell some 
district water to outside of the district (District Only). 
Unlikely 26.7% 17.0% 21.2% 35.2% 
Neutral 26.7% 10.0% 33.3% 30.0% 
Likely 44.4% 22.2% 22.2% 11.1% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
 This finding indicates that variance in the perceptions towards risk factors, such as 
weather patterns, input costs, and farm uncertainties; are associated with different 
intentions to purchase a lease of water.  This may indicate that purchasing a lease of water 
is used by irrigators as a way to offset risks associated with variable input costs, crop needs, 
and other farm uncertainties.  This is consistent with the literature suggesting that 
motivations for permanent sales are different than motivations for temporary ones 
(Bjornlund, 2002; Bjornlund, 2003a; Bjornlund, 2003b; Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005; Nicol 
and Klein, 2006b; Kuehne and Bjornlund, 2008). Social acceptance attitude, on the other 
hand, tends to have the opposite effect (Table 5.7).  Low social acceptance attitude, or 
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views that social groups would disapprove of re-allocation, had a higher association with 
intentions to purchase a lease of water than high social acceptance attitudes.   
Table 5.7 – Social Acceptance Attitude and Trading or Transfer Intentions 
Trading Intention   Social Acceptance Attitude 
  1 2 3 4 
d1_a -- Purchase a lease of water. **/** 
Unlikely 32.4% 22.8% 14.7% 30.1% 
Neutral 47.6% 7.1% 7.1% 38.1% 
Likely 37.3% 11.8% 21.6% 29.4% 
d1_b -- Permanently buy water.  
Unlikely 31.5% 21.3% 18.1% 29.1% 
Neutral 47.5% 12.5% 7.5% 32.5% 
Likely 37.2% 12.4% 16.8% 33.6% 
d1_c -- Selling a lease of water. 
Unlikely 36.6% 16.5% 16.1% 30.8% 
Neutral 40.0% 8.0% 12.0% 40.0% 
Likely 31.3% 21.9% 18.8% 28.1% 
d1_d -- Permanently sell some of your water 
allocation. 
Unlikely 38.6% 16.9% 16.1% 28.4% 
Neutral 29.6% 7.4% 18.5% 44.4% 
Likely 16.7% 22.2% 11.1% 50.0% 
d1_e -- Vote 'yes' in a plebiscite to permanently sell 
some district water to outside of the district (District 
Only). 
Unlikely 35.8% 17.6% 15.2% 31.5% 
Neutral 50.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
Likely 22.2% 11.1% 33.3% 33.3% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
 Pro-environmental value displayed the most significant associations with intentions 
(Table 5.8).  High pro-environmental values are associated with low intentions to purchase 
a lease of water, whereas low pro-environmental values are associated with more of an 
intention to purchase a lease of water.  The same holds true with intentions to permanently 
buy water. Higher pro-environmental values also correspond with higher intentions to re-
allocate water via plebiscite.  This value seems to be associated with intentions to consume 
less water. 
 This finding is consistent with the extractive-commodity literature and studies 
pertaining to the categorisation of farmers based on their values (Beus and Dunlap, 1990; 
Beus and Dunlap, 1994; Maybery et al, 2005; Kuehne et al, 2008).  The pro-environmental 
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value that exists seems to encourage less water used for consumptive agriculture, and more 
water being conserved.    
Table 5.8 – Pro-Environmental Value and Trading or Transfer Intentions 
Trading Intention   Pro-Environmental Value 
  1 2 3 4 
d1_a -- Purchase a lease of water. **/** 
Unlikely 21.3% 19.9% 15.4% 43.4% 
Neutral 35.7% 16.7% 23.8% 23.8% 
Likely 34.3% 16.7% 25.5% 23.5% 
d1_b -- Permanently buy water. ***/*** 
Unlikely 22.8% 16.5% 18.1% 42.5% 
Neutral 30.0% 32.5% 10.0% 27.5% 
Likely 33.6% 15.0% 26.5% 24.8% 
d1_c -- Selling a lease of water. 
Unlikely 28.6% 17.9% 19.2% 34.4% 
Neutral 24.0% 32.0% 20.0% 24.0% 
Likely 28.1% 9.4% 28.1% 34.4% 
d1_d -- Permanently sell some of your water allocation. 
Unlikely 28.0% 18.2% 19.9% 33.9% 
Neutral 18.5% 22.2% 29.6% 29.6% 
Likely 44.4% 11.1% 11.1% 33.3% 
d1_e -- Vote 'yes' in a plebiscite to permanently sell 
some district water to outside of the district (District 
Only). */* 
Unlikely 29.1% 19.4% 21.2% 30.3% 
Neutral 16.7% 20.0% 16.7% 46.7% 
Likely 0.0% 11.1% 55.6% 33.3% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
 The next round of chi-square tests analysed the significant associations between 
risk-averse attitudes, pro-environmental value and policy preferences.  Social acceptance 
attitude and pro-sharing attitude did not display significant associations with policy 
preferences.  The policy preference responses were much more normally distributed than 
the trading intentions (Table 5.9).  The responses to the statements suggest that there is a 
reluctance to re-allocate water via market mechanisms.  This matches Bjornlund et al 
(2007) and Nicol et al (2008) findings indicating a general reluctance among irrigators to 
use market mechanisms to re-allocate water.  The findings also suggest that irrigators 
believe that if water is to be re-allocated, the government should not set the price, but 
should abide by the market rules.  There is also a general belief that water saved through 
efficiency gains should be used to increase economic activity, not to be re-allocated to 
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rivers and streams.  These perceptions among irrigators support the fear that some 
researchers have expressed that increased efficiencies may not lead to more water 
conservation, due to irrigators’ intentions to use the water (English et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 
2003; Bjornlund et al, 2009).   
Table 5.9 – Policy Preference Responses 
Policy Preference Statement  Frequency Percentage 
b1_a -- The government, rather than market forces, should determine 
who uses Alberta's water. 
SD 84 27.5 
N 78 25.6 
SA 137 44.9 
b1_b -- If an ID/private license holder isn't using all water allocation, 
the gov't should be able to take water for environmental purposes, w/o 
compensation. 
SD 246 80.7 
N 25 8.2 
SA 32 10.5 
b1_c -- Minimum flows of water should be set for all rivers and 
streams, and only the water above those minimum flows should be used 
for economic purposes. 
SD 68 22.3 
N 58 19.0 
SA 175 57.4 
b1_d -- Private groups and individuals should be able to hold water 
licenses for environmental purposes. 
SD 94 30.8 
N 91 29.8 
SA 117 38.4 
b1_e -- Water that is saved through improved water use efficiency 
should be used to increase economic activity. 
SD 24 7.9 
N 50 16.4 
SA 228 74.8 
b1_f -- The government should buy water from current license holders, 
like irrigation districts, so that more water can be left in the rivers. 
SD 164 53.8 
N 73 23.9 
SA 62 20.3 
b1_g -- The seniority of a water license must be honoured under all 
circumstances. 
SD 31 10.2 
N 32 10.5 
SA 239 78.4 
b1_h -- Public funds should be used to improve irrigation systems only 
if the water that is saved is left in rivers. 
SD 106 34.8 
N 74 24.3 
SA 122 40.0 
b1_i -- If water is to be traded among irrigation districts and/or 
municipalities, the government should set the price. 
SD 196 64.3 
N 51 16.7 
SA 53 17.4 
Underneath the intentions to use water, is, however, a fairly polarized level of 
environmental consciousness amongst the respondents.  When asked if public funds should 
be used to improve irrigation systems only if the water saved is left in rivers, responses 
tended to be bi-modal with similar numbers agreeing and disagreeing.  Furthermore, when 
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asked if private license holders should hold water for environmental purposes, the 
responses indicate general agreement.  This reiterates recent findings in the SSRB 
analysing the value orientations of rural and urban populations (Bjornlund et al, 2013a; 
2013b).   
Another similar finding is that the majority also believed that minimum flows 
should be set for rivers and streams, and only water above that minimum flow should be 
used for economic purposes (Bjornlund et al, 2013a).  The two value and attitude factors 
that had significant differences in policy preferences are risk-averse attitude and pro-
environmental value (Table 5.10 and Table 5.11)   
Table 5.10 – Risk-Averse Attitude and Policy Preferences 
Policy Preference Statement   Risk Averse Attitude 
  1 2 3 4 
b1_a -- The government, rather than market forces, should 
determine who uses Alberta's water. **/** 
SD 38.0% 8.9% 19.0% 34.2% 
N 22.1% 26.0% 16.9% 35.1% 
SA 24.0% 16.5% 28.9% 30.6% 
b1_b -- If an ID/private license holder isn't using all water 
allocation, the gov't should be able to take water for 
environmental purposes, w/o compensation. 
SD 26.6% 21.0% 23.1% 29.3% 
N 36.4% 4.5% 22.7% 36.4% 
SA 27.6% 10.3% 24.1% 37.9% 
b1_c -- Minimum flows of water should be set for all rivers and 
streams, and only the water above those minimum flows should 
be used for economic purposes. 
SD 22.6% 19.4% 19.4% 38.7% 
N 25.5% 16.4% 21.8% 36.4% 
SA 28.6% 16.1% 24.8% 30.4% 
b1_d -- Private groups and individuals should be able to hold 
water licenses for environmental purposes. */* 
SD 27.9% 11.6% 29.1% 31.4% 
N 19.3% 22.9% 18.1% 39.8% 
SA 33.6% 15.5% 21.8% 29.1% 
b1_e -- Water that is saved through improved water use 
efficiency should be used to increase economic activity. **/** 
SD 58.3% 12.5% 8.3% 20.8% 
N 22.9% 18.8% 31.3% 27.1% 
SA 24.6% 16.9% 22.7% 35.7% 
b1_f -- The government should buy water from current license 
holders, like irrigation districts, so that more water can be left 
in the rivers. 
SD 31.5% 13.4% 23.5% 31.5% 
N 23.2% 21.7% 18.8% 36.2% 
SA 20.3% 18.6% 27.1% 33.9% 
b1_g -- The seniority of a water license must be honoured 
under all circumstances. 
SD 40.7% 7.4% 25.9% 25.9% 
N 30.0% 23.3% 20.0% 26.7% 
SA 25.4% 17.0% 22.8% 34.8% 
b1_h -- Public funds should be used to improve irrigation 
systems only if the water that is saved is left in rivers. 
SD 30.3% 13.1% 21.2% 35.4% 
N 33.3% 21.7% 20.3% 24.6% 
SA 21.4% 17.0% 25.9% 35.7% 
 99 
 
b1_i -- If water is to be traded among irrigation districts and/or 
municipalities, the government should set the price. 
SD 27.7% 19.0% 22.3% 31.0% 
N 23.9% 17.4% 19.6% 39.1% 
SA 29.2% 8.3% 27.1% 35.4% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
Table 5.11 – Pro-Environmental Value and Policy Preferences 
Policy Preference Statement   Pro-Environmental Value 
  1 2 3 4 
b1_a -- The government, rather than market forces, should 
determine who uses Alberta's water. 
SD 32.9% 16.5% 15.2% 35.4% 
N 28.6% 14.3% 23.4% 33.8% 
SA 23.1% 22.3% 21.5% 33.1% 
b1_b -- If an ID/private license holder isn't using all water 
allocation, the gov't should be able to take water for 
environmental purposes, w/o compensation. 
SD 28.8% 18.8% 21.0% 31.4% 
N 22.7% 9.1% 22.7% 45.5% 
SA 24.1% 20.7% 13.8% 41.4% 
b1_c -- Minimum flows of water should be set for all rivers 
and streams, and only the water above those minimum flows 
should be used for economic purposes. 
SD 33.9% 21.0% 17.7% 27.4% 
N 34.5% 10.9% 27.3% 27.3% 
SA 23.0% 19.9% 19.3% 37.9% 
b1_d -- Private groups and individuals should be able to hold 
water licenses for environmental purposes. 
SD 34.9% 19.8% 15.1% 30.2% 
N 24.1% 21.7% 24.1% 30.1% 
SA 25.5% 13.6% 21.8% 39.1% 
b1_e -- Water that is saved through improved water use 
efficiency should be used to increase economic activity. 
SD 37.5% 16.7% 20.8% 25.0% 
N 22.9% 18.8% 25.0% 33.3% 
SA 28.0% 18.4% 18.8% 34.8% 
b1_f -- The government should buy water from current 
license holders, like irrigation districts, so that more water 
can be left in the rivers. **/** 
SD 32.9% 21.5% 18.8% 26.8% 
N 26.1% 15.9% 24.6% 33.3% 
SA 16.9% 11.9% 18.6% 52.5% 
b1_g -- The seniority of a water license must be honoured 
under all circumstances. 
SD 18.5% 14.8% 18.5% 48.1% 
N 36.7% 6.7% 20.0% 36.7% 
SA 28.1% 20.1% 20.5% 31.3% 
b1_h -- Public funds should be used to improve irrigation 
systems only if the water that is saved is left in rivers. 
SD 34.3% 21.2% 19.2% 25.3% 
N 23.2% 20.3% 24.6% 31.9% 
SA 25.0% 14.3% 18.8% 42.0% 
b1_i -- If water is to be traded among irrigation districts 
and/or municipalities, the government should set the price. 
**/** 
SD 32.6% 17.9% 15.2% 34.2% 
N 23.9% 23.9% 28.3% 23.9% 
SA 16.7% 12.5% 31.3% 39.6% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
Higher risk-averse attitudes tend to be associated with support for government 
control over allocation as opposed to market-based allocation (Table 5.10). High risk-
averse attitudes also tend to coincide with neutrality or disagreement over the issue of 
private ownership of licenses for environmental purposes.  The most marked difference in 
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policy preferences within the risk-averse attitude orientation is the issue of whether or not 
water saved through efficiency gains should be used to increase economic activity.  Low 
risk-averse attitude is associated with negative views towards using efficiency gains solely 
for economic purposes, whereas high risk-averse attitude are associated with neutrality or 
agreement with the use of efficiency gains for economic purposes. 
Higher pro-environmental value is associated with a positive views of government 
interference towards i) allocating water back into rivers and streams;  and ii) government 
setting prices for permanent water sales between irrigation districts and municipalities.  
This is consistent with the extractive-commodity literature suggesting that pro-
environmental views tend to have positive associations with more of a desire for 
government regulation (Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978; Beus and Dunlap, 1990; Beus and 
Dunlap, 1994).   
5.3.1 – Summary of Value and Attitude Relationships with Intentions and Policy 
Preferences 
 Risk-averse attitude and pro-environmental value are the factors which are mostly 
associated with differences in trading intentions and policy preferences.  High risk-averse 
attitude is associated with a desire to purchase more temporary water, and with more of a 
desire to use efficiency gains for economic purposes.  Pro-environmental value 
orientations, on the other hand, are associated with favourable views of conserving more 
water and putting unused water back into rivers and streams.  Pro-environmental value 
orientations generally support the role of the government in ensuring environmental 
protection and water conservation.  Low social acceptance attitudes towards re-allocation is 
associated with more of an intention to purchase temporary water, most likely indicative of 
the negative views of re-allocation (Bjornlund et al, 2007; Nicol et al, 2008).  These 
findings lead to the conclusion that hypothesis one is partially confirmed.  Underlying 
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value and attitude orientations did account for some of the variation of intentions and policy 
preference responses, but not all value and attitude orientations.  For instance, pro-sharing 
attitudes had no significant association with intentions or policy preferences; and social 
acceptance attitude was limited in its categorical differences in trading intentions and policy 
preferences.  The next step in the research is to identify groups of irrigators based on 
demographics and farm characteristics.  
5.4 Cluster Analysis 
 As discussed in the Methodology chapter, clusters of farmers were identified based 
on demographic and farm characteristics as set out in table 5.12: 
Table 5.12 – Cluster Analysis Variables 
Characteristics Variables 
Demographics 
Age 
Education 
Income derived from Land 
Farm Characteristics 
Amount of allocation used 
Proportion of irrigated land to dry land 
Crops Grown 
Irrigation Equipment  
 
 For hierarchical cluster analysis, the best results are obtained by clustering variables 
of the same type (i.e.: categorical to categorical, numeric to numeric) (Anderberg, 1973).  
The two-step clustering method is usually recommended for data that varies in nature 
(Anderberg, 1973).  Therefore, to yield the most robust results, numeric and string variables 
were re-coded into categorical variables.  Crops were first recoded from string variables to 
categories.  The percentage of land dedicated to each crop type is outlined in Table 5.14.  
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The crop categories used are listed in table 5.13 and are defined by using Alberta 
Agriculture and Rural Development crop reports (2011a; 2011b). 
As discussed in the Methodology chapter, not all land uses were known as many 
refused to answer the question in the survey.  There was one other use of irrigation, which 
was for mixed farming purposes accounting for 700 acres that is not represented in Table 
5.14.  Since most farmers in the sample irrigated more than one type of crop, four variables 
were created based on percentage of irrigated land in each crop type.  Each variable has the 
following categories: 1 = 0%-33%; 2 = 34%-66%; and 3 = 67%-100%.  Missing values 
were not used in the cluster analysis. 
The final farm characteristic that needed re-coding was irrigation equipment types.    
Respondents were asked roughly what percentage of their irrigated land was under 
gravity/flood, hand move, wheel move, high pressure centre pivot, and low pressure centre 
pivot.  This information was re-coded into three different variables, each representing 
different irrigation systems.  Each of these four variables was re-coded into the following 
categories depending on the percentage of the irrigated land in each irrigation equipment 
type: 1 = 0%-33%; 2 = 34%-66%; and 3 = 67%-100%. All relevant variables were then 
included into a hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis to group irrigators according to 
these farm characteristics.  Descriptive statistics, as well as preliminary cluster analysis 
results, showed that percentage of land under certain irrigation systems was not a good 
variable for clustering.  Problems arose because of outliers in the data, particularly for 
gravity/flood and hand move where more than 85% of respondents had between 0%-33% 
of their land covered by each irrigation system  
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Table 5.13 – Crop Classifications 
Crop Category Crop Types 
Grain Crops 
Barley – all types 
Wheat – all types 
Rye 
Buckwheat 
Forage Crops 
Alfalfa Hay 
Timothy Hay 
Fescues 
Pasture and Ranges 
Green Feed 
Oilseed Crops 
Canola 
Flax 
Specialty Crops 
Sugar Crops – Sugar Beets 
Potatoes 
Corn for Grain 
Fodder Corn 
Dry Beans 
Chickpeas 
Soybeans 
Canary Seed 
Lentils 
Triticale 
Sunflower 
Alfalfa Seed 
Mustard Seed 
Canola Seed 
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Most irrigation equipment types were heavily skewed one way or another, which 
has serious effects for Ward’s minimum variance clustering method (Anderberg, 1973; 
Adams, 2003; Rienmann et al, 2008).  For this reason, it was not practical to use irrigation 
systems information to internally validate the clusters.  Due to this, these variables were 
taken out of the cluster analysis and were instead used for external validation, after the 
clusters have already been created with the existing demographic and farm characteristic 
variables.    
Table 5.14 – Percentage of Land Dedicated to Crop Type 2011 
Crop Type Hectares Percentage 
Grain 27,293 35.43% 
Forage 19,772 25.67% 
Oilseed 18,418 23.91% 
Specialty 11,542 14.98% 
Total 77,025 100% 
Before cluster analysis began, the relationships between the variables were observed 
by analysing a Pearson’s correlation matrix.   The Pearson’s correlation matrix indicated 
that multi-collinearity was not strong, as the highest coefficient was 0.576, considered low 
by most standards (Anderger, 1973; Gujarati, 2003).  Nevertheless, variables with a 
coefficient higher than 0.50 were subjected to linear multiple regression generating VIFs.  
The highest VIF obtained from multiple regression was 2.5 indicating very low multi-
collinearity (Gujarati, 2003).  
 The final diagnostic was to check for outliers for the remainder of the variables.  
More than 86% of the respondents had between 0% and 33% of their land under specialty 
crop production.  This item was broken down further to investigate the amount of 
respondents at quartile levels.  More than 85% of respondents had between 0% and 25% of 
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their land under speciality crop production.  The variable representing land under specialty 
crop production was therefore removed from the cluster analysis, and was used as an 
external validation variable much like irrigation equipment.  The remaining items were then 
used for cluster analysis. 
 The number of clusters to be extracted from hierarchical cluster analysis is rather 
subjective (Anderberg, 1973; Punj and Stewart, 1983; Gujarati, 2003; Padgett, 2011).  It is 
first important to analyse a dendrogram (Figure 5.2) in order to visually identify the data.  
After analysing the dendrogram, it was decided that a three cluster solution was optimal.  
The variables included in the analysis were then compared against each cluster in order to 
offer some form internal validation, that is, to ensure that the variables used in the cluster 
analysis differ significantly between the clusters (Anderberg, 1973; Padgett, 2011).    
Table 5.15 – Cluster Composition 
Cluster Frequency Percentage 
1 87 33.0% 
2 113 42.8% 
3 64 24.2% 
Total 264 100% 
5.4.1 – Cluster Validation 
 Internal validation was conducted using Chi-square tests and Cramer’s V statistic.  
Each variable used in the cluster analysis was compared between cluster groups in order to 
identify differences.  Clusters that have high internal validity will have significant Chi-
square and Cramer’s V statistics indicating that the clusters have a significant degree of 
difference between the clusters.   
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Figure 5.2 – Dendrogram 
Age and education are not very different between the clusters (Table 5.16).  Age is 
found to be significant at the 10% level and education did not show any significant 
differences between clusters.  Cluster group 2 is the youngest with a larger proportion 
falling into the 36-45 year old and 46-55 year old ranges than the other two clusters.  
Cluster group 1 has more of its respondents in the 56-65 year old cohort than the other two 
clusters.     
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Table 5.16 – Demographic Variables 
Demographic 
Variable 
  Ward 
Method                              
  
  1 2 3 Total 
Age */* 
18-35 4.6% 8.8% 9.4% 7.6% 
36-45 6.9% 21.2% 17.2% 15.5% 
46-55 29.9% 31.0% 25.0% 29.2% 
56-65 37.9% 27.4% 26.6% 30.7% 
66 or older 20.7% 11.5% 21.9% 17.1% 
Education 
Completed high school or 
less 
28.7% 28.3% 28.1% 28.4% 
Some College/University 21.8% 21.2% 17.2% 20.4% 
Completed 
College/University 
44.8% 40.7% 48.4% 43.9% 
Some graduate school or 
more 
4.6% 9.7% 6.3% 7.2% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
Crop type is a defining feature of the clustered groups, despite the fact that the 
oilseeds category violated the minimum cell count requirements, and specialty crops not 
being included in the cluster analysis (Table 5.17).  The second cluster has more land 
dedicated to grain and oilseed production than the other two clusters.  Furthermore, 
specialty crop production was heavily represented in the second cluster, whereas the first 
and third clusters had a comparatively small amount of land dedicated to specialty crop 
production.  The third cluster proportionally has the most land dedicated to forage 
purposes, and proportionally had less land dedicated to oilseed and specialty crop 
production than the other two clusters.  The first cluster had most of its land dedicated 
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towards forage and grain production, but also had a sizeable amount dedicated to oilseed 
production.   
 
Table 5.17 – Crops by percentage of Irrigated Land, 2011 
Crop Type Percentage Wards Method  
1 2 3 Total 
Grain 
***/*** 
0-33% 64.4% 50.4% 79.7% 
62.1% 
34%-66% 23.0% 42.5% 9.4% 28.0% 
67%-100% 12.6% 7.1% 10.9% 9.8% 
Forage 
***/*** 
0-33% 44.8% 63.7% 23.4% 47.7% 
34%-66% 13.8% 19.5% 10.9% 15.5% 
67%-100% 41.4% 16.8% 65.6% 36.7% 
Oilseeds 
*Minimum cell 
count violation 
0-33% 78.2% 71.7% 98.4% 80.3% 
34%-66% 14.9% 23.9% 1.6% 15.5% 
67%-100% 6.9% 4.4% 0.0% 4.2% 
Specialty 
*Minimum cell 
count violation 
*Not Included in 
Cluster Analysis 
0-33% 93.1% 76.8% 92.2% 85.9% 
34%-66% 5.7% 18.8% 3.1% 10.7% 
67%-100% 1.1% 4.5% 4.7% 3.4% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
  The most defining features of the clusters are the percentage of income derived 
from land, the percentage of land irrigated, and the area of land irrigated (Table 5.18).  The 
first cluster clearly represents mainly dryland farmers with a small proportion of irrigated 
land.  The vast majority of farmers in this cluster depend on farming for income, yet the 
majority only have 0 to less than 25% of their land irrigated.  Despite the low proportion of 
irrigated land, this cluster has an average of 612 acres under irrigation which is still quite 
 109 
 
large in comparison to the third cluster.  This indicates that this group is primarily 
composed of full-time, large scale farmers that primarily use irrigation to support another 
part of their operation, such as livestock (Table 5.19). 
Table 5.18 – Income derived from Land and Percentage of Land Irrigated, 2011 
  Ward Method  
  1 2 3 Total 
Percentage of Income 
derived from Land. 
***/*** 
0 to less than 25% 0.0% 2.7% 67.2% 17.4% 
25% to less than 
50% 
3.4% 5.3% 31.3% 11.0% 
50% to less than 
75% 
16.1% 20.4% 1.6% 14.4% 
75% to 100% 80.5% 71.7% 0.0% 57.2% 
Percentage of Land 
Irrigated. 
***/*** 
0 to less than 
25%. 
66.7% 0.0% 18.8% 26.5% 
25% to less than 
50% 
27.6% 2.7% 14.1% 13.7% 
50% to less than 
75% 
5.7% 15.9% 18.8% 13.2% 
75% to 100% 0.0% 81.4% 48.4% 46.6% 
Mean Irrigated Land 
***/*** 
 
612acres 991acres 179acres 
 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
Table 5.19 – Irrigated Crops supporting Other Parts of Farming Operation by 
Cluster 
  Ward Method                               
  1 2 3 Total 
Do your irrigated crops support another part of 
your operation, for example providing feed for 
livestock? */* 
Yes 70.1% 55.4% 68.8% 63.5% 
 No 
29.9% 44.6% 31.3% 
36.5% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
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 The second cluster, on the other hand, is heavily dependent on irrigation with the 
vast majority of farmers having between 75% and 100% of their land under irrigation.  This 
group on average has 991 irrigated acres, by far the most of the three clusters.  The majority 
of the farmers in this cluster depend on irrigated crop production for their income, although 
they are slightly less dependent on farming than the first cluster group.  The third cluster 
most likely represents hobby or lifestyle farmers that use irrigation to support livestock 
operations.  The vast majority of farmers in this group had a low level of dependence on 
farm income.  Although the majority of this group had over half of their land under 
irrigation, they also had the smallest irrigated land area with an average of 179 acres.    
Table 5.20 – Location and Irrigator Type 
  Ward Method  
  1 2 3 Total 
Location 
*Minimum cell count violation. 
Bow River Group 37.5% 56.3% 27.3% 43.1% 
Central Group 41.1% 32.3% 31.8% 35.1% 
Southern Tributaries 21.4% 11.5% 40.9% 21.9% 
Irrigator type 
***/*** 
Private Irrigator 36.8% 15.9% 31.3% 26.5% 
District Irrigator 63.2% 84.1% 68.8% 73.5% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
Geographic distribution is different between each cluster, as well as their status as 
either private or district irrigators.  Locational information was re-coded so that both private 
and district irrigators could be classified into: i) the Bow river group (including the Western 
Irrigation District, Bow River Irrigation District and Eastern Irrigation District); ii) Central 
group (Lethbridge Northern Irrigation District, St. Mary River Irrigation District and Taber 
Irrigation District); and iii) Southern Tributaries (Leavitt Irrigation District, Mountain View 
Irrigation District, United Irrigation District, Magrath Irrigation District, Raymond 
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Irrigation District and Aetna Irrigation District).  Private irrigators were also grouped into 
these categories based on where their water source is from.  Although the information 
violated the chi-square minimum cell count, it is clear that a large proportion of the third 
cluster farms in the Southern Tributaries (Table 5.21).  The majority of the second cluster 
comes from the Bow River group and are predominantly composed of district irrigators, 
possibly indicating the large representation of the Bow River Irrigation District in the 
sample.  A higher percentage of the first cluster is private irrigators compared to the other 
two, with the majority of its farmers coming from the Central group.  It is interesting to 
note that the Central group is also the most evenly distributed in geographic location. 
Table 5.21 Irrigation Systems as percentage of Land Coverage 
Irrigation System Percentage 
Wards Method Total 
1 2 3  
Gravity/Flood  
*Minimum cell count violation 
0-33% 81.6% 89.4% 70.3% 82.2% 
34%-66% 2.3% 4.4% 4.7% 3.8% 
67%-100% 16.1% 6.2% 25.0% 14.0% 
Hand Move 
*Minimum cell count violation 
0-33% 93.1% 99.1% 87.5% 94.3% 
34%-66% 1.1% 0.0% 3.1% 1.1% 
67%-100% 5.7% 0.9% 9.4% 4.5% 
Wheel Move 
*Minimum cell count violation 
0-33% 80.5% 85.0% 67.2% 79.2% 
34%-66% 3.4% 5.3% 0.0% 3.4% 
67%-100% 16.1% 9.7% 32.8% 17.4% 
High Pressure Centre Pivot 
*Minimum cell count violation 
0-33% 83.9% 83.2% 90.6% 85.2% 
34%-66% 1.1% 3.5% 1.6% 2.2% 
67%-100% 14.9% 13.3% 7.8% 12.5% 
Low Pressure Centre Pivot ***/*** 
0-33% 56.3% 34.2% 84.4% 53.7% 
34%-66% 3.4% 10.8% 1.6% 6.1% 
67%-100% 40.2% 55.0% 14.1% 40.2% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
An analysis of irrigation systems, in addition to information concerning crop types 
and the role of irrigation on the farm, confirms studies in the region indicating that most 
efficiency gains are possible among private irrigators who use irrigation to support another 
part of their operation (Bjornlund et al, 2007; Bjornlund et al, 2009; Nicol et al, 2010).  
Irrigators that grow more specialty crops and oilseeds, and who tend to be within irrigation 
 112 
 
districts, have the most efficient irrigation systems (Table 5.21).  The third cluster has the 
most room for efficiency gains.   
Table 5.22 – Percentage of Water Allocation Used During Average Year 
  Ward Method                               
  1 2 3 Total 
To the best of your knowledge, how 
much of your water allocation do you 
typically use during an average year? 
***/*** 
 
Less than 60% 17.2% 17.7% 51.6% 25.8% 
60% - less than 
70% 
13.8% 17.7% 25.0% 18.2% 
70% - less than 
80% 
32.2% 35.4% 14.1% 29.2% 
80% - less than 
90% 
17.2% 19.5% 7.8% 15.9% 
90% - 100% 19.5% 9.7% 1.6% 
11.0% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
Finally, the percentage of water allocation used during the average year differs 
between clusters.  This is particularly the case when comparing the third cluster with the 
first and second clusters (Table 5.22).  Whereas the majority of the first two clusters use 
more than 70% of their allocations in the average year, the third cluster typically uses less 
than 60%.  The first cluster tends to use the most of their allocations.  Nearly one-fifth of 
the first cluster uses between 90%-100% of their allocations, over double that of the second 
cluster.   
5.4.2 – Naming the Clusters 
 The first step of cluster validation, comparing and contrasting clusters on variables 
used in the cluster analysis, has yielded sufficient evidence to suggest that three distinct 
groups of irrigators exist within the sample (Table 5.23).  Based on this information, 
hypothesis two is confirmed.  Furthermore, variables included for external validation 
(location, irrigation status and irrigation systems information), have shown that each 
distinct group has differences in characteristics that go beyond what was included in the 
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cluster analysis.  This is indicative of good cluster formations (Anderberg, 1973; Punj and 
Stewart, 1983; Gujarati, 2003; Reinmann et al, 2008).   
Table 5.23 – Cluster Characteristics 
Characteristic Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Age 
Tend to be older, over 56 
years old. 
Tend to be between 36-
65 years old. 
Tend to have a normally 
distributed age range. 
Crops Grown 
Focus on grain and forage 
crops for livestock 
operations. 
Focus on oilseeds and 
specialty crops, but also 
involved in livestock. 
Focus on forage for 
livestock operations. 
Location 
Spread out throughout 
southern Alberta. 
Majority located in 
Bow River Group. 
Majority located in Central 
Group and Southern 
Tributaries. 
Dependence on 
Irrigation 
Tends to have lower 
dependence on irrigation 
with low proportion of 
irrigated land to dry land. 
Tends to be heavily 
dependent on irrigation 
with large proportion of 
irrigated land to dry 
land. 
Tends to have high 
proportion of irrigated land 
to dry land, but also tends to 
have less irrigated land than 
the other two clusters. 
On-farm vs. Off-
farm income 
Heavily dependent on use 
of land for income. 
Tends to have high 
dependence on use of 
land for income. 
Least amount of dependence 
on land for income. 
Irrigation Systems 
Room for efficiency gains, 
comparatively high 
percentage of land under 
wheel move and 
gravity/flood. 
Efficient systems with 
less room for efficiency 
gains. 
Tend to have less efficient 
systems with more room for 
efficiency gains. 
Water allocation 
used during 
average year 
Usually between 70% and 
100% used. 
Usually between 70% 
and 90% used. 
Usually less than 70% used. 
The first cluster tends to exhibit some of the trends outlined by previous research in 
the SSRB concerning irrigators who use irrigation as a supplement for pre-dominantly dry 
land farming operations (Bjornlund et al, 2009; Nicol, 2010).  Since the first cluster is 
comparatively less dependent on irrigation than the other two, but even more dependent on 
farming for income, they are henceforth termed as drylanders.  The second cluster is most 
dependent on irrigation.  Respondents from the second cluster tend to produce higher 
valued crops than the other two clusters, and have comparatively efficient irrigation 
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systems compared to the other two clusters.  To highlight their comparative dependence on 
irrigation for income, and the amount of irrigated land they have, this group is henceforth 
termed as the dependent group.  Finally, the third cluster has a lower dependence on 
irrigated agriculture for income, and has a relatively small amount of irrigated land in 
comparison to the other two clusters.  As such, this group is henceforth termed the hobby 
group.   
5.5 Cluster Results 
 The remainder of the results are dedicated to analysing differences between the 
drylander, dependent, and hobby groups with respect to values and attitudes; intentions; 
past actions; and policy preferences.  
5.5.1 – Values and Attitudes 
 The third hypothesis is that irrigators will have different value and attitude 
orientations.  This hypothesis is confirmed (Table 5.24).  Different groups of irrigators 
had different risk-averse attitude, social acceptance attitude and pro-environmental value.   
 The only factor that does not have a significant difference between groups is pro-
sharing attitude.  The dependent group displayed the most risk-averse attitudes, identifying 
input costs, weather patterns and farm uncertainties as particularly important when making 
water trading decisions.  Conversely, the hobby group seems less risk-averse.  The 
drylander group put less emphasis on risk-averse attitude than the dependent group, but 
more so than the hobby group.  These attitudes most likely reflect the different levels of 
dependence on irrigation, as also identified by others (Bjornlund, 2002; Gomez-Limon and 
Riesgo, 2004; Maybery et al, 2005).   
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Table 5.24 – Value and Attitudes by Cluster 
  Ward Method                               
  Drylander Dependent Hobby Total 
Risk-Averse Attitude 
***/*** 
1 28.0% 20.0% 31.1% 25.3% 
2 18.3% 12.4% 24.6% 17.3% 
3 24.4% 20.0% 27.9% 23.4% 
4 29.3% 47.6% 16.4% 34.0% 
Social Acceptance Attitude 
***/*** 
1 32.9% 48.6% 16.4% 35.6% 
2 12.2% 7.6% 34.4% 15.6% 
3 11.0% 18.1% 16.4% 15.3% 
4 43.9% 25.7% 32.8% 33.4% 
Pro-Sharing Attitude 
1 24.4% 26.7% 24.6% 25.4% 
2 17.1% 18.1% 26.2% 19.7% 
3 25.6% 22.9% 23.0% 23.8% 
4 32.9% 32.4% 26.2% 31.1% 
Pro-Environmental Value 
**/** 
1 36.6% 29.5% 14.8% 28.3% 
2 22.0% 19.0% 11.5% 18.2% 
3 14.6% 22.9% 24.6% 20.6% 
4 26.8% 28.6% 49.2% 33.0% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
Social acceptance attitude differs between groups with drylanders expressing the 
strongest belief that their neighbours, family and friends think re-allocation is a good idea.  
This group also has the largest proportion of private irrigators.  Dependents experienced a 
very low social acceptance attitude highlighting their comparative dependence on irrigation 
water.  The hobby group was split somewhere down the middle.  
 The analysis of pro-environmental value orientations among the clusters confirms 
other findings in the literature suggesting that those less dependent on farming for income 
express more pro-environmental values (Tremlay and Dunlap, 1978; Beus and Dunlap, 
1990; Berenguer et al, 2005).  The majority of the hobby group displayed high pro-
environmental value while the drylander group displayed the lowest pro-environmental 
value.  The dependents had a rather normally distributed response towards pro-
 116 
 
environmental value.  This finding is interesting considering that the extractive-commodity 
literature suggests the existence of a negative association between dependence on land for 
economic purposes, and conservation values and attitudes (Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978; 
Beus and Dunlap, 1990; Beus and Dunlap, 1994; Berenguer et al, 2005).   
5.5.2 – Future Intentions and Past Behaviours 
 Water trading intentions remained largely the same across each group, with the 
exception of the intention to permanently buy water (Table 5.5.2).  The hobby group has 
low intentions to buy water if it becomes available over the next five years.  The drylanders 
and dependents have more of a bimodal distribution with roughly equal amounts being 
unlikely and likely to buy water if it becomes available. 
This intention to buy water coincides with intentions to buy land over the next five 
years.  A roughly equal amount of drylanders do and do not intend to buy more land over 
the next five years.  Dependents express similar intentions, with a slightly larger margin not 
having intentions to buy more land.  The hobby group has an overwhelming intention not to 
buy land, which coincides with this groups low level of dependence on farming, and 
generally not having a successor lined up for the farm.  A larger proportion of drylanders 
have a successor lined up for the farm than dependents.   
The groups also had different past actions regarding water rights acquisitions over 
the last five years (Table 5.25).  The dependents had a large proportion who acquired water 
rights over the last five years, with drylanders having the second large proportion.  This 
contrasts with the hobby group whose overwhelming majority did not engage in any market 
activity.  All other past trading activity did not show significant differences between the 
groups. 
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Table 5.25 –Trading, Transfer and Expansion Intentions by Cluster 
Trading Intention  Ward Method                               
  Drylander Dependent Hobby Total 
d1_a -- Purchase a lease of water. Unlikely 48.3% 45.1% 53.1% 48.1% 
Neutral 9.2% 20.4% 15.6% 15.5% 
Likely 42.5% 34.5% 31.3% 36.4% 
d1_b -- Permanently buy water. **/** Unlikely 42.5% 41.1% 57.8% 45.6% 
Neutral 9.2% 19.6% 10.9% 14.1% 
Likely 48.3% 39.3% 31.3% 40.3% 
d1_c -- Selling a lease of water.  Unlikely 79.3% 80.5% 78.1% 79.5% 
Neutral 11.5% 8.8% 6.3% 9.1% 
Likely 9.2% 10.6% 15.6% 11.4% 
d1_d -- Permanently sell some of your water 
allocation. 
 
Unlikely 82.8% 85.8% 77.8% 82.9% 
Neutral 9.2% 8.0% 14.3% 9.9% 
Likely 8.0% 6.2% 7.9% 7.2% 
d1_e -- Vote 'yes' in a plebiscite to 
permanently sell some district water to outside 
of the district. *Minimum cell count violation 
Unlikely 80.4% 82.3% 77.3% 80.5% 
Neutral 16.1% 12.5% 18.2% 15.1% 
Likely 3.6% 5.2% 4.5% 4.5% 
Intention to buy land over next five years. 
***/*** 
Yes 42.5% 38.9% 14.1% 34.1% 
No 40.2% 44.2% 75.0% 50.3% 
Uncertain 17.2% 16.8% 10.9% 15.5% 
Do you have a successor lined up for your 
farm? 
***/*** 
Yes 60.5% 38.2% 33.3% 44.4% 
No 29.1% 48.2% 58.7% 44.5% 
Uncertain 10.5% 13.6% 7.9% 11.2% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
Table 5.26 – Cluster differences in Permanently Buying Water over last Five Years 
  Ward Method                               
  Drylander Dependent Hobby Total 
Permanently bought water? 
**/**  
Yes 25.3% 37.8% 10.9% 27.2% 
No 74.7% 72.6% 89.1% 77.3% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
As discussed, there is relatively little room for efficiency gains among the 
drylanders and dependents in comparison to the hobby group.  Nevertheless, these findings 
suggest that it is these two groups with more of an intention to upgrade irrigation systems 
than the hobby group.  Most of the drylanders and dependents already have relatively 
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efficient irrigation systems, a finding similar to Bjornlund et al (2009) suggesting limited 
room for further efficiency improvements.  As a result, the only intention that differs 
between groups regarding equipment changes is the intention to convert from high pressure 
to low pressure centre pivots.  The drylanders and dependents are significantly more likely 
than the hobby group to have intentions to upgrade by using AIMM or IMCIN; purchase 
computer panels for their pivots; or starting to use private consulting to assist with 
irrigation decision making.  This suggests that the drylanders have the strongest intentions 
to expand and the dependents have the most intentions to improve efficiency.  The hobby 
group has little intention to do either.  
Table 5.27 – Intentions to Upgrade Irrigation Systems 
Irrigation System Upgrade  Ward Method                               
  Dryalnder Dependent Hobby Total 
Convert from flood/gravity to wheel move. 
Yes 7.0% 3.5% 9.8% 6.2% 
No 93.0% 96.5% 90.2% 93.8% 
Convert from wheel move to pivot irrigation. 
Yes 16.5% 24.3% 17.5% 20.1% 
No 83.5% 75.7% 82.5% 79.9% 
Convert from flood/gravity to pivot irrigation. 
Yes 8.1% 12.6% 8.1% 10.0% 
No 91.9% 87.4% 91.9% 90.0% 
Convert from high pressure pivot system to low 
pressure pivot system. */* 
Yes 18.3% 21.3% 8.1% 17.1% 
No 81.7% 78.7% 91.9% 82.9% 
Purchase a computer panel for your pivot system. 
***/*** 
Yes 21.7% 35.9% 11.9% 25.4% 
No 78.3% 64.1% 88.1% 74.6% 
Start to use AIMM or IMCIN to schedule irrigation.  
**/** 
Yes 25.9% 23.7% 7.3% 20.4% 
No 74.1% 76.3% 92.7% 79.6% 
Start to use private consultants to support irrigation 
decision making. **/** 
Yes 19.8% 26.0% 8.1% 19.6% 
No 80.2% 74.0% 91.9% 80.4% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
 When analysing past irrigation systems upgrades, it becomes clear why there are 
low intentions amongst drylanders and dependents to change systems (Table 5.28).  These 
findings suggest that room for efficiency gains are running out, as many irrigators already 
have upgraded in the past.  Large proportions of each group have upgraded from relatively 
inefficient to more efficient systems over the last five years.  Again, the hobby group has 
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been the most dormant group, with the vast majority not upgrading over the last five years.  
The long-term intentions of farmers seem to differ depending on their dependence on 
farming and intensity of irrigation.  These findings confirm hypothesis four that different 
groups of irrigators have different long-term goals and intentions for their farms. 
Table 5.28 – Past Irrigation System Upgrades 
Past Upgrade  Ward Method                               
  Drylander Dependent Hobby Total 
Converted from flood/gravity to wheel move. 
Yes 3.5% 4.5% 10.9% 5.7% 
No 96.5% 95.5% 89.1% 94.3% 
Converted from wheel move to pivot irrigation. 
***/*** 
Yes 28.7% 38.7% 15.6% 29.8% 
No 71.3% 61.3% 84.4% 70.2% 
Converted from flood/gravity to pivot irrigation. 
***/*** 
Yes 9.2% 21.6% 3.1% 13.0% 
No 90.8% 78.4% 96.9% 87.0% 
Converted from high pressure pivot system to low 
pressure pivot system. ***/***  
Yes 29.9% 42.0% 9.4% 30.1% 
No 70.1% 58.0% 90.6% 69.9% 
Purchased a computer panel for your pivot system. 
***/*** 
Yes 26.7% 41.1% 10.9% 29.0% 
No 73.3% 58.9% 89.1% 71.0% 
Start to used AIMM or IMCIN to schedule 
irrigation. **/** 
Yes 17.2% 15.5% 3.3% 13.1% 
No 82.8% 84.5% 96.7% 86.9% 
Started to use private consultants to support 
irrigation decision making. ***/*** 
Yes 14.9% 27.7% 4.8% 17.9% 
No 85.1% 72.3% 95.2% 82.1% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
 These findings confirm some fears in the literature over the intentions to save and 
re-allocate efficiency gains (English et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 2003; Bjornlund et al, 2009).  
The fear that improved irrigation systems will actually result in an increase in net use of 
water, rather than less was clearly expressed by Whittlesey (2003).  Whittlesey (2003) 
argued that more improved irrigation systems that maximize efficiency enables irrigators to 
put to use water that traditionally flowed back into the water cycle as run-off.  Therefore, 
because of irrigators’ intentions to maximise the productive use of water, as opposed to 
intentions to conserve, water use actually goes up and conservation aims become threatened 
(Whittlesey, 2003).  These findings do, indeed, suggest that those who have upgraded the 
most, and with intentions to upgrade systems further, have stronger intentions to maximize 
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the productive use water saved through efficiency gains.  A review of their policy 
preferences identifies their views on this issue in more detail. 
5.5.3 – Policy Preferences 
 The findings for policy preferences closely resemble findings concerning value and 
attitude differences between the clusters (Table 5.29).   An interesting finding is that only 
three of the nine policy statements were significantly different between the clusters, and all 
three of them were associated with securing water for the environment.  The hobby group 
generally supports minimum flow requirements for rivers as well as buy back of water from 
irrigators for in-stream or environmental purposes.  This reflects the findings of differences 
in environmental values. 
The dependents and drylanders tend to be split on whether or not private individuals 
should hold licenses for environmental purposes, whereas the hobby group tends to find 
this a preferable policy.  This finding has interesting implications concerning the Minister’s 
Advisory Groups 2009 recommendation to “assess the potential role of water trusts as a 
vehicle for acquiring licenses through the transfer process for WCO purposes on an arms’ 
length basis.”  The hobby group, who tends to have more of a proportion of private licenses 
than the other two groups, seems to be most receptive to this policy idea.   
The final difference in policy preferences concerns the possibility of the 
government actively buying back licenses for environmental purposes, similar to what has 
been done in the Murray Darling Basin of Australia (Maybery et al, 2005; Kuehne et al, 
2008).  The drylanders expressed a strong dislike of this policy preference with over 65% 
disagreeing.  This is in contrast with the hobby group who tends to have a more normally 
distributed response range for this statement.   
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Table 5.29 – Policy Preferences by Cluster 
Policy Preference  Ward Method                               
  Drylander Dependent Hobby Total 
b1_a -- The government, rather than market forces, 
should determine who uses Alberta's water. 
SD 26.7% 28.6% 23.8% 26.8% 
N 22.1% 25.9% 31.7% 26.1% 
SA 51.2% 45.5% 44.4% 47.1% 
b1_b -- If an ID/private license holder isn't using all 
water allocation, the gov't should be able to take 
water for environmental purposes, without any 
compensation. 
SD 81.6% 83.0% 79.7% 81.7% 
N 9.2% 5.4% 9.4% 7.6% 
SA 9.2% 11.6% 10.9% 10.6% 
b1_c -- Minimum flows of water should be set for all 
rivers and streams, and only the water above those 
minimum flows should be used for economic 
purposes. 
**/** 
SD 25.3% 25.9% 14.1% 22.8% 
N 26.4% 16.1% 10.9% 18.2% 
SA 48.3% 58.0% 75.0% 58.9% 
b1_d -- Private groups and individuals should be 
able to hold water licenses for environmental 
purposes. **/** 
SD 36.0% 30.4% 23.4% 30.5% 
N 32.6% 34.8% 21.9% 30.9% 
SA 31.4% 34.8% 54.7% 38.5% 
b1_e -- Water that is saved through improved water 
use efficiency should be used to increase economic 
activity. 
SD 5.8% 8.0% 7.8% 7.2% 
N 16.3% 15.0% 15.6% 15.6% 
SA 77.9% 77.0% 76.6% 77.2% 
b1_f -- The government should buy water from 
current license holders, like irrigation districts, so 
that more water can be left in the rivers. ***/*** 
SD 65.5% 59.5% 39.7% 56.7% 
N 19.5% 25.2% 27.0% 23.8% 
SA 14.9% 15.3% 33.3% 19.5% 
b1_g -- The seniority of a water license must be 
honoured under all circumstances. 
SD 9.2% 8.0% 15.6% 10.2% 
N 6.9% 10.6% 12.5% 9.8% 
SA 83.9% 81.4% 71.9% 79.9% 
b1_h -- Public funds should be used to improve 
irrigation systems only if the water that is saved is 
left in rivers. 
SD 34.5% 39.3% 31.7% 35.9% 
N 26.4% 23.2% 22.2% 24.0% 
SA 39.1% 37.5% 46.0% 40.1% 
b1_i -- If water is to be traded among irrigation 
districts and/or municipalities, the government 
should set the price. 
SD 66.7% 65.5% 66.7% 66.2% 
N 18.4% 18.2% 15.9% 17.7% 
SA 14.9% 16.4% 17.5% 16.2% 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Chi-square/ *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Cramer’s V 
This coincides with a stronger agreement for the role of WCOs and holding back 
water for environmental purposes.  Simply put, the hobby group is not as economically 
dependent on irrigation, and have more of an attachment than the other two clusters to what 
they perceive as the environmental and lifestyle values of the land and water.  Therefore, 
they have less incentive to conserve water for economic purposes.  The fact that the 
majority of this group live in the Central group and Southern Tributaries, regions with the 
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highest risks of water scarcity, has interesting implications concerning the possibility of 
private license holders holding water for environmental purposes.   
5.6 Intentions’ Association with Attitudes and values 
 The survey findings suggest that intentions to trade water via purchasing a lease, 
and intentions to permanently buy water, display a bimodal distribution in the sample.  This 
indicates that, dependents and drylanders in particular, are expressing an interest to expand 
their operations within the next five years.  Generally speaking, ‘market’ activity has been 
slow, as previous research has identified in the SSRB (Nicol et al, 2006b; Bjornlund et al, 
2007). 
Pro-environmental value has the strongest association with intentions to vote yes in 
a plebiscite.  The hobby group has the strongest pro-environmental value, with more of 
their group supporting environmental claw-backs.  This re-affirms extractive commodity 
literature indicating that those with less of a financial attachment to land tend to have 
different views towards the environment than those with a strong financial attachment to 
land (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Samdahl and Robertson, 1989; Beus and Dunlap, 1990; 
Morris and McBeth, 2003).  Strong pro-environmental values are associated with a positive 
disposition towards government control over the transfer system, and towards the 
government taking an active approach towards buying portions of licenses to put towards 
WCOs.  This conclusion is also reiterated through risk-averse attitude’s association with 
policy preferences.  In particular, the hobby group who had the lowest risk-averse attitude 
tend to have a negative disposition towards the notion of only using efficiency gains 
towards enhancing economic activity.   
Another finding re-affirming transactional theory literature, is that different groups 
of irrigators based on their farm characteristics and demographics, tend to have different 
values and attitudes (Willock et al, 1999a; Willock et al, 1999b; Austin et al, 2001; 
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Bjornlund, 2002; Jackson-Smith and Buttel, 2003;  Maybery et al, 2005; Darnhofer et al, 
2005; Kuehne et al, 2008).  This research also suggests, however, that using the types of 
attitude and value constructs that were used in the survey are not very strongly associated 
with trading or transfer intentions.  
 Social acceptance attitude and risk-averse attitude do have associations with 
intentions to purchase a lease of water over the next five years.  This affirms TRA and TPB 
literature suggesting that social influences, as well as perceived behavioural controls, 
influence farming intentions and goals (Ajzen and Fisbhein, 1970; Ajzen, 1985; Sheppard 
et al, 1988; Madden et al, 1992; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Armitage and Conner, 2001; 
Rehman et al, 2007).  An interesting finding is that attitudes and values associate with 
intentions to trade or transfer differently.  Risk-averse attitude, social acceptance attitude 
and pro-environmental value have associations with intentions to purchase a lease of water.  
Different clusters of irrigators display different risk-averse attitude, social acceptance 
attitude and pro-environmental value.  These groups, however, do not have significant 
differences with their intentions to purchase a lease over the next five years.  This suggests 
that values and attitudes associate differently with intentions than demographics and farm 
characteristics do.   
On the other hand, risk-averse attitude has associations with policy preferences 
pertaining to role of market forces in water distribution and whether private groups should 
own licenses for environmental purposes.  Pro-environmental value has associations with 
minimum flows and government control over the pricing of transfers.  This corresponds 
with hobby farmers who are less dependent on irrigation who have less risk-averse attitude 
and more pro-environmental value than drylanders or dependents.  Furthermore, it is also 
associated with very low intentions of hobby farmers to expand, and to invest more in their 
operations.   
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All groups display a lack of intention to sell, or to lease.  The main differences exist 
with intentions to expand, intentions to upgrade, and policy preferences towards 
environmental legislation.  Dependents have the strongest intentions to expand their farms 
and to purchase a lease of water.  The dependents have the strongest intentions to upgrade, 
despite investing the most in upgrades over the past five years.  These groups express a 
desire to use water saved through efficiency gains for economic purposes.  This raises a 
concern that is expressed regarding increased water use due to increased efficiency (English 
et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 2003; Bjornlund et al, 2009).   
The most pronounced difference in policy preferences amongst all groups views 
towards environmental claw-backs of water, and government involvement in the transfer 
process.  This brings up two questions that were discussed with the key informants: i) what 
is the root of skepticism towards WCOs and ii) what is the root of skepticism towards using 
the transfer system?  The next sections express viewpoints towards the skepticism towards 
the transfer process.  They include transaction costs, use it or lose it concerns, property 
rights concerns, and the role of WCOs.   
5.7 Summary of Survey Results 
 The differences in policy preferences partially confirms hypothesis five, that 
different groups of irrigators will have different policy preferences regarding water re-
allocation for environmental purposes.  With the partial confirmation of this hypothesis, the 
survey has achieved the second and third research objectives, which sought to investigate 
factors influencing irrigators’ unwillingness to engage in transfers; and to investigate 
irrigators’ approval of policies towards re-distributing water for environmental purposes 
and the government’s role in water transfers.  The key finding from this research is that 
dependence on irrigation seems to have a strong association with different long termed 
goals and plans.  Furthermore, they tend to indicate different risk-averse attitudes, social 
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acceptance attitudes and pro-environmental values.  The findings confirm previous research 
indicating little room for efficiency gains, but it also indicates that most irrigators in the 
sample intend to maximise the productive and economic value of efficiency gains.   
 On the other hand, most in the sample did support minimum in-stream flows and the 
policy of only allowing water above this minimum to be allocated to economic purposes, 
such as irrigation.  Furthermore, there was no significant difference between the groups 
regarding involvement with environmental organizations such as WPACs.  So, even though 
the hobby group displayed the highest support for WCOs and re-allocating water from 
irrigation to environmental purposes, there is a general environmental consciousness.  
 These findings seem to support extractive commodity literature stressing that the 
dependence on the land for income is a fundamental driver of values and attitudes towards 
that environment (Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Beus and 
Dunlap, 1994).  High dependence on irrigated land use for income seemed to correlate with 
higher risk-averse attitudes and lower pro-environmental value.  Those with more irrigated 
farm investments had intentions to expand, and to maximise the value of irrigation water, a 
similar finding to Bjornlund and Rossini’s (2005) study. 
 This chapter has identified how the survey results match up against the literature by 
testing the five research hypotheses.  The next chapter will focus on discussions with the 
five key informants that were interviewed after the survey was analysed.  These discussions 
often lead to topics that were not identified in the survey, but may play a vital role in the 
unwillingness of irrigators to use the transfer system to re-allocate water to non-agricultural 
uses.  Chapter seven discusses the implications of the two results chapters, and conclusions 
as to the implications of these findings.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
INTERVIEW RESULTS 
6.0 Introduction 
 The objective of this chapter is to identify factors, identified in the previous chapter, 
causing the skepticism towards, or unwillingness to use, the transfer system as a tool for re-
allocation in the SSRB.  This was done by analysing in-depth interviews with key 
informants. The results of this chapter contributed to the research objectives in a different 
way than the survey findings.  The survey findings re-affirmed trends in the literature, 
particularly showing that different types of irrigators based on personal and farm 
characteristics, tend to have different values and attitudes towards transfers.  There were 
many similarities, however, between all groups including a general unwillingness to use the 
transfer system.  This formed the basis for interviews with five key informants between 
May and August of 2012.  Common themes began to emerge among the five key 
informants when asked about the general unwillingness of irrigators to participate in the 
transfer system in order to re-allocate water to meet new demand.  i) Transaction costs 
associated with transfers; ii) the ability to make assignment agreements or licensed 
amendments to meet new demand; iii) fear of government claw-backs; and iv) 
dissatisfaction with WCOs and environmental holdbacks associated with transfers.  
6.1 Transaction Costs 
 Barriers to transfers found in the chapter conclusions of the Policy Context include 
a lack of information and a lengthy approval process that impedes incentives to temporary 
or permanently transfer water from one user to another (Thobani, 1997; Bjornlund, 2003b; 
Horbulyk, 2005; Nicol et al, 2008).  Interviews with key informants reiterated these 
concerns about transaction costs, particularly towards temporary transfers of low volumes 
of water.  This concern was reiterated by the Minister’s Advisory Group (2009) with their 
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recommendation: “a number of operational barriers established in the Water Act should be 
removed to allow the transfer system to operate more effectively” (Alberta Environment, 
2009: 7).  As the Minister’s Advisory Group points out, the process imposes significant 
costs on the applicant, and may take many months from the time of initial application to the 
time of final approval.  This operational barrier was reiterated by one AARD 
representative: 
If we had a system in place right now that if I put a ‘for 
sale’ tag in the Lethbridge Herald that said I have 100 
acre feet of water for sale on the St. Mary's river, and 
there was a way that very quickly that Alberta 
Environment could give me the ok to sell it wherever I 
want…I think people would be just fine with it. Right 
now, as a seller, there are so many hoops you have to go 
through. I think there's so much confusion that people 
think there must be something behind it. If it takes that 
much paper work and that much time... My guess is that 
if I went to Albertan Environment today and said I had 
100 acre feet on the St. Mary's, and I have potential 
buyers here and here, could I sell it? My guess is that it 
would take months before I would get that decision 
(Key Informant 7). 
 
The main concerns over the lengthy process and operational barriers to transfers 
have come about largely because temporary and permanent transfers undergo the same 
application and approval procedures (Water Act Section 81).  While for permanent 
transfers that involve a change of ownership, and change in point of extraction, it has been 
argued that a thorough and rigorous analysis of the third party effects and environmental 
effects has been cited as necessary in the literature ((Thobani, 1997; Solanes and Gonzalez-
Villarreal, 1999; Easter et al, 1999; Horbulyk, 2005; Chong and Sunding, 2006; Levine et 
al, 2007; Bjornlund, 2010).  Applying the same system for temporary transfers of water, 
with smaller volumes of water, may present transaction costs that are too great, and an 
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approval process that is too long and drawn out to make it feasible.  As one representative 
from Alberta Environment notes: 
The rules are the same for everyone. If someone wants 
to move 2 acre feet half a mile upstream and split it in 
half, putting some towards some acres and others for 
some cows, it's a ridiculous system because they see all 
the things they have to do for a little bit of water. But, 
it's the same rules if you're moving 10,000 acre feet 100 
miles upstream and changing the timing from summer 
to winter. It's the same rules. So yes for a small land 
owner who isn't familiar with a lot of other jurisdictions, 
and wants to do something small and local, it would 
seem like ridiculous (Key Informant 8). 
 The same representative from Alberta Environment also notes that the process 
appears long and convoluted because of Alberta Environment’s willingness to approach 
problems with applications as opposed to rejecting them.  By doing this, few applications 
are denied, but applicants are approached to fix certain problems associated with their 
applications.  This is described by the Alberta Environment representative below:  
If we want to make the Auditor General happy when 
they do audits, we should refuse every one of those 
[applications]. So that way, when they come in the door 
they're complete and everything is perfect. Instead we 
work with them [applicants] and see what they can do to 
fix the issue as opposed to making them re-apply. This 
makes the process look long and convoluted (Key 
Informant 8). 
  
Furthermore, the same Albertan Environment executive went on to acknowledge 
that although the administrative process of transferring water in Alberta may appear time 
consuming, it is much cheaper and more efficient than other systems.  In particular he made 
a comparison between the administrative control process regarding water transfers in 
Alberta against the appropriative, court based transfer system prevalent in many western 
states of the USA.   
There are two ways of doing a transfer system: i) we 
can do it as a government administrative process; or ii) 
you can do it as a court based system. The Americans in 
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the western states, they do it as court based. You apply 
to the water court. The judge will decide.   Ours is 
administratively based. So to do that, we end up with a 
whole bunch of stuff in the legislation about the 'how's'. 
In a court based system all you have to say is 'don't hurt 
anybody' and the judge will make sure, and away you 
go. The appeal system is already laid out in a court 
system so you don't have to identify an appeals system. 
Because we do it administratively, it's a hell of a lot 
cheaper. In a court based system you have to do all the 
technical work anyways, plus the lawyers. Here, no 
lawyers and you have to do the technical work…we do 
half the technical work (Key Informant 8). 
 
 This matches the findings by Nicol et al (2008) that Alberta’s transfer system 
actually has fewer transaction costs than other systems around the world, including those in 
the western USA.  Nevertheless, the high transaction costs, particularly for temporary 
transfers of small volumes of water, is identified and acknowledged as a barrier to the 
transfer system.  As mentioned earlier in this thesis, there is a suggestion in the literature to 
revise lengthy approval processes, and to make it easier to transfer water (Rosegrant and 
Binswanger, 1994; Dinar et al, 1997; Thobani, 1997; Bjornlund et al, 2003b).  The current 
legislative regime is cumbersome in that the approval process for temporary changes in 
diversion from one point to another are treated very similarly to permanent transfers.  There 
is a common disposition in the survey findings, however, that suggest that most irrigators 
approve of government control and regulation over the transfer system.  Although the 
survey findings suggest that support for government regulation over the system is strong, 
key informants acknowledge that the system can be revised to make it operate in a more 
efficient and flexible manner.       
6.2 Property Rights 
In Alberta, water is attached to irrigated land in a different way to countries like 
Australia, Chile or the United States, with long established and more active water markets.  
The Water Act and Irrigation Districts Act attach irrigation water to land according to its 
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use and purpose.  While the Water Act does allow for water to be detached from land, 
studies have shown that there is rarely the financial incentive to do so given the increased 
land values associated with water entitlements (Easter et al, 1999; Bjornlund, 2001).  One 
key informant from the EID reiterated this concern: 
All our land [in EID] is now worth $800,000 a quarter, 
it would go back to being worth $5,000 a quarter plus 
whatever oil wells you have [if the water is sold]. So it's 
[the water] worth huge amounts of money and we see 
that increasing. So obviously people are going to be 
reluctant to trade some of it (Key Informant 9). 
 
 Furthermore, many key informants expressed skepticism towards separating water 
from land as many farmers have borrowed money based on land values including water 
rights.  This fear was most appropriately expressed by a representative from the SMRID: 
If a farmer has irrigation rights and wants to sell it 
somebody, he can sell it. He can control that market. 
But again, we have to leave it tied to the land because if 
you take it off the land we are going to have some 
problems…The scary thing about Australia is that they 
didn't tie that to the land. So once it's tied off from the 
land it is chaos. Plus all the banking system, all the 
finance... all this land is borrowed by water rights 
because water rights add value to the land. So the banks 
are just going to be upset [if they separate this from the 
land] (Key Informant 10). 
 
  Beyond the disapproval of detaching water from land, there is also a major issue 
concerning the allocations that license holders are able to put to use, or to transfer.  The 
current legislation does give Alberta Environment control over the allocation process, and 
allows Alberta Environment to limit diversions.  The current legislation is, however, not 
clear about the volumes of water that license holders can transfer.  This concern has been 
addressed by the Minister’s Advisory Group (2009) with their recommendation that “the 
minister must clarify the amount of water the licensee is entitled to transfer.  The Water Act 
does not deal clearly with this and it must ultimately be resolved for the transfer system to 
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achieve its full potential” (Alberta Environment, 2009: 4).  This brings into question the 
amount license holders ought to be able to transfer, given the potential changes in water 
use, return flows, and how they will effect environmental and third party users.  This is a 
particularly complex issue regarding water that has been saved through efficiency gains.   
 Water that is saved through efficiency gains is either kept in storage, or is not used.  
This usually results in more water not being diverted.  The fear associated with district 
expansions, and transfers, is that these mechanisms will allow license holders to divert 
more water from the rivers.  While increased water use does not necessarily equate with 
increased diversions, there is a fear expressed by some that expansions and transfers will 
result in less water in the rivers and streams (Bankes and Kwasniak, 2005; Christensen and 
Droitsch, 2008).   
Another point that was brought up by key informants during the interviews was that 
other options available, such as assignments and license amendments, are more preferable 
than transfers.  In particular, amendments were highlighted as most preferable, since 
assignments cannot satisfy new demand, but are rather used as an alternative to the priority 
system.  This is a finding consistent with the literature (Bankes and Kwasniak, 2005; 
Bjornlund et al, 2007; Christensen and Droitsch, 2008; Bjornlund et al, 2009).   
6.2.1 Amendments and Assignments 
 There has been a fear that amending district licenses will effectively allow districts 
to become water brokers, selling water to the highest bidder (Christensen and Droitsch, 
2008).  As discussed, there is also a fear that amendments and transfers may result in more 
water being diverted, which is contrary to the goals of the WFL strategy (Bankes and 
Kwasniak, 2005; Christensen and Droitsch, 2008; Alberta Environment, 2009). The Water 
Act does have safeguards for third party users and the environment stipulated in the 
amendment process (Section 54).  It does not, however, make stipulations or guarantees 
 132 
 
over return flows. This is very different to actual transfers of licensed allocations where the 
director must be satisfied that the transfer will not have third party impacts.  A concern 
raised by some is that assignments circumnavigate the approval process and thereby avoid 
environmental safeguards (Bankes and Kwasniak, 2005; Christensen and Droitsch, 2008).  
This issue was touched upon by a representative from the AIPA: 
Say we're going to save 15% more water over a 10 year 
period.  About 10% of that saved is going to be 
reducing return flows. So that will be used now, and not 
going back to the river. So they are actually increasing 
use. So we save 15% let's be generous and say half of 
that is reduced return flow and half of that is water 
saved. So there's the complaint of the environmental 
groups.  That's why in our conservation and efficiency 
plans we did not say we will use less water.  We will 
divert the same [amount] or less. So even though the 
districts are expanding we may be leaving more water in 
the rivers. I think there's a very distinct possibility that 
we are (Key Informant 6).   
The Water Act does require an application for an amendment to contain detailed 
plans explaining how the amended license will affect riverine eco-systems (Section 54).  
The act also enables the director to amend the license lowering the diversion if he/she feels 
it negatively affects third parties or the environment (Section 54).  Nevertheless, concerns 
do remain over the increased water use.  As discussed in the Policy Context and Literature 
Review chapters, often times the increased efficiency leads to more use, which puts more of 
a strain on the resource because of less return flow (English et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 2003).  
Amendments leading to more use of water naturally lead to fears about reduced return 
flows and the long-term vitality of riverine eco-systems and water available for downstream 
users. 
On the other hand, amendments allow users to maximize the benefit of being able to 
use or transfer water that is saved through efficiency gains, which is the foundation of the 
goals of the WFL strategy.  Irrigation districts in particular, see amendments as an optimal 
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alternative to transfers because they are able to retain control over the licensed allocations 
in the future.  This sentiment was expressed by a representative from AIPA: 
The districts don't like the ideas of transfers. I will give 
you the EID's view because I think it's quite rational. 
They think that, if we supply to a community we would 
like to do it via transfer because we know that 
community is going to be there. Water for the district 
we would like to do that via amendment because in 
essence it's a lease. That's because, we don't know if the 
business is going to be there in the next five years. In 
the case of the community that water licenses is pretty 
secure. In the case of a business, if it goes under, then 
that water is lost (Key Informant 6). 
 
 Furthermore, there was a sentiment expressed by the key informants that 
amendments are complementary towards the goals of the WFL in the sense that they 
“expand” the resource by taking advantage of efficiency gains.  Section 6(1) of the 
Irrigation Districts Act clearly defines that the purpose of each district is to “maintain and 
promote the economic viability of each district”.  Many of the key informants see this as 
promoting food based industry in the districts, including food processors.  This was 
expressed clearly from a representative of Alberta Environment:  
When an irrigation district wants to attract a food 
producer and move a bit of their water from water 
savings by upgrading from flood/gravity to a bunch of 
pivots; and divert that water to a processor so the 
processor can process the goods coming off of the fields 
so that they can grow more high valued crops because 
they could not afford to transport bulky crops that are 
perishable 800 miles to a processor...that's within the 
purpose of the irrigation district to facilitate this, so why 
not? That subject went to appeal and everyone went 
crazy. We got appeals and all kind of things over 
something as simple as that. Something a municipality 
does all the time (Key Informant 8). 
 
Irrigation districts often run the conveyance and delivery systems for municipalities 
and industries.  Several users are, therefore, inter-connected through irrigation works.  
Sharing agreements, often times involving licensed amendments, have been used in the past 
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as an effective way to meet the demands of non-agricultural users within a district.  Due to 
this, many key informants see amendments as cooperation between several users, while 
providing security for districts over long-term control over the licensed allocations.  The 
representative from the AIPA identified these sentiments by responding to the opposition 
encountered over the EID amendments accounting for 940,000 ML:      
The big scare came when the EID tried to amend their 
license. Certain groups thought the sky was falling, and 
that the EID was going to send water down to the states 
and that they would start charging more for their water. 
But it was really the EID trying to supply the town of 
Brooks.  It's sensationalized in order to try to create 
negative thoughts in my opinion. So the EID finally got 
their amendment a while ago. It was enough to help the 
town of Brooks and other industries (Key Informant 6). 
 
  Another option that license holders have is to share their water through 
assignments.  The researcher was fortunate enough to discuss assignments with the 
individual that assisted in their creation as an administrative tool in Alberta, leading to the 
ability to use assignments being entrenched in the Water Act (Section 33).  This individual 
from Alberta Environment explains the popularity of sharing water via assignments over 
the permanent or temporary transfer of licensed water allocations: 
I never thought it would work past the bus route the kids 
take from school. But we made it work in 2001 with no 
money or no lawyers. There were assignments done 
between individuals but there was money trading hands. 
But in the big assignment, the 'social engineering' 
assignment, there wasn't any money changing hands. To 
the point where the districts have now formalized their 
intentions in a statement saying 'we're not going to use 
our priority if it conflicts with human uses' (Key 
Informant 8). 
 
 Assignments cannot exceed the licensed volume that was originally stipulated on 
the license (Water Act Section 33).  Therefore, assignments cannot satisfy new demand.  In 
many ways, an assignment is an administrative mechanism that can be used to circumvent 
 135 
 
the FITFIR system by allowing license holders to make agreements to share risk.  
Nevertheless, they have traditionally been much more popular than temporary transfers of 
licensed water allocations because assignments do not have the transaction costs associated 
with the transfer process (Nicol et al, 2008). 
 As mentioned, one of the key factors that lead to the unwillingness of districts to 
transfer water, is the loss of control they have over the long-term allocation.  This is why 
they typically prefer supply agreements made under amended licenses for long term 
transfers, and assignments for short term allocations, as under both scenarios districts are 
still guaranteed control over their licensed allocations.  It is no surprise, given this 
sentiment, that there is a fear prevalent pertaining to the use it or lose it legislation in the 
Water Act (Section 55). 
6.3 Use it, or lose it 
 One finding from the survey indicates that a large percentage of drylanders and 
dependents have intentions to buy water and land over the next five years; and they also 
have bought irrigated land over the last five years.  There have been several district 
expansions since 2006, largely because the irrigation districts have saved significant 
amounts of water from increased efficiency gains over the last 15 years (Bjornlund et al, 
2007; Nicol et al, 2010).  Many of these efficiency gains are derived from on-farm 
efficiency improvements (Bjornlund et al, 2007; Nicol et al, 2010).  This research confirms 
that a large proportion of drylanders, and especially dependents, have upgraded their 
irrigation equipment over the last five years.   
 When discussing this finding with the key informants, it became clear that there are 
serious concerns over the recommendation made by the approved water management plan 
with respect to how Alberta Environment is able to claw back part of a license when traded.  
There are two main concerns: i) it will be to the detriment of irrigators and food processors 
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because it will increase risk of shortage during drought years; and ii) it actually encourages 
irrigation district expansion to occur, thereby resulting in more water use thereby increasing 
the volume of water diverted.  
 The second point is interesting, in that the fear of losing some of a license has led to 
irrigation district expansion. As one representative from the AIPA explains: 
So if they [irrigation districts] feel threatened that they 
are going to take portions of licenses they are not using 
then what are you going to do? You are going to 
expand. So why are the districts expanding? It is out of 
fear. I know the districts have presented it to their 
farmers that if you don't use it, you're going to lose it 
(Key Informant 6). 
 
This view was further reiterated by an executive from Alberta Environment, and an 
irrigation district board member from the EID.  The Alberta Environment representative 
specifically referred to the potential reaction of irrigation communities towards more strict 
government guidelines, taking away water that has not been traditionally used: 
Do we really want that knee jerk reaction?  That if the 
government tries to say 'well we're going to take it away 
and give it to them if they grow'? Then the one party 
will just try to stop the growth. They'll use all their rural 
friends to try to block any expropriation of land to any 
municipality that's trying to grow while expropriating 
their water at the same time (Key Informant 8). 
 
 A representative from the EID reiterated fears over government claw backs by 
explaining how district expansions have taken place out of fear, and that this has ultimately 
resulted in more water being used: 
As far as I can see they've [environmental groups] really 
hurt themselves. They wanted this but they didn't really 
like what might occur. A lot of districts have expanded.  
For example the SMRID has another 10% expansion 
going on, BRID has just expanded another 30,000 acres 
and I heard most of that is already spoken for... So all of 
a sudden there's a whole bunch less water. That is in 
part caused by this, people are afraid there will be 
nothing available (Key Informant 9). 
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 Many within irrigation communities also fear the risk associated with cutting back 
allocations.  These risks go beyond the farm, as there is a fear that food processors and 
other industries, supported by district water, may scale back their operations if claw backs 
were to occur.  One member from AARD expressed this concern with regards to the 
recommendation in the approved water management plan: 
Claw-backs put the whole industry at risk. They 
increase the risk as an irrigation producer and as an 
irrigator crop processor. The only reason we have 
McCain's potatoes processor here is because of the high 
quality of the product. The only reason why the canola 
seed industry is here, is because the guaranteed high 
quality of the product. Will they remain and stay here if 
somebody stipulates that in 10% of the years there may 
not be sufficient allocation to meet the needs of these 
crops? I'm going to suggest there are a number of 
processors that think that's a risk they are no longer 
willing to take (Key Informant 7). 
 
 These findings suggest that fears exist towards the use it or lose it policy in Alberta.  
These fears have encouraged irrigation districts to expand in order to use their allocations 
as opposed to the possibility of having some of that license being taken away.  The survey 
findings suggest that most irrigators in the sample support using this water for economic 
expansion, and many dependents and drylanders have taken this opportunity to expand their 
irrigated acres.  This brings up an issue pertaining to government policies towards WCOs 
that intend to increase the naturalized flow of many of the rivers and streams in the SSRB.  
While license holders are not necessarily increasing their diversions, they are increasing 
their net water use which may affect stream flow.  The main argument made by the key 
informants is that, through threatening to claw back some of the licensed volumes, 
efficiency gains that would have otherwise resulted in less water use and reduced 
diversions have resulted in more water use.  This has a tangible effect on government 
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strategies to allocate more water for environmental purposes.  There is also the fear of 
activating previously unused water allocations in order to keep them, which means that 
water previously left in rivers or reservoirs will be used.  It has been a goal of the 
government to protect water by creating WCOs that serve as licensed environmental 
holdbacks.  WCOs are, however, viewed upon negatively by many in the survey findings 
and most key informants.     
6.4 Environmental Holdbacks 
 
 As discussed in the survey findings, the hobby group tends to have more of a 
positive disposition towards WCOs and the notion that the government should claw back 
water to put back in the rivers.  Dependents and drylanders tend to have more negative 
dispositions towards WCOs as they intend to expand and use that water in the future.  This 
finding was interesting in the sense that most irrigators from all groups in the sample 
tended to view minimum flows positively, and acknowledged the role of the government 
towards setting environmental flow objectives; while having significantly different views 
towards WCOs.   
 This finding was discussed with the key informants.  These interviews uncovered 
that there exists much skepticism towards WCOs among those in the irrigation community 
because of their perceived lack of effectiveness. Furthermore, the key informants expressed 
a certain mistrust of government holdbacks; and also cite WCOs not taking into account 
riverine eco-system resiliency.  First, the issue of eco-system resiliency is explained by an 
executive of the AIPA: 
So the WCO was set in the South Saskatchewan basin at 
45% of natural flow. There were a number of things that 
went into that. Number one, the basin already had lots 
of allocation in it. So, are you going to dry society and 
the economy here?  No. So you have to allow diversions 
out of the river. One scientific study says you need 85% 
of the natural flow of the river or else you're doing 
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damage. That's what being talked about for setting 
WCOs on rivers that have low allocations. One thing 
that does not take into account is what's called 
resiliency. Let us say at 85% of the flow on June 4th 
that would be 2500 c/f/s. Next year we have a dry year 
and nature sends us 500 c/f/s. So why didn't nature meet 
the WCO? So if nature doesn't meet the WCO the year 
earlier, then is the river damaged? So, rivers are 
dynamic, they have resiliency, and we need to stay in 
the bounds of natural resiliency of the system. So yes, if 
we are stressing an eco-system, then sometimes that 
stress needs to be relieved so it doesn't do damage. 
That's the hard number to get at. It's not that a specific 
flow is the right number.   It's hard to get that [number] 
for functional flow. That is the flow that has specific 
purpose for riparian areas (Key Informant 6). 
 Furthermore, most key informants expressed an opinion that WCOs were not as 
useful as they should be because of the miniscule volumes that have thus far been allocated 
towards them via a 10% holdback of a traded volume.  The following key informants from 
the AIPA and AARD discuss this in more detail: 
If you're taking 10% out of the rivers, that is a token. 
That is a small volume. The modelling that was done on 
the Bow River they could say 'well if the districts can 
take this much water at this stage, say in late August 
and we can negotiate with other users like Trans Alta, 
that would make a big difference'. So I don't know what 
the transfers have contributed, what they've 
accumulated but let's say there's... I'll use a number so 
it's easy math...let's say there has been 14,600 acre feet 
of water transferred. So 10% of that would be say 1400 
acre feet of water. So if you were to see how much, if 
you were let all that water out into a river for six 
months, how many cubic feet per second is that? 
…That's around what 4 cubic feet per second. Can you 
measure the difference for that? That's in your margin of 
error. So what are we really accomplishing there? We 
don't say that too loudly because people think that they 
are important and if that's what makes them feel good so 
be it. But, managing the river for specific times and 
stuff like that is, in my books, what we need to do more 
of (Key Informant 6). 
 
Yeah the 10% holdback is an interesting concept. 
Somebody thought it was a win so they put it in. But, if 
you add up all the transfers that have happened in the 
 140 
 
last five years and take 10% of it from the Oldman 
River, I would question whether that amount is even 
accurate enough to know whether it's there or not. Your 
margin of error is actually bigger than what you're 
getting back. So let's say we quadruple that amount, it 
still is so insignificant. Is it really going to make an 
impact?   It's a good news story for the environmental 
part of the rivers. Is it measurable and is there really an 
impact? I doubt it (Key Informant 7). 
 These are very similar concerns to those raised by the minister’s advisory group in 
2009 stating that WCOs “…[do] not reflect the level of protection that would have been 
defined if the basin had not been so heavily allocated at the time that the Management Plan 
was completed.” (Alberta Environment, 2009: 1).  This is why the minister’s advisory 
group recommended future studies of the possibility of a fee or financial charge as opposed 
to the 10% holdback.  Furthermore, cutting back the licensed volume by 10% is seen as an 
impediment to transfers because of a mistrust of the government.  This is expressed by one 
SMRID board member: 
Well there hasn't been many transfers because the 
government steps in and can take 10%.   They [the 
government] screwed up and now they're trying to 
rectify it. But it's at the backs of people that can help. 
The way I look at it, we are all businessmen. So you 
look at it like 'wow a 10% loss'. Well what are you 
going to do with the 10%? That's going to correct your 
mistake. Well I'm sorry you made a mistake but I don't 
think I want to correct your mistake. So there are some 
issues I have with that (Key Informant 10). 
 The hobby group was the only group in the survey where the majority were either 
neutral or agreed with the ability of the government to cancel some under-utilized licenses.  
The other two groups, more dependent on agriculture with more invested in irrigation, 
tended to heavily disagree with that.  An executive from the AARD explains that this may 
be because of mistrust over the government’s intentions to do this: 
The other problem with that is, ok so we cancel it. So 
then you have to ask yourself, do you trust the 
government enough now that they have this extra 
allocation of water that is allocated to them again. What 
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do they do with it?   Are they just going to hold it? Or 
re-allocate it to someone who will use it? (Key 
Informant 7). 
 
 This executive is referring more specifically to a crown reservation.  A crown 
reservation is water that is currently not allocated, that the government has the ability to 
store and lease out according to the discretion of the director (Water Act Section 35).  A 
crown reservation is, in essence, a risk management tactic used by the government to 
ensure that demand may be met.  It can also, however, become an ‘annuals’ market for 
users willing to lease from the government.  As an executive from Alberta Environment 
explains,  
We could change that. We could say 'there is this much 
water you're not going to need, so in five years from 
now we are going to take that entire block of water 
back. We are going to put it in a water bank and 
distribute water from the water bank on an annual basis 
only to those who meet a certain conservation standard 
in their new growth'. We could create an annual use 
category by setting water aside for that specific purpose. 
We don’t see the need for it. As long as the growth is 
within municipal use, and the municipal use within the 
current market can by far outbid the agricultural use 
where lots of water is available the market doesn't seem 
to be broken (Key Informant 8). 
 
 Interestingly, while irrigators in the survey showed predominantly negative views 
towards the notion of the government cancelling licenses, or clawing back portions of 
licenses as opposed to the entire allocation; they tended to stay neutral or even support the 
notion of private individuals holding water for environmental purposes.  This brings up an 
interesting possibility that is not available under the current legislation.  Under the Water 
Act Alberta Environment is the only entity that can hold water for in-stream flows.  This 
means that private individuals or NGOs cannot purchase licensed water allocations with the 
purpose of leaving the water in the river in support of WCOs.  
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 This is a topic that is explored by those in the literature (King, 2004; Neuman, 2004; 
Garrick et al, 2009; Garrick et al, 2011; Lane Miller et al, 2013).  Since this is currently not 
possible under the current legislation in Alberta, the possibility of allowing private 
individuals or groups to hold licensed allocations to contribute towards WCOs may be a 
useful administrative tool to protect water for conservation purposes.    
Interestingly, most key informants did not approve of this notion.  As 
representatives from the AIPA and SMRID explained: 
I think the government needs to be responsible for 
managing rivers. I don't think the districts should be 
responsible because the districts are very well 
intentioned but they need to deliver water. So I think it 
is right that government controls the flows in the rivers. 
I don't think most of the districts would disagree with 
that (Key Informant 6). 
 
I don't know if private license holders [for 
environmental purposes] can do as well [as the 
government]. Private is there to make money. I mean I 
am still concerned about us selling our natural resources 
to foreign countries. It concerns me because I think in 
the future water is going to be a very valuable asset. I 
think we need to maintain control over it. I'm not saying 
farmers do everything right, but at least it's a grassroots 
approach. We are going to become the bread basket of 
the world here pretty quickly so water is important (Key 
Informant 10). 
 Nevertheless the disposition of most irrigators in the survey was either neutral or 
supportive of allowing private individuals to obtain licenses for environmental purposes.  
Irrigation community support is typically essential in achieving conservation objective 
goals by allowing private groups or individuals to obtain licenses for environmental 
purposes (King, 2004; Neuman, 2004; Garrick et al, 2009; Garrick et al, 2011; Lane Miller 
et al, 2013).  As Lane Miller et al (2013) point out, however, in order to achieve 
conservation objectives by allowing private license holders to acquire water for 
environmental purposes, there must be four fundamental conditions: i) legal and 
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institutional settings which clearly define water rights and lower administrative and other 
barriers to water transfers; ii) non-governmental organizations and community groups 
which play a complementary role to government; and iii) creation of a system that will 
fairly distribute future risk of water availability and provide choices for a variety of ways of 
obtaining it; and iv) efforts that minimize negative community impacts, thus helping to 
maximize irrigator participation.  This topic is explained in more detail in the next chapter. 
6.5 Prior Allocation   
 The final topic emerging from the discussion with key informants was the FITFIR 
system in Alberta.  As discussed in the Policy Context chapter, water users in Alberta have 
options for managing the priority system.  This chapter has explained the viability of supply 
agreements via license amendments and assignments.  It is an interesting fact to point out 
that, as of 2014, no license holder has ever “called priority” for all of their license.  During 
water shortages, such as during 2001 and 2002 in southern Alberta, assignment agreements 
and water rationing were used in order to help junior license to access water by effectively 
applying a proportional sharing system.  The key informants expressed various sentiments 
towards the notion of changing Alberta’s priority system that included moral objections 
towards changing the system and other objections towards the practicality of such a move. 
 A moral objection is expressed in the following statement by a representative from 
Alberta Environment: 
The other thing about the first in time anxiety... people 
say that's old and dead and we should not do that. They 
should work with people in a drought. It's a life 
changing experience to work with people in a drought.  
I've done it for a long time. To anyone that thinks we 
shouldn't have a priority system of some kind...try 
walking into the bank 4:30 on Friday before a long 
weekend having only put a nickel in the parking meter. 
See the long line up, you go to the front of the line 
because you're worried about your circumstance 
because you only put one nickel in the parking meter so 
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you just have to go first... people are going to say 'that's 
your problem, get the hell to the back of the line' (Key 
Informant 8). 
  From a practical point of view there is also a fear that eliminating the FITFIR 
system will alter land values, and result in mass dissent in the irrigation community.  As 
one SMRID board member points out: 
If it [FITFIR] ever gets thrown out the window it will be 
chaos around here. Even land titles and everything like 
that will be thrown out. I don't think they've given it 
much thought (Key Informant 10). 
 
 Irrigators in the sample, and key informants, express both a moral objection to 
altering the FITFIR system, and a fear of depreciating land values and increasing risk of not 
receiving allocation during times of low flow.  Furthermore, many claim that following 
FITFIR is not the only option, and that the current arrangements allow license holders to 
make do with what they have without threating the supply of others, such as with 
assignments, and amending licenses to allow supply agreements.  License holders also have 
the ability to deal with risk associated with the FITFIR system by conducting a reverse 
transfer or an assignment of priority.  A reverse transfer of a higher risk license in exchange 
for a low risk license allows license holders to manage risk by being able to purchase 
another license holders priority.   
 6.6 Summary 
 This chapter has identified factors associated with the unwillingness of irrigators to 
conduct water transfers as a means to re-allocate water.  Many of the concerns of the key 
informants match concerns discussed in the Chapter Two regarding barriers to transfers, 
including property rights, ability to bypass the transfer system by conducting assignments 
or entering into supply agreements, and skepticism over environmental holdbacks from 
traded volumes.  These findings suggest that the source of the unwillingness to use transfers 
as a primary tool of re-allocation among irrigation district board members and other 
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members of the irrigation community, is institutional in nature.  The next chapter discusses 
the implications of these findings, shortcomings of the research, and suggested avenues of 
future research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The intention of this research was two-fold: i) identify the intentions of irrigators to 
trade or transfer water and the factors that influence those intentions; and ii) identify 
irrigators’ acceptance of policies to re-allocate or share water. By addressing irrigators’ 
unwillingness to use the transfer system to re-allocate water it is possible to identify gaps in 
the water policies in southern Alberta that may prohibit the use of the transfer system.  
Identifying irrigators’ acceptance of policies to share water offers information about how 
irrigators’ dispositions towards certain policies may affect the re-allocation of water 
between users in southern Alberta.  
 In order to achieve these research goals a telephone survey was used in conjunction 
with interviews with leading members of the water management and irrigation communities 
in southern Alberta.  This provided information that offers useful additions to attitude-
behaviour literature, extractive-commodity literature, and literature investigating the factors 
that may impede a transfer system in the South Saskatchewan River Basin.          
7.1 Key Findings and Contributions 
 In order to achieve the goals of this research, the following question guided the 
research process: ‘what are the factors associated with irrigators’ unwillingness towards 
using water transfers as a way to re-allocate water to other users’.  Through applying 
concepts found in attitude-behaviour literature and extractive-commodity literature, several 
key findings identified the factors associated with unwillingness to use transfers as a way to 
re-allocate water. 
7.1.1 Association between Intentions, Values and Attitudes 
 This research took the unique approach of combining concepts derived from the 
TRA, TPB, transactional theory and extractive-commodity theory to analyse the 
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impediments to water transfers, and the use of trading in order to facilitate water transfers.  
As such, the conceptual framework from which the telephone survey was created is heavily 
based on attitude-behaviour connection research.  In this manner, the telephone survey 
focused much more on the non-financial influences that the literature has shown to be 
influential in farmers’ decision making (Gasson, 1973; Potter and Gasson, 1988; Austin et 
al, 1996; Willock et al, 1999a; Willock et al, 1999b; Tisdell et al, 2001; Maybery et al, 
2005).    
 The literature has identified several attitudes that may influence farmers’ 
willingness to participate in water transfers.  They include: i) attitudes towards social 
acceptability, and the power of social influences towards transfers (Potter and Gasson, 
1988; Samdahl and Robertson, 1989; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Tisdell et al, 2001; 
Jackson-Smith and Buttell, 2003; Burton, 2004; Kuehne et al, 2008); ii) attitudes towards 
risk and economic factors (Dinar et al, 1995; Petzrelka, 1996; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 
2004; Darnhofer et al, 2005; Bjornlund, 2006; Brooks and Harris, 2008); and attitudes 
towards the long-termed impacts of re-allocation strategies (Bjornlund, 2002; Tisdell and 
Ward, 2003; Burton, 2004; Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005).   Furthermore, the literature 
focusing on psychological motives behind farming suggests that values towards family, 
farming as an occupation, and values towards the environment also play an important role 
in farmers’ decisions (Gasson, 1973; Beus and Dunlap, 1990; Austin et al, 1996; Salamon 
et al, 1997; Corner et al, 1999; Maybery et al, 2005; Kuehne et al, 2008).  These concepts 
were included in a telephone survey that loosely embraced the affective attitude and value 
statements that Ajzen and Fishbein championed for TRA and TPB.   
 The responses gathered from the telephone survey indicate that there are four 
dominant dimensions that account for 57.43% of the variance in irrigators’ values and 
attitudes towards economic, social, and environmental affairs towards water transfers.  
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These factors are risk-averse attitude, social acceptance attitude, pro-sharing attitude and 
pro-environmental value.  Generally speaking, however, these factors did not associate 
statistically with various stated intentions, in contrast to what is articulated in the literature. 
However, the pro-environmental value factor did display some significant relationships 
with different trading or transfer intentions, and it was the only factor that displayed 
statistically significant associations with intentions to vote yes in a plebiscite to transfer 
water.  
 This finding shows that the attitude and values had a weaker association with 
intentions to trade or transfer than expected.  This is most likely because most irrigators had 
little intentions of selling or re-allocating water via a plebiscite.  Many irrigators had the 
intention to buy water, or purchase a lease of water, over the next five years; while very 
few had intentions to sell.  Those who did have intentions to sell tended to have more pro-
environmental values than other irrigators.  This, however, can also be explained by this 
group’s lack of dependence on irrigated agriculture for income. 
7.1.2 Association between Demographics, Farm Characteristics and Intentions 
 This research embraced the concept that farmers are heterogeneous, and most likely 
have a diversity of characteristics contextualizing their behavioural intentions.  This follows 
the literature that has categorized farmers based on their personal demographics and farm 
characteristics (Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978; Fairweather and Keating, 1994; Petzrelka et 
al, 1996; Salamon et al, 1997; Corner et al, 1999; Schoon and Grotenhuis, 2000; Darnhofer 
et al, 2005; Maybery et al, 2005).  These findings re-affirmed the literature suggesting that 
farmers can be specifically grouped based on their characteristics, and that these groups 
will display different intentions, values and attitudes towards water transfers. 
 The core finding from the cluster analysis indicates that three main groups of 
irrigators were found in the sample: i) drylanders who are actively seeking to expand their 
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irrigated acres, who are usually dependent on livestock operations, and who have the 
majority of their income derived from the farm; ii) dependents who are more crop 
dependent growing more specialty crops, and having a large percentage of their farming 
operations dedicated to irrigated agriculture; and iii) hobby farmers who are not dependent 
on the land for income, and who have small farms usually dedicated to livestock 
production.  The findings suggest that these groups all have varying attitudes, values and 
intentions.   
 The hobby farmers are distinctly different from the drylanders and dependents 
regarding their values and attitudes.  They hold less risk-averse attitudes towards inputs and 
costs, and they display a notably higher pro-environmental value than the drylanders or 
dependents.  The drylanders have the highest intentions to expand over the next five years, 
with plans to buy land and water.  This group is also most certain of a successor for the 
farm, thereby drawing some parallel between intentions to expand and certainty of farm 
succession.  The dependents were similar to the drylanders in their dispositions, but had 
more intentions to upgrade irrigation systems to maximise the water-use efficiency of their 
farms.  The dryalnders and dependents both had few plans to sell water, and displayed a 
strong unwillingness to re-allocate water via plebiscite, or to permanently sell their water to 
other users.  Universally, irrigators in the sample expressed more of a demand for water, 
and an unwillingness towards transfers that has been previously noted in the literature 
(Bjornlund  et al, 2007; Nicol et al, 2008).  This, combined with an analysis of the barriers 
to trade, and dispositions in the sample towards various policy preferences, has some 
implications for water policies aiming at the use of market based water transfers to re-
allocate water in the SSRB. 
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7.2 Policy Implications 
 The third research objective was to investigate irrigators’ policy preferences towards 
re-distributing water and the government’s role in transfers. This was done in order to 
identify policy gaps, or areas of further investigation.  Identifying attitudes towards policies 
can provide information on the root of the unwillingness and skepticism towards transfers.  
A review of the literature identified four institutional barriers to water trading in Alberta: i) 
property rights barriers; ii) lack of information; iii) environmental holdbacks; and iv) high 
transaction costs.  Data were gathered by using policy preference statements in the 
telephone survey, and by conducting interviews with leading members of the irrigation 
community. 
 Interviews with leading members of the irrigation community confirmed the 
presence of property rights barriers, environmental holdback barriers and high transaction 
costs in the SSRB’s transfer system.  Transaction costs are seen as high to many, 
particularly for temporary transfers for low volumes between users.  Most key informants 
expressed a similar sentiment as was expressed by the Minister’s Advisory Group in 2009, 
that “a number of operational barriers established in the Water Act should be removed to 
allow the transfer system to operate more effectively” (Alberta Environment, 2009: 7).   
Clearly defined property rights were also identified as an issue, as the amount that a 
licensee is able to transfer is not clearly defined.  Survey respondents expressed the desire 
to either trade water they are not using, or to use water saved through efficiency gains 
towards economic purposes such as expanding irrigation on the farm.   
 In addition to this, irrigation districts are seeking to amend licenses in order to 
satisfy other users.  There is a fear expressed that this may lead to more water use through 
diversions, and less water for rivers and streams (Christensen and Droitsch, 2008).  This is 
compounded by the intention of most drylander and dependent irrigators to expand their 
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farms and buy more water rights.   Irrigators in the sample have shown that they are much 
more interested in expanding their existing operations, and using more water, than they are 
by transferring any efficiency gains.  The common view is to identify water being 
transferred as ‘being lost’ as Key Informant 6 points out, to the district, whereas 
amendments and assignments can ensure that the water stays with the license holder.   
These findings indicate that, because of irrigators’ intentions to use water saved 
through efficiency gains, more water use can be expected in the next five years.  This 
brings up a concern that increased water use efficiency will actually lead to more use and 
less water being left to other users or the environment (English et al, 2002; Whittlesey, 
2003).  This concern is justified from the survey results given the intentions of irrigation 
districts and private irrigators in the sample, and through interviews with key informants. 
The survey findings suggest that some efficiency gains are expected through irrigation 
system upgrades, particularly among the dependent irrigator group, but that irrigators have 
a desire to put these efficiency gains to use on their farms.  
WCOs are viewed critically by most irrigators in the sample, and by several key 
informants.  This skepticism is most likely due to how WCOs are structured, and 
particularly that the 10% holdback is associated with WCOs.  Many see WCOs as not 
useful because of the trivial amounts of water that have been allocated to them from 
transfers.  Most key informants viewed WCOs as ineffective and an impediment to transfer 
water.       
7.3 Lessons Learned from the Research 
 There were some shortcomings of the research, and some mistakes that were made 
concerning methodology.  The most apparent shortcoming was associated with the survey 
instrument.  In particular, the value statements embodied in the telephone survey were 
heavily skewed.  Roughly half of the value and attitudes statements were removed from the 
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factor analysis because of low correlations, low communalities and extreme skew-ness.  
This reiterates a fundamental lesson that was over-looked with the creation of the survey: to 
keep the statements as direct and simple as possible.  Furthermore, more testing should 
have been conducted with the survey, as it had what could be perceived of as confusing 
wording.  An approach to solve this error would be to create the survey instrument to test a 
much more specific outcome, or behaviour, as stressed by Ajzen and Fisbhein’s work on 
TRA and TPB literature.  At the same time, it is also evident that the TPB and TRA may be 
directly applicable in studying irrigator’s decision making behaviour.   
 The second shortcoming of the research was the wording of the intentions to 
transfer or trade water in the telephone survey.  The primary objective of the survey was to 
identify the intentions of irrigators to transfer water, and what the factors influencing those 
intentions are.  The survey should have been reduced to one overall outcome or behaviour, 
as opposed to including a scenario in an attempt to gage their attitudes and values towards 
various factors that may influence their decisions to transfer.  The scenario was considered 
to be confusing by some respondents. 
 Another shortcoming of the research was the absence of questions regarding 
assignments and amendments in the survey.  Assignments and amendments are seen as 
more preferable to key informants.  Questions crafted around the use of assignments and 
amendments to achieve the goals of the WFL may have yielded interesting results, and 
could have contributed to a greater understanding of the unwillingness of irrigators to use 
the transfer system to re-allocate water. 
 The final shortcoming of the research was the inclusion of private and district 
irrigators in the sample.  The survey was crafted to be administered to both separately, and 
to combine the results to provide an overall explanation of their intentions, attitude and 
value dispositions, and characteristics.  It would have been more effective to focus more on 
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district irrigators, as irrigation districts hold the largest and most senior licenses in the 
SSRB, and to analyse private irrigators in a separate survey.  This is warranted due to the 
institutional differences between irrigators within a district, and irrigators using their own 
private licenses.   
7.4 Suggested Avenues for Future Research 
  Despite the shortcomings of the research, there were several findings that warrant 
future investigation.  The first is to investigate the viability or potential for allowing private 
individuals to hold licenses that can contribute towards WCOs.  This is not permitted under 
the current legislation.  The survey findings suggest, however, that most irrigators in the 
sample were at least somewhat receptive to the idea.  Lane Miller et al (2013) point out that 
in order to achieve conservation objectives by allowing private license holders to acquire 
water for environmental purposes, there must be four fundamental conditions: i) legal and 
institutional settings which clearly define water rights and lower administrative and other 
barriers to water transfers; ii) non-governmental organizations and community groups 
which play a complementary role to government; and iii) creation of a system that will 
fairly distribute future risk of water availability and provide choices for a variety of ways of 
obtaining and; and iv) efforts that minimize negative community impacts, thus helping to 
maximize irrigator participation.  Each of these topics deserves more investigation in the 
SSRB in order to not only identify the viability of allowing private individuals to hold 
environmental licenses, but to maximise flexibility and effectiveness of the allocation 
system in general. 
 In order to address the shortcomings of this research, it is also recommended to 
address value relationships with intentions more thoroughly.  More concrete measures of 
values, in particular, may be useful in statistical models used to predict outcomes based on 
the parameters set by value and attitude constructs, such as with structural equation 
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modelling (Austin et al, 1998a; Austin et al, 1998b).  This research has suggested some 
core attitude and value constructs through factor analysis.  These constructs may be used in 
a more precise manner in such predictive models in order to enhance or identify their 
explanatory power.     
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APPENDIX A 
Pre-Survey Interview Questions 
1. How important is irrigation water to your farming operation? 
 
2. Is farming the only way you and your family make a living? 
 
3. What type of irrigation system do you have? 
 
4. As you may know, irrigators in Southern Alberta are allocated about three-quarters 
of the freshwater resources.  Do you think this is the best use for that water, or do 
you think this is too much/too little? 
 
5. Do you feel as though there is a water scarcity issue in Southern Alberta? 
 
6. One of the goals of the Water for Life Strategy is to increase water use efficiency 
and productivity by 30% in 2015 over 2005 levels.  Do you think is attainable? 
 
a. Why or why not? 
b. Do you think irrigators are as efficient as they can be with the water 
resources they have? 
c. Have you upgraded your irrigation system to increase water efficiency since 
2003? 
d. Do you intend to increase your water efficiency? 
 
7. How do you feel about water markets in Southern Alberta? 
 
8. One of the goals of the Water for Life Strategy is the protection and restoration of 
aquatic ecosystems.  How do you feel about that and how do you feel about 
providing water for ecosystems? 
 
a. How do you feel about Water Conservation Objectives? 
b. What are your views on the environment, and do you think aquatic 
ecosystems have as much value as agriculture? 
 
9. What are your long termed goals for your farming operation? 
a. Are your children interested in farming? 
b. Have you ever considered selling your land to people who will use it for 
non-farming purposes? 
 
10.  Do you describe yourself as a religious person? 
a. Does this tend to shape your values? 
 
11.   Where do you get most of your information from regarding water and 
environmental issues? 
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12.   Are you a member of any clubs or organizations (ie: Ducks Unlimited, 4-H, any 
political parties or organizations, etc?) 
 
13.   If you feel comfortable answering, may I ask what political affiliation you tend to 
‘swing’ to?  Conservative?  Liberal?  Anything Else? 
 
14.   What would you identify as the biggest problem for your farming operation?   
 
15.   What generation of farming do you belong to, and how much do you associate 
yourself with the farming lifestyle? 
 
16.   This may sound like a ‘loaded’ question but if you had to choose one of the 
following, what would it be? 
 
a. Increase profits. 
b. Protect the environment. 
c. Continue the farming lifestyle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 171 
 
APPENDIX B – ETHICS FORM FOR INTERVIEWS 
 
 
4401 University Drive 
    Lethbridge, Alberta 
    T1K 3M4 
    TEL: (403) 329-2225 
    FAX: (403) 329-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Geography 
 
Dear Participant: 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project I am conducting for a Master's thesis at the 
University of Lethbridge. By agreeing to be interviewed you will have the opportunity to influence the 
questions asked in a survey for research that concerns the sustainability of Alberta’s water supplies.  
 
My research is investigating the values, attitudes and motivations of Alberta's irrigators towards 
water use and water transfers. By better understanding irrigators’ values and attitudes towards 
water I hope to better understand what factors influence irrigators’ management decisions, and to 
address how irrigators view optimal water usage.   
 
By interviewing irrigators of different farming backgrounds in the South Saskatchewan River Basin I 
hope to identify all relevant value orientations of the irrigation sector in the region towards water use 
and the water market.   I also hope to identify the terms under which Alberta’s irrigators feel water 
transfers should take place.  By sharing with me your personal views on this issue, you will aid me 
in ensuring that all aspects of concern regarding water use and water transfers are captured by the 
survey.  This will provide valuable insight that may shape future policy and research. 
 
Several steps will be taken to protect your anonymity and identity.  While the interviews will be tape 
recorded, the voice files will be destroyed once they have been transcribed.  The typed interviews 
will not contain any mention of your name, and any identifying information from the interview will be 
removed.  The typed interviews will be kept in a locked filing cabinet at the University of Lethbridge 
and electronic versions of the interviews will be kept on a password protected computer.  Only the 
two main researchers, and a research assistant, all under professional obligation to keep all 
information confidential, will have access to the interviews.  All information will be destroyed in five 
years.  You will be sent a copy of the transcript of the interview for your comments. 
 
There are no known risks or discomforts associated with participating in this research, and your 
participation in the interview is completely voluntary. If you chose, you may withdraw from the study 
at any time. If you do this, all information you have provided will be destroyed.   
 
The benefits of participating in the survey development process include ensuring that your values 
are considered in the development of the final survey instrument, which may influence future 
research and policy on the way water transfers are conducted in Alberta.  
 
A short report summarizing the results of the survey will be published on the internet at 
http://www.waterresearch.net in advance of the final results being published as part of a Master’s 
Thesis as well as in professional and academic journals and in conference presentations and 
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proceedings papers to academics and policymakers. At no time, however, will your name be used 
or any identifying information be revealed. 
 
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you in 
reaching a decision about participation, please contact me by phone at 403-329-2535 or email at 
Mathew.hall@uleth.ca). You can also contact my faculty supervisors Dr. Henning Bjornlund in the 
Department of Economics (phone: 403-317-2884; email: henning.bjornlund@uleth.ca) or Dr. Wei 
Xu in the Department of Geography (phone: 403-332-4561; email: wei.xu@uleth.ca).  
 
Questions regarding your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the Office of 
Research Services, University of Lethbridge (phone: 403-329-2747 or email: 
research.services@uleth.ca). 
 
Thank you in advance for your interest in this project. 
 
 
 
Mathew Hall 
Student Investigator 
 
 
 
I have been offered a copy of this consent form that I may keep for my own reference. 
 
I consent to this interview being tape recorded acknowledging that all procedures concerning my 
privacy and anonymity will be followed. 
 
I have read the above form and, with the understanding that I can withdraw at any time and for 
whatever reason, I consent to participate in today's interview. 
 
 
_______________________                                                    ___________________ 
 Participant's signature                                                              Date 
 
_______________________ 
 Researcher’s signature 
 
 
I agree to be part of the focus group to evaluate the questionnaire. 
 
I agree to be part of the final pilot test of the questionnaire which will be conducted by phone. 
 
If you agree to be part of the final pilot test and/or the focus group please provide: 
 
Name: 
 
Email: 
 
Contact Phone Number:  
 
 
 
Participant's signature              
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Appendix C – SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Part 1 - Introduction 
 
Int1 
 
Hello, my name is _____. Today we're conducting a study with local irrigators on behalf of 
the University of Lethbridge and Alberta Innovates about water management decisions.  
Your input will be very instrumental for a U of L Master’s student research project and will 
help inform policy makers on irrigators’ opinions and attitudes related to water 
management.  By accepting to participate in this survey you will also be eligible for a one-
time $500 prize draw that will be conducted upon research completion sometime early in 
the new year.  This is not a sales call.  
 
Are you a rural landowner with irrigated land either in an irrigation district or with your 
own water license, and over 18 years of age? 
 
([If the person answering the phone is not a landowner over 18: ask if there is someone 
else in the household who is and ask to speak to that person]) 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Call back later 
4 Not interested 
 
T1 Show if not an irrigator or over 18 
 
Thank you for your time. Good bye. 
    
 
CB3 Show if call back 
 
Go to call back page 
 
 
T0 Show if refused (No or Not Interested) 
 
Thank you for your time. Good bye. 
   
 
Int2 
 
Would you consider yourself a long-term decision maker for your land, if not can I speak to 
someone in your home who is? 
 
([IF DECISION MAKER IS NOT HOME: Ask: Would there be a convenient time to call 
back to reach him/her? 
 
Long-term decision maker: A household member who makes land management decisions 
that may affect their land in the long run. People who recently moved onto a property 
qualify, but people who only rent land should not qualify.]) 
 
1 Yes 
2 Yes, getting person 
3 No, call back later 
4 No, refusal 
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T2 Show If refused 
 
Thank you for your time. Good bye. 
 
 
CB1 Show If call back 
 
Go to call back page 
 
 
Int3 
 
<<int3_intro>>  
 
Your number was randomly chosen from a phone list gathered by matching numbers to 
your corresponding postal code.  This survey is voluntary and your responses will be kept 
strictly confidential and anonymous.  Although some personal information will be collected 
in this survey, in order to get demographic information, it will be protected.  Only the 
researcher and research assistants will have access to this information, and your name and 
identity will not be recorded, published or used in any work deriving from this survey.  We 
are interested in your responses, not your identity.  The information gathered from the 
survey will be used in publications and will be part of a Master’s thesis.  The survey will 
take about 20 to 30 minutes depending on your answers, and there are no known risks or 
anticipated discomforts expected from participating; however, you may withdraw at any 
time.  Would you be interested in participating in this research project by answering some 
questions? 
 
([If NO: Ask: Would there be a more convenient time for me to call back?]) 
 
1 Yes 
2 No, call back later 
3 No, refuse 
 
T3 Show if refused 
 
Thank you for your time. Good bye. 
   
 
CB2 Show if call back 
 
Go to call back page 
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Int4 
 
Great, before we get started I’ll just let you know that if you have questions about the research, I 
can supply you with the contact information of Mathew Hall, a Master’s student at the University 
of Lethbridge.  He will be able to provide you information and will answer general questions you 
may have about the study. Also, if you have questions regarding your rights as a participant, then 
I can give you the phone number to the Office of Research Services at the University of 
Lethbridge. 
 
I’d also like to inform you that this call may be monitored for quality assurance purposes.  
 
([IF ASKED: 
Mathew Hall:  Phone: 403-329-2535 or Email: Mathew.hall@uleth.ca 
Office of Research Services:  Phone: 403-329-2747 or Email: research.services@uleth.ca]) 
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Part 2 – Screening Questions 
Scr1 
Before we get started, does an irrigation district supply you with water or do you have your own 
private water license? 
1 District Irrigator 
2 Private Irrigator 
3 Both 

 (If District Irrigator, ask Scr2.  
If Private Irrigator, ask Scr3 and Scr4   
If Both, ask Scr2., Scr3., Scr4 and Scr5) 
Scr2 
Which irrigation district supplies you with water? (Manually Write In Response; for Spelling 
look in Appendix A) 
__________________ 
14   Refuse to Answer   
Scr3 
What river(s) or stream(s) do you get your water from for irrigation purposes as specified on 
your license? 
1     [Input names of river(s) and stream(s) manually here]. 
2    Not Sure 
4      Refuse to Answer 
Scr4 
The priority date of a water license is the date on the license that specifies when it was issued.  I 
am interested in the year the license was issued.  What is the year that your water license was 
issued?  
1      [Input priority date(s) here] 
2    Not Sure 
3    Refuse to Answer 
 177 
 
Scr5 
Do you get most of your irrigation water from a district or from your private license? 
1      District 
2    Private License 
3    Not Sure/Refuse to Answer 
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Part 3 – Value Orientations 
A1. 
The next part of the survey entails questions about you, your farming operation, and the benefits 
you derive from your farming operation.  Please indicate your level of agreement with the 
following statements using a 1 to 7 scale with 1 being “strongly disagree”, 7 being “strongly 
agree”, and 4 in the middle being “neither agree nor disagree”. 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. A maximum annual financial 
return from your farm is your 
most important goal. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Managing environmental 
problems on your land is a 
high priority.  
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. The lifestyle that comes with 
living in a rural area is very 
important to you. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Increasing the asset value or 
net worth of your farming 
operation is very important to 
you. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. For you, a rural environment 
is a better place to live than an 
urban environment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Your right to do what you 
want with your water 
allocation has to be balanced 
against wider environmental 
concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. You view your farming 
operation as first and foremost 
a business investment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Rural communities are a great 
place to live and raise a 
family. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Having enough water in rivers 
and streams to support healthy 
ecosystems is important to 
you. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. You make farm decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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based on how they will affect 
future generations farming on 
your land. 
 
k. Having land to pass down to 
future generations is more 
important than selling it for 
profit. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
l. When faced with decisions 
that affect the way you 
manage your farm, financial 
concerns tend to outweigh 
lifestyle considerations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
m. When faced with decisions 
that affect the way you 
manage your farm, financial 
concerns tend to outweigh 
environmental concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
n. When faced with decisions 
that affect the way you 
manage your farm, 
environmental concerns tend 
to outweigh lifestyle 
considerations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Part 4 – Policy Statements and Water Use Attitudes 
B1. 
With the same 1 to 7 scale, please indicate your level of agreement with the following policy 
statements. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. The government, rather than 
market forces, should get to 
decide who uses Alberta’s 
water. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. If an irrigation district or 
private license holder is not 
using all of their water 
allocation, the government 
should be able to take that 
water for environmental 
purposes, without any 
compensation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Minimum flows of water 
should be set for all rivers and 
streams, and only the water 
above those minimum flows 
should be used for economic 
purposes such as irrigation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Private groups and individuals 
should be able to hold water 
licenses for environmental 
purposes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Water that is saved through 
improved water use efficiency 
should be used to increase 
economic activity. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. The government should buy 
water from current license 
holders, like irrigation districts, 
so that more water can be left 
in the rivers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. The seniority of a water license 
must be honoured under all 
circumstances. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Public funds should be used to 
improve irrigation systems 
only if the water that is saved 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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is left in rivers. 
 
i. If water is to be traded among 
irrigation districts and/or 
municipalities, the government 
should set the price. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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B2.  
Next I will provide you with a context from which to answer some related questions. 
Alberta’s Water for Life Strategy encourages the use of economic instruments in an attempt to 
fairly distribute Alberta’s water supply to new and existing users.  The term economic instrument 
partially refers to enabling water license holders to transfer all or a part of their water licenses to 
a willing buyer.  These transfers may be temporary leases of water to another license holder, or 
permanent transfers.   
All transfers between license holders are subject to approval by Alberta Environment and must 
adhere to provisions in your river basin’s Water Management Plan.  Transfers must also not 
impair or have adverse effects on the rights of a household user, traditional agricultural user, or 
the aquatic environment, and may result in a 10% holdback which the government can use to 
meet their water conservation objectives. Transfers within irrigation districts may occur upon 
the approval of the irrigation district, and district fees associated with these transfers may be 
assessed.  Transfers that occur within an irrigation district are not subject to a 10% holdback. 
Now, with the same scale of 1 to 7 please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements: 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. Rivers and streams of Southern 
Alberta are environmentally 
degraded due to low flows. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b. You are aware of your abilities 
to buy or sell water with other 
farmers. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. There is an increasing demand 
for water from municipalities 
and industries in Southern 
Alberta. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Irrigation water should not be 
transferred to non-agricultural 
users. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Irrigation water should only be 
permanently sold to non-
agricultural users if the money 
made from the sale goes 
towards increasing agricultural 
water use efficiency (for 
example, fixing canals or 
installing pipelines resulting in 
a net savings of water). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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f. Temporary leases of water are 
ok, but permanent sales of 
water are not. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. More water should be set aside 
for irrigation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Municipalities and other non-
agricultural users should be 
more efficient with their water. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Re-allocating water from 
irrigation to municipalities and 
non-agricultural users is 
beneficial to society. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. Re-allocating water from 
irrigation to water conservation 
objectives is beneficial to 
society. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
k. Permanent water transfers 
between farmers are ok but 
trading water out of agriculture 
is not. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
l. You would feel more 
comfortable transferring your 
unused allocation rather than 
water you are actually using. 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 
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B3. 
To the best of your knowledge, in percentage, how much of your water allocation do you 
typically use during an average year? 
1 Less than 50% 
2 50% – less than 60% 
3 60% - less than 70% 
4 70% - less than 80% 
5   80% - less than 90% 
6  90% - less than 100% 
7   100% 
8   Don’t know.   
9   Refuse to Answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 185 
 
 
Part 5 – Attitudes 
[**For District Irrigators AND Both if Scr5 answer is District**] 
In the following scenario, a non-agricultural user has approached your irrigation district with a 
proposition to permanently purchase water.  The irrigation district is going to hold a plebiscite to 
approve the sale of water to the non-agricultural user.  The irrigation district plans to spend the 
money made from the sale to upgrading its infrastructure to result in increased water use 
efficiency. 
[**For Private Irrigators AND Both if Scr5 answer is Private License**] 
In the following scenario, a non-agricultural user has approached you to buy some of your water 
allocation.   
C1. 
Using a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 being “extremely negative”, 7 being “extremely positive” and 4 
being “neutral” please indicate what you think about the potential outcomes of a permanent sale 
of water: 
 
Extremely 
Negative 
Neutral Extremely 
Positive 
a. Move water away from 
agriculture. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b. Satisfy the water demands of a 
municipality. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Satisfy the water demands of 
an industry. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Increase water use efficiency. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. A 10% holdback of the traded 
volume to meet water 
conservation objectives. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Less water for irrigation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. [**District Irrigators AND 
Both if Scr5 answer is 
District]. 
Irrigation infrastructure 
improvements. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. [**Private Irrigators AND 
Both if Scr5 answer is 
Private License]. 
Money made from the sale. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Part 6 – Subjective Norms 
C2. 
O.K. now using a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 being “strongly disagree”, 7 being “strongly agree” and 4 
being “neither agree nor disagree” state your level of agreement with the following statements  
about  what other people would think about a permanent sale of water. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. Members of your family would 
think it’s a good idea 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b. Members of your community 
would think it’s a good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. The government would think 
it’s a good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Your neighbours and friends 
would think it’s a good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Members of agricultural 
communities and organizations 
would think it’s a good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Recreational users of rivers and 
streams would think it’s a good 
idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Professionals, scientists and 
members of environmental 
groups would think it’s a good 
idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Other irrigators around where 
you live would think it’s a 
good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. [**For District Irrigators 
AND Both**] 
Your irrigation district would 
think it’s a good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Part 7 – Control and Social Acceptance Statements 
C3.  
For the next statements, with a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 being “not at all”, and 7 being “very much” 
please indicate how much each of these factors would influence your decision to approve of a 
permanent transfer of water.   
 
 
Not at all  Very Much 
a. Uncertainty about the costs and 
benefits associated with the 
sale. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b. Plans to expand your farming 
operation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Annual precipitation patterns. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Rising or declining commodity 
prices. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Rising or declining operations 
costs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Having a successor lined up for 
your farm. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Growing water demand from 
industry. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Uncertainty about the future of 
your farm. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Growing water demand from 
communities. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. Environmental water demands. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Part 8 – Past Behaviour and Behavioural Intentions 
D1. 
Now, on a scale of 1-7 with 1 being “highly unlikely”, 7 being “highly likely” and 4 being 
“uncertain” please state the probability that you will do the following actions over the next five 
years assuming that the opportunity for each action arises, and in particular, assuming that the 
scenario mentioned before occurs. 
 
Highly 
Unlikely 
Uncertain Highly Likely 
a. Purchase a lease of water. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b. Permanently buy water. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Sell a lease of water. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Permanently sell some of your 
water allocation. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. [**For District Irrigators 
and Both] 
Vote ‘yes’ in a plebiscite to 
permanently sell some district 
water to outside of the district. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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D2. 
Now, related to the previous questions, have you done any of the following actions over the last 
five years? 
a. Leased out water? 
1      Yes. 
2      No. 
3    Refuse to Answer. 
b. Permanently sold water? 
1      Yes. 
2    No. 
3    Refuse to Answer. 
 
c. Purchased a lease of water? 
1      Yes. 
2    No. 
3    Refuse to Answer. 
 
d. Permanently bought water? 
1      Yes. 
2    No. 
3    Refuse to Answer. 
 
[**For District Irrigators and Both**] 
e. Has your irrigation district held a plebiscite in the last five years regarding a sale of water, 
and if so, what did you vote in that plebiscite? 
1      Yes; I voted yes. 
2    Yes; I voted no. 
3    No my irrigation district did not have a plebiscite in the last five years. 
4    Yes; I did not vote in the plebiscite 
5     Uncertain 
6     Refuse to Answer 
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Part 9 – Demographics and Farm Specifics 
Thank you very much we are just about finished the survey.  Now I will just ask you some very 
brief questions about yourself and your farm that will take another couple minutes. 
E1. 
DO NOT READ – Record Gender 
(Please select one) 
 
1 Male 
2 Female 
 
E2. 
 
In what year were you born? 
 
  ___________ 
 
-8 Refused 
 
E3. 
 
What is your marital status? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 Single and never married 
2 Legally married 
3 Common-law 
4 Separated 
5 Divorced 
6 Widowed 
 
-8 Refused 
 
E4. 
 
How many children do you have? 
 
  ___________ 
 
-8 Refused 
E5. 
Do you have a successor lined up for your farm? 
(Please select one) 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Uncertain 
4 Refused to Answer 
 191 
 

 
E6 
 
What type of certificate, diploma or degree did you receive? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 Secondary (high school) diploma or equivalency certificate 
2 College or other non-university certificate diploma (including apprenticeship or trade) 
3 University Bachelor's Degree 
54 University Master's or Doctorate degree 
5   None of the above 
 
-8 Refused 
 
E7 
 
What was your approximate net annual household income as of 2011? 
 
  1   Less than $40,000 
2  $40,000 – less than $80,000 
3  $80,000 – less than $120,000 
4  $120,000 – less than $160,000 
5  $160,000 – less than $200,000 
6   $200,000 or more   
-8 Refused 
 
E8 
 
How much of your net income is derived from the use of your land,in percentage? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 0 to less than 25% 
2 25% to less than 50% 
3 50% to less than 75% 
4 75% to less than 100% 
 
-8 Refused 
E9 
 
Were you raised in a rural setting? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
-8 Refused 
 
E10 
 
Up to and including yourself, how many generations has your land been in your family?  
 
  ___________ 
 
-8 Refused 
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E11 
 
How many acres of land do you farm? 
 
  ___________acres 
 
-8 Refused 
 
E12 
How many irrigated acres of land do you farm? 
___________acres 
 
-8 Refused 
 
E13 
 
What are the primary uses of your irrigated land (such as crops grown) and how many irrigated 
acres do you have of each during the 2011 growing season? 
 
(Check those that apply) 

1  Forage crops, _______ acres. 
2  Pastureland, ________ acres 
3  Potatoes, ________ acres 
4  Sugar Beets, _________ acres 
5  Oilseeds, _________ acres 
6  Other Specialty Crops (Specify), __________ acres 
7  Cereal Crops (not for forage), __________ acres 
8  Others not mentioned (Specify), __________ acres 
 
9 Refused 
 
 
E14 
Do your irrigated crops support another part of your operation, for example providing feed for 
livestock? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Uncertain 
4 Refused to Answer 
 
[If Yes, ask E15] 
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Which part of your operation does your irrigated crop support? (Check those that apply) 
1 Cow-calf 
2 Feedlot 
3 Other (Specify) __________ 
4 Refused to Answer 
 
E16 
Can you estimate the percentage of irrigated acres irrigated by the following equipment 
categories 
1 Gravity/Flood _______ %  
2 Wheel move _______ % 
3 Low pressure pivot (under 30 psi)  __________ % 
4 High pressure pivot (30 psi or more) _________ %  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 194 
 
E17 
Below is a list of activities that can possibly improve water use efficiency.  Please indicate 
whether you have done any of these over the past five years, or intend to do so over the next five 
years (Check those that apply). 
Action Last Five 
Years 
Next Five Years Next Five 
Years 
a. Convert from flood/gravity to 
wheel move. 
Yes No  Unsure  Yes No 
b. Convert from wheel move to 
pivot irrigation. 
Yes No  Unsure  Yes No 
c. Convert from flood/gravity to 
pivot irrigation. 
Yes No  Unsure  Yes No 
d. Convert from high pressure 
pivot system to low pressure 
pivot system. 
Yes No  Unsure  Yes No 
e. Purchase a computer panel for 
your pivot system. 
 
Yes No  Unsure  Yes No 
f. Start to use AIMM or IMCIN 
to schedule irrigation. (If asked 
what these acronyms mean, 
definitions are provided in 
Appendix A.) 
 
Yes No  Unsure  Yes No 
g. Start to use private consultants 
to support irrigation decision 
making. 
Yes No  Unsure  Yes No 
 
E18 
Do you intend to buy more land over the next five years? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Uncertain 
4 Refused to Answer 
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[If ‘Yes’ ask E19 ], 
Do you intend to buy dryland or irrigated land? 
1 Dryland 
2 Irrigated land 
3 Both dryland and irrigated land 
4 Uncertain 
5  Refused to answer 
E20 
Are you a member of WPAC or a Watershed Stewardship Group? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
-8 Refused 
 
E21 
Are you a member of an environmental or conservation group such as Ducks Unlimited, Trout 
Unlimited, Alberta Eco-Trust Foundation, etc?) 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
-8 Refused 
 
E22 
Are you a member of a recreational or social organization such as minor hockey, 4-H, the rotary 
club, etc? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
-8 Refused 
 
[If “Yes” to E21 or E22 ask E23:] 
How many hours do you spend in an average month participating in the recreational, social or 
environmental organizations that you belong to? 
_______________ hours.  
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Part 8 – End 
Alright, thank you for your time. That concludes the questionnaire. Your participation is much 
appreciated, and a short report summarizing the results of the survey will be published on the 
internet at www.waterresearch.net in advance of the final results being published as part of a 
Master’s Thesis as well as in professional and academic journals.  But again, your responses will 
be kept strictly confidential and you will remain anonymous. As for the prize draw, if you are the 
winner we will notify you via phone call sometime early in the New Year.  
 
[**For District Irrigators Only**] 
 
Our group at the University of Lethbridge is conducting another study involving district 
irrigators. We would therefore like to ask if you are willing to be contacted again for further 
research involvement. Since you have already responded to this survey, the next one would be 
shorter because you have already responded to some of the same questions.  
Would you like to be contacted again to participate in the other study? 
 
Yes – ([if Yes: Say: your participation is much appreciated. When would be a good time 
to call back?]) 
No – ([If No: Say: thanks anyway, your participation is much appreciated]) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A – List of Irrigation Districts and Definitions 
1. Western Irrigation District (WID) 
2. Eastern Irrigation District (EID) 
3. Bow River Irrigation District (BRID) 
 197 
 
4. Saint Mary Irrigation District (SMRID) 
5. United Irrigation District (UID) 
6. Lethbridge Northern Irrigation District (LNID) 
7. Ross Creek Irrigation District (RCID) 
8. Taber Irrigation District (TID) 
9. Magrath Irrigation District (MID) 
10. Raymond Irrigation District (RID) 
11. Leavitt Irrigation District (LID) 
12. Aetna Irrigation District (AID) 
13. Mountain View Irrigation District (MVID) 
 
Water conservation objective (WCO) -  A volume and quality of water to remain in rivers for 
the protection of a natural water body and its aquatic environment.  WCO’s are set by water 
management plans for various rivers in Alberta.   
AIMM – Alberta Irrigation Management model.  It is a decision support tool software package 
that assists irrigation producers with their irrigation scheduling decisions. 
IMCIN – Irrigation Management Climate Information Network.  A network intended to provide 
the irrigation industry in Alberta with up-to-date information on Irrigated Crop Water Use and 
Decision Support Tools to help irrigators make on farm water management decisions. 
 
